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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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USSR REPORT  
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No. 2, 1980

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO  
VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute,  
USSR Academy of Sciences.

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LENINISM AND THE CHINA PROBLEM

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## ANTISOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY LINE OF THE PRC IN RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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[Article by Professor V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] A large group of countries, conventionally called the developing or liberated countries, entered the sphere of international relations after World War II. Despite their many common socioeconomic and political features, these countries are on various levels of development, differ considerably from one another and therefore do not represent any kind of single entity. Most of them are located in three regions--Africa (51 states), Asia (32 states) and Latin America (30 states). The countries of each region have their own distinctive features and peculiarities.

The developing countries are becoming increasingly important in contemporary international relations with each year. The problem of the developing countries is now one of the most important and urgent issues in world politics. This is due to many factors. In the first place, they constitute the majority of sovereign states in today's world (more than 110 of the total 160). In the second place, their total population exceeds 2 billion, or more than 50 percent of the world population. In the third place, these countries account for almost 60 percent of the earth's territory and they have abundant reserves of minerals and other scarce raw materials: The developing countries account for 30 percent of world exports of 24 types of mineral and agricultural raw materials, and 80 percent of 12 types. In the fourth place, these countries are actively fighting for complete national liberation, political sovereignty and equality, economic independence, just international economic relations, security and peace--that is, they represent a dynamic anti-imperialist and antineocolonial force in the world arena. In the fifth place, a struggle is going on in many of these countries for social progress and democracy, and future paths of development are being investigated. The majority of these states connect this investigation with national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle, and some countries are taking the socialist path. In the sixth place, in their confrontation with imperialism and neocolonialism, these countries are tending more and more to act collectively, they are uniting and they are establishing their own movements,

organizations and associations, all of which is increasing their influence in international relations. In the seventh place, it would now be impossible to solve such global problems as the fight against nuclear proliferation and environmental pollution and others without the developing countries. In the eighth place, the development of their economies is increasing their influence on international economic relations and, in particular, on world trade.

At the same time, most of the developing countries are experiencing serious economic, social and political difficulties due to underdeveloped means of production, the agrarian, often single-crop, nature of their economies, the poverty of their populations, their shortage of capital, unemployment, archaic social structures, political instability, traditional peculiarities of public thinking and illiteracy. These factors are diminishing the developing countries' capability to influence international affairs and the effectiveness of their struggle against imperialism.

It is exceptionally significant that the developing countries entered the world arena in an era when the world split into two diametrically opposed social systems--socialism and capitalism. Moreover, the birth and increasing strength of socialism were, in the final analysis, the main precondition for the birth and increasing strength of the developing countries in the system of contemporary international relations. For this reason, the entire history of the developing countries is inseparable from the process of struggle between socialism and capitalism in the world arena. This struggle demands that they choose their course of internal development and foreign policy within the context of confrontation between the two basic socioeconomic systems of the present day.

As for the treatment of the developing countries by socialism and capitalism, their positions are diametrically opposed. Capitalism has traditionally been the enslaver, oppressor and exploiter of the present developing countries and it must bear most of the responsibility for their underdevelopment and the difficulties they are experiencing. What is more, capitalism is still oppressing these countries. If they enter the system of capitalist economic relations, they suffer from inequality and exploitation. This means that the basic interests and goals of the developed capitalist countries and the developing states in the area of international relations are objectively different and opposed to one another. Conversely, the basic interests and goals of the socialist and developing countries in the international arena are identical or similar. These are the struggle for peace, detente, just economic international relations, democracy and social progress. Relations between the socialist and developing countries are based on the principles of independence, equality, mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. It should be stressed that these principles became part of the system of international relations through massive efforts on the part of the socialist countries.

In the 1970's, serious changes took place in the developing countries and in their status in the system of international relations. This forced imperialism to make adjustments in its neocolonial policy. The decade of the 1970's demonstrated that imperialism would have to give more consideration to the developing countries, accept the fact of their growing influence and take steps to establish good relations with them. However, although imperialism realized that the economic progress and even the industrial development of the liberated countries were inevitable, it tried to impede social and political progress in these countries and to establish control over their economic development. Furthermore, its desire to preserve the developing countries' dependence on imperialism often compelled it to agree to economic modernization and quicker development in these countries and to plan a new neocolonial strategy. In connection with this, imperialism is trying to "perfect" the neocolonial forms and methods of its policy and to impose its concepts of "interdependence" on the developing countries in order to ensure that these ties serve the interests of the developed capitalist states. This policy is aimed at strengthening capitalism's positions in the world's "outlying districts." This new neocolonial strategy, however, cannot stop social and political progress in the developing countries. This is why the tendency to use force in dealing with the developing countries became more pronounced in the United States and several other NATO countries at the end of the 1970's. Evidently, the strategy of imperialism is undergoing new revisions both on the global scale and with respect to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

All of this naturally gives rise to questions about PRC policy toward the developing countries. What goals is it pursuing and which of the opposing sociopolitical systems will it ultimately serve?

As we know, the People's Republic of China made its appearance in the world arena in 1949--that is, almost simultaneously with many of the developing countries, although it had little in common with them in terms of modern and contemporary socioeconomic and historical development. Now it is one of the largest states in today's world, covering an area of 9,597,520 square kilometers (around 25 percent of Asia), with a population of 1 billion. China has abundant natural resources and a large army equipped with nuclear weapons. Its influence in the world arena has also increased gradually, and it now has a significant effect on international relations.

After going through three basic stages in the development of its foreign policy (identification with the USSR and the socialist community in 1949-1959, identification with the developing countries in 1960-1970, and identification primarily with the developed capitalist countries in 1970-1980), the PRC is now conducting a great-power social-chauvinistic policy line in the international arena. Its foreign policy is distinguished by clearly expressed hegemonism, expansionism, aggressiveness, and hostility toward the USSR and the entire socialist community (this last feature was

most distinctly reflected in the form of Beijing's overt aggression against the SRV). Moreover, all of the basic features of PRC foreign policy are derivatives of its chief characteristic--belligerent chauvinism. Another traditional characteristic of Chinese foreign policy is its emphasis on stratagems--that is, long-range or short-range intrigues and plans concerning China's bilateral, regional and global relations in the international arena.

A tremendous role in the engineering of contemporary PRC foreign policy, its strategies and tactics was played by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Today's Chinese leaders have stressed numerous times that Mao Zedong was personally responsible for working out the "line, course and political aims" of Chinese foreign policy and that they will "continue their resolute implementation."

Speaking at the 25th CPSU Congress, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev noted that any strategy "begins with the setting of priorities, with the definition of fundamental, long-range goals." <sup>1</sup> What fundamental, long-range goals are the Chinese leaders pursuing in the international arena? This goal was clearly defined by Mao Zedong in September 1959 at a confidential military-diplomatic conference held in the heyday of the "Three Red Banners" policy, when it seemed to the Chinese leaders that they would definitely accomplish a great leap forward in national economic development and thereby create the necessary conditions for the implementation of their global schemes. At that time, Mao Zedong frankly said: "We must conquer the world. Our object is the entire world, where we will establish a strong empire." <sup>2</sup>

Therefore, the main strategic goal of Maoism is world supremacy for China. It is obvious that this goal cannot openly be declared the foreign policy objective of the PRC and made known to the world public. This is why the formulas used to define this goal in statements by Chinese leaders, in official party and state documents and in propaganda are on the order of "the liberation of all mankind" from exploitation, a "comparatively great contribution to the cause of civilization" and so forth.

When the Chinese leadership announced that "conquering the world" was its main strategic goal, this unavoidably made all states with substantial influence in the international arena potential adversaries of the PRC, as Beijing viewed them as main obstacles in its way. Beijing regards the Soviet Union as China's strongest and most dangerous global adversary. This is why the foreign policy strategy of the Maoists is directed primarily against the USSR.

Beijing's long-range foreign policy strategy is not only based on an absolutely distorted view of international relations, but is also completely inconsistent with China's actual economic, scientific, technical, military and other capabilities. The Chinese leadership's realization of this fact is what caused it to recognize the need to accomplish "four modernizations"--that is, the modernization of industry, agriculture, the



military, and science and technology--as quickly as possible, so as to turn China into a modern and powerful state by the year 2000. In this way, the attainment of its final strategic goal has been postponed to 2000 at the earliest.

When the global strategy of Maoism is analyzed, the question arises: What place do the developing countries occupy in it? This depends, firstly, on the status, potential and role of the developing countries in contemporary international relations and, secondly, on the nature, goals, status and potential of PRC foreign policy, both in the international arena in general and in relations with the developing countries in particular. The PRC's present chief objective in its policy toward the developing countries is to win them over to its side, use them in the interests of its own strategy and tactics and involve them in the global struggle in the international arena against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. In connection with this, the emphasis on struggle against "hegemonism" is acquiring particular significance in PRC foreign policy toward the developing countries. With the aid of this, the Chinese leaders hope to turn the anti-imperialist feelings and struggle in the developing countries against the Soviet Union.

The foreign policy strategy of the Chinese leadership was developed over a long period of time, and its development was connected from the very beginning with China's feelings about the countries that are now called the developing states. It could be said that the foundations of this strategy were already being laid at the end of the 1930's, when Mao Zedong constructed his theory of "new democracy."

Apparently, Mao Zedong and his closest associates had essentially completed the construction of their strategic plans by the early 1950's and later adjusted these plans in accordance with developments in China and the world situation.

One of the goals of Maoist strategy was the establishment of Maoist ideological, political and socioeconomic models outside China. As early as the 1950's, the Chinese leaders were already viewing the colonial and semicolonial countries in general, and the Asian countries in particular, as objects of Maoist ideological and political expansion in the belief that these countries would be the easiest place to cultivate Maoism. It was these countries that Mao Zedong had in mind when he developed his model of "new democracy," which should have become, in his opinion, compulsory for the colonial and semicolonial countries. In 1940, he wrote that the form of "government" he had discovered--"the new democratic republic"--would be a "necessary and compulsory" form "in all colonial and semicolonial countries."<sup>3</sup> The Chinese model of the revolutionary process was being engineered and perfected at the same time, and it was also considered by Beijing to be compulsory for these countries.

Consequently, the PRC's relationship with the developing countries was colored, firstly, by the tendency of the Chinese leadership to view these countries as objects which it could control with relative ease and which

would submit to Chinese hegemony, first in Asia and later in Africa and Latin America, and, secondly, by the fact that the Chinese leaders hoped to make these countries their allies in a lengthy struggle--that is, the struggle against all developed states without exception.

These expectations caused the Maoists to call the developing countries the "main force" in the contemporary struggle in the international arena. Beijing's policy toward the developing countries and their populations in the 1950's and 1960's was built on the expectation of using, for hegemonistic purposes, the objective revolutionary processes taking place in these countries and the desire of these countries and populations for liberation, independence and social progress, and of taking advantage of their resulting conflicts with imperialism.

Proceeding from this, the Chinese leadership expected to compel the developing countries to accept the Chinese model of revolution, followed by socioeconomic reforms in the spirit of the Maoist policy of "new democracy" and Maoist pseudo-socialism.

These plans were clearly expressed by Guo Moruo in a poem written in 1967:

China's yesterday is the today of  
Many Afro-Asian countries,  
And China's today  
Will be their tomorrow,  
We will fight for the total liberation of  
Oppressed countries and peoples,  
We will raise the great red banner of the Thought of Mao Zedong  
Over all Afro-Asian countries,  
Over all five continents and four oceans.<sup>4</sup>

In Maoist strategy, therefore, the developing countries were regarded as China's chief ally and the main force in a lengthy struggle. They were supposed to deliver a "decisive and crushing blow to the entire old world" (Mao Zedong). The Maoists believed that "the main conflicts in the world will be conflicts between the people of Asia and Africa and the people of Europe and America" (Mao Zedong). This means that in China the basic contradiction of the present era was not viewed from a class standpoint, but from nationalistic and even racial positions.

It should be noted that the Maoists' hope of relying on the developing countries in the struggle for world supremacy was not an original idea. Other Chinese nationalists, whose ideas were expressed by Dai Jitao, Chiang Kai-shek and others, had similar plans. Both groups hoped to use the national liberation struggle of these countries against the developed capitalist states in their own interest and to place their revolutionary potential and hatred for foreign oppressors at their own service.

Besides this, the Chinese leaders evidently believed that China would have little difficulty in making the developing countries follow its example. When the Maoists worked out their foreign policy strategy, they considered a variety of ways in which China could gradually expand its dominion in the world. Considering the comparative weakness of China, its foreign policy traditions and other factors, it is probable that the Chinese leaders hoped to first establish a system of states close to China, built according to the Chinese political and ideological model.

Judging by some statements by Chinese leaders and diplomats, they regarded the resolution of regional strategic problems in direct proximity to China as one of the preconditions for the ultimate realization of their global strategic plans. In 1975, Qiao Guanhua, who was then the PRC minister of foreign affairs and a close associate of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, announced: "China is now fighting a war in the vicinity of its outposts. When we have established order in these outposts, we will begin to resolutely fight our enemies." Moreover, this system was supposed to begin not by means of open and overt aggression, but primarily the covert ideological and political infiltration of these countries, their disintegration from within with the aid of pro-Chinese political forces (including Chinese emigrants) and the creation of political systems based on Maoism in these countries. After this, the other Asian, African and Latin American states were also supposed to be placed under Chinese political control.

The Chinese leaders could not agree on methods of infiltrating the developing countries. Mao Zedong and his closest associates were inclined to favor the tactic of creating a "united front from below" in these countries--that is, the use of revolutionary forces and popular movements in Chinese interests. Liu Shaoqi and his supporters wanted to influence primarily governments and statesmen with the aim of convincing them to cooperate with China in the creation of a "united front from above."

There is reason to believe that the Chinese leadership hoped to first create a system of states based on the Maoist political and ideological model in Southeast Asia. The reasons for the choice of this region were its geographic location, its abundant natural resources, the traditional southward direction of Chinese expansion and the presence of millions of Chinese emigrants in this region. It was precisely this last factor that could considerably simplify the ideological and political infiltration of the region by Maoism and the institution of political systems based on Maoism.

The Chinese leadership began to take practical steps toward the implementation of this regional strategic plan as early as the end of the 1940's, when it tried to establish control over national liberation movements by imposing the Chinese model of the revolutionary process on them. It was in the first half of the 1950's, however, that the Chinese leadership was particularly active here. In the mid-1960's, Beijing called

southeast Asia the "eye of the revolutionary storms" of today's world and the center of "all world conflicts." The Chinese leadership was particularly active in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Kampuchea. Beijing tried to start "people's wars" in many of these countries and intervened flagrantly in the internal affairs of Nepal, India, Ceylon, Laos and other states.

In spite of Beijing's tremendous efforts, however, this policy produced no positive results.

In 1965 the foreign policy strategy of Maoism in relations with the developing countries was reflected in the theory of the struggle between the "rural world" (the Asian, African and Latin American states) against the "urban world" (the states of North America and Western Europe, including the Soviet Union, which Beijing categorized as a European state) by means of the launching of "people's wars." It is indicative that this theory was thoroughly substantiated in the Chinese press on 3 September 1965--that is, not long before the well-known events in Indonesia--and represented, as it were, the ideological and theoretical preparation for them. This was an attempt to implement the Chinese leadership's most important foreign policy regional design in Asia, where it planned an entire series of political actions connected with the attempted coup d'etat in Indonesia on 30 September 1965, the Indo-Pakistani military conflict and the struggle of the Indochinese people for their national independence and social progress. The successful completion of these actions was supposed to, according to Beijing's plans, fundamentally change the military and political situation in Southeast Asia and, consequently, in East Asia as a whole, and establish Chinese control first over Indonesia, then over other Southeast Asian states and, finally, over India.

The failure of these actions dealt a severe blow to the plans of the Maoists in Asia, intensified their internal fighting and stimulated the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC. This, however, did not cause the Chinese leadership to renounce its regional strategic plans in Asia, but it did necessitate certain changes in these plans in line with the new international situation in this part of the world.

The inconsistency of Maoist strategy in regard to the developing countries after the events of fall 1965 in Indonesia was most distinctly reflected in its complete failure in the years of the "Cultural Revolution," when a massive effort was made to openly force the experience of the "Cultural Revolution" and the Maoist model of socioeconomic and political organization on many developing countries. The attempts to export the "Cultural Revolution" were pointedly resisted in the developing countries, led Beijing foreign policy in these countries into a blind alley and forced the Chinese leaders to revise their line in relations with the developing countries.



Did this mean that the developing countries had lost their place in the strategic plans of the Chinese leaders? No, it did not mean this. They were still assigned the role of the "main force" in the struggle for Chinese interests, but it was decided to postpone the performance of this role until such time as the PRC would itself become a "superpower" and have the ability to effectively influence the developing countries economically.

Consequently, the place and role of the developing countries in the long-range goals of Beijing foreign policy have not changed. Beijing expects to reorganize the contemporary international economic and political order and, in this way, to take the leading place in the world arena, backed up primarily by the developing countries.

A new stage in PRC foreign policy began in the 1970's--a stage of increasingly open rapprochement with imperialism and other reactionary forces in the international arena. Policy toward the developing countries has also undergone changes. Naturally, these changes were, as always, camouflaged by revolutionary phrases, graphically illustrated by the use of the "theory of the three worlds." Nonetheless, since the beginning of the 1970's the Chinese leadership has muffled propaganda about the "urban world" encircling the "rural world" and other ultra-revolutionary theses.

In PRC policy toward the developing countries, there is an increasingly strong tendency not only to create "united fronts from above," but also to form alliances with the most conservative, reactionary governments in the developing countries, such as the Pinochet and Sadat governments and others. This does not mean, however, that the Chinese leadership has decided not to intervene in the internal affairs of the developing countries or support various opposition, anti-government movements for the purpose of exerting pressure on these governments. On the other hand, Maoism's barracks socialism was completely discredited in the 1970's, meaning that the Chinese leadership had to refrain temporarily from advertising the Chinese "model" of socioeconomic development in the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

It should be noted that the Chinese leadership's interest in the developing countries began to increase noticeably in the mid-1970's after these countries began to actively demand the reorganization of international economic relations and exert pressure on the developed capitalist countries by raising the prices of minerals and other commodities. "The developing countries now have access to new means of struggle, they are waging this struggle on a broader scale and they can now gradually work toward cooperation and concerted action in the common struggle"--this was the conclusion drawn by Chinese strategists, who stressed that these countries "established numerous regional or specialized international organizations for a collective struggle in defense of their common rights and interests." Proceeding from this, Beijing officials apparently concluded that the developing countries could have a strong effect on contemporary economic and political conditions in the world, could deprive the developed

countries of "resources" if necessary, and could thereby exercise exceptional influence in the contemporary international situation. In other words, the developing countries could change the role and importance of the developed countries in today's world, which, given the presence of huge quantities of human and natural resources in China, would guarantee it the leading role in international relations. This is why Beijing persistently stresses the "common objectives" of China and the developing countries and declares that its long-range interests in the international arena are inseparable from the interests of the developing countries. What is more, the Chinese leaders are assuring the developing countries that China will make a special contribution "to the development of the Third World countries" when it is a strong power at the beginning of the next century.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the 1970's, significant adjustments were made in Chinese strategy in regard to the Asian, African and Latin American countries, and intermediate strategic goals were determined. The Chinese leadership's correction of its strategy toward the developing countries in the 1970's was conducted with a view to the present state and future prospects of PRC relations with the United States, the developed European capitalist countries and Japan; the increasing hegemonism in the policy of the United States and other NATO countries; the crisis in the world capitalist system and neocolonialism's new march on the developing countries, initiated under the influence of this crisis for the purpose of transferring the burden to the Asian, African and Latin American countries. One increasingly noticeable feature of the new tactic of neocolonialism in relation to the developing countries is the emphasis on creating a system of so-called "dependent capitalism" by means of "supranational corporations," the active involvement of these countries in international capitalist division of labor, the intensification of social differentiation within these countries, the reinforcement of the bourgeois class and certain concessions to this class in the interests of the development of "dependent capitalism." There is no question that the Chinese leadership is taking this new economic and social tactic into account and is striving to act in accordance with this in the hope of undermining the developing countries' contacts with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

It is also obvious that the hegemonistic "Carter Doctrine" was born and took shape in indissoluble connection with this neocolonial tactic, accompanied by the buildup of U.S. military strength, primarily in Asia, in the Pacific and Indian oceans. At the same time, the United States, in Z. Brzezinski's words, is striving to establish "closer relations" with "powers of great significance on the regional and international levels," primarily referring to Russia. In other words, steps were taken to involve these "powers" in the hegemonistic U.S. policy toward the developing countries. Moreover, these steps produced results in the case of the PRC, which was reflected in Beijing's political support of the buildup of U.S. military strength in the world arena, directed not only against the USSR and the socialist community, but also against national liberation

movements and social progress in the developing countries. When Z. Brzezinski, the American President's national security adviser, visited the PRC in May 1978, he unequivocally mentioned the "parallel interests" and actions of the United States and China in Africa and Asia. The Indian newspaper VISALA ANDHRA reported on 6 February 1979 that the United States had been able to make China "a partner in its imperialist strategy against the USSR and the socialist countries, against the national liberation movement and against world peace."

In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the PRC is becoming increasingly dependent, economically and otherwise, on the developed capitalist countries, whose policy toward China resembles their neocolonial line in relations with the developing countries--that is, the policy of establishing "dependent capitalism," the reinforcement of bourgeois elements and tendencies, and intensive involvement in the system of international capitalist economic relations. This means that the PRC's intermediary strategy in relations with the developing countries is objectively serving the strategy and interests of imperialism and now actually represents an element of this strategy or an addition to it. As for the intermediate strategic goals of PRC foreign policy with regard to the developing countries in the present and, to all indications, in the next 10 years, the most important are the following:

To depict China as a developing country and to turn it into the leader of the developing countries for reliance on them in the struggle for hegemonic goals in the international arena, primarily against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community;

To undermine the friendship and cooperation of the developing countries with the USSR and the entire socialist community and to impede the development of relations between the liberated countries and the USSR;

To unite the developing countries on the platform of the "common struggle" against "hegemonism" (that is, against the USSR and the socialist community) in some kind of "anti-hegemonic alliance" headed by China and to merge this alliance with a corresponding alliance of the developed capitalist countries in a "broad united front" of struggle against the USSR and the socialist community; to support, in connection with this, existing or potential political and military blocs of imperialist countries;

To undermine the developing countries' movement in defense of peace, detente and security;

To draw the developing countries into the arms race in order to slow down their economic and social progress, exacerbate relations or create tension between them, increase their dependence on the PRC and heighten the possibility of conflicts and wars;

To divide the developing countries into isolated and opposed groups to weaken their unity and conduct policy according to the "divide and conquer" principle;

To fight against the national liberation movement and social progress in the developing countries, particularly in those cases when they lead these countries onto a socialist path; to support, in connection with this, the most reactionary antisocialist regimes and the corresponding political forces, playing up nationalism and racism;

To infiltrate the international organizations and movements of the developing countries for the purpose of subverting them from within and exerting the necessary influence on them;

To use economic relations with the developing countries primarily for the purpose of exerting the necessary political influence on them, conquering their markets, attaching them to the Chinese economy, and acquiring the free currency needed to cover the deficit in economic relations with the developed capitalist countries;

To intensify influence on the developing countries through the establishment of official bilateral political, scientific, technical and cultural contacts;

To intensify influence on the developing countries by using unofficial channels of interference in internal affairs, ethnic strife, internal political fighting, and Chinese emigration;

To use the developing countries to strengthen the regional influence of the PRC and its international influence in general by creating "support" states in Asia and Africa (Pakistan and Tanzania) and by supporting imperialism's "support states" (Egypt, Pakistan and others).

The above-listed intermediate goals of Beijing strategy with regard to the developing countries testify that they are largely parallel, and often partially or fully coincide, with the goals of imperialism's present neo-colonial strategy. It is also possible that some of them were jointly set by Beijing and Washington strategists (for example, the struggle against the USSR and the socialist countries under the guise of struggle against hegemonism). The fact that Beijing's strategic goals are identical or similar to imperialism's objectives with regard to the developing countries naturally heightens their danger considerably for world socialism, the national liberation movement and social progress on the one hand and, on the other, diminishes the possibility of their attainment because it exposes the actual pro-imperialist, chauvinistic and hegemonistic purpose of PRC foreign policy toward the developing countries. In the struggle for influence in the developing countries, the Chinese leadership is certainly not averse to establishing its absolute supremacy there even now, if the opportunity should arise. Corroboration of this fact can be seen in the establishment of the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, overtaken in 1979 by the Kampuchean people with the aid of the SRV.



It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of these intermediate goals are political in nature. This means that Beijing's strategy toward the developing countries is now primarily a political strategy (supplemented by economic measures), while imperialism's strategy toward the developing countries is mainly an economic strategy, although it recently also began to acquire an increasingly political nature. Consequently, there is some indication of a certain distribution of duties regarding the developing countries between the developed capitalist countries and China. With the aid of the latter, imperialism is trying to solve certain political and ideological problems in the developing countries which, for one reason or another, it will not or cannot solve. Therefore, it is a justifiable conclusion that Beijing's foreign policy strategy toward the developing countries now represents an important addition to the anti-socialist strategy of imperialism.

The adjustments made by the Chinese leadership in its strategy in the 1970's and its vigorous political, propagandistic and economic pressure on the developing countries, with imperialism's support, contributed to the establishment and development of bilateral relations between the PRC and a number of these countries. By the beginning of the 1980's, China had diplomatic relations with more than 80 liberated states (22 in Asia, 45 in Africa and 14 in Latin America). A characteristic feature of this process in the 1970's was the establishment of contacts with any regime, regardless of its policy and ideology.

In 1958 the PRC began to conclude bilateral political agreements with the developing countries. By 1965, it had signed such agreements with 11 states: Yemen, Burma, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nepal, Guinea, Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania. The Chinese side viewed these agreements as a means of increasing its influence and isolating the Afro-Asian countries from the socialist community. It has not refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of states with which it not only has diplomatic relations, but has even signed friendship treaties. As a result of this, not one developing state signed a new political agreement with the PRC after 1965. The developing countries are making a conscious effort to limit their political relations with the PRC.

In an attempt to simplify the establishment of its influence in the developing countries, Beijing has advertised its willingness to "establish and develop relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." In fact, however, this kind of declaration is a Chinese diplomatic tactical ruse, aimed at pacifying the developing countries and achieving compromises and agreements with reactionary nationalistic regimes and circles. These agreements are often concluded in secret because they are directed against revolutionary processes and social progress. For example, Beijing's agreement with Cairo for the purpose of military and political cooperation in Africa against "Soviet-Cuban penetration" deserves mention in this connection. It can be assumed that the PRC and Pakistan have the same kind of agreement on joint struggle against revolutionary processes in Afghanistan and other Southwest Asian countries.

In view of the fact that Beijing does not now have the potential to quickly carry out its hegemonistic plans in regard to the developing countries, Chinese diplomacy is aimed at preserving the imperialist influence in them for a specific period of time. Beijing will resort to anything that interferes with the development of the relations of these countries with the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole.

In Beijing's diplomatic relations with the developing countries, visits by Chinese leaders to these countries and visits by the leaders of the developing countries to the PRC play a prominent role. The diplomacy of visits is used to influence the leaders of the developing countries politically and to convince them to accept Chinese foreign policy beliefs and theories directed against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. In 1978-1979 alone, Chinese leaders visited 34 countries and received leaders of 20 developing countries.

As a means of exerting pressure on several Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, the Chinese leadership is continuing to make use of the rebellions provoked by Maoism in Malaysia, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as pro-Maoist groups in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and other countries. With the aid of these forces, Beijing is trying to direct the domestic policy of these states toward struggle against social progress, and their foreign policy toward the support of PRC foreign policy. Chinese emigrants, who often occupy key positions in the economies of these countries, are an important means of exerting pressure on the developing countries.

One of the characteristic features of Maoist political diplomacy in relations with the developing countries in the 1970's was the desire to involve these countries in the struggle against "hegemonism" (that is, the USSR and the other socialist countries) at any cost. The Maoists say absolutely nothing about the prospects and goals of this struggle and painstakingly avoid any discussion of social progress, the non-capitalist course of development and the socialist orientation of these countries. The Chinese leaders are doing this deliberately, as their chief objective has always been to impede these processes in the developing countries, divert them from the struggle for national liberation and independence and push them into confrontations with the Soviet Union and the socialist community--that is, force them to serve the strategic interests of the Chinese leadership. Consequently, Beijing does not even regard the developing countries as a worthy ally in a struggle for common interests, but merely as an instrument of struggle, used temporarily for the attainment of selfish goals. The emphasis on struggle against "hegemonism" simultaneously represents the concealment and disguise of Beijing's actual move toward open alliance with imperialism and reactionary circles in the developing countries for a fight against world socialism.

1. Logical propaganda, which is intended to instill Chinese beliefs on the one hand and, on the other, to discredit scientific socialism and the Soviet Union, still occupy a significant place among the means by which Chinese diplomacy hopes to influence the developing countries.

In conjunction with bourgeois ideologists, the Maoists are trying to force unscientific reactionary theories on the developing countries, preventing the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the growth of the revolutionary process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are stressing the need to cultivate and reinforce the reactionary aspects of nationalism in the developing countries, which lead to national isolation, to alienation from world socialism and the international working class. In this way, Beijing is trying to weaken the influence of the world socialist system on the developing countries, channel the national liberation process onto the petty bourgeois, nationalistic track, and thereby keep the people in the liberated countries from advancing along the path of social progress.

The combination of phony anti-imperialism, "antihegemonism" and genuine nationalism in Maoist ideological concepts has impressed several petty bourgeois leaders in Asia, Africa and Latin America, among whom Beijing is seeking and finding kindred spirits and allies.

Although the slogans of the fight against imperialism, colonialism, racism and Zionism still figure prominently in Chinese propaganda, Beijing's actions cogently testify that the policy of the Chinese leaders and their approach to major problems in the developing countries are radically contrary to the vital interests of the struggle of people for national independence and social progress.

The Chinese leaders are imposing anti-Sovietism on the developing countries as the main facet of "anti-imperialist" struggle. Denying the existence of real socialism and the socialist community, the Maoists are trying to deprive the developing countries of their chief ally in the struggle against imperialism and for national independence and social progress, and interfere in their choice of a socialist identity. Beijing propaganda serves the interests of the antisocialist line and of alliance with imperialism, with anticommunists of various types, with the regimes of racist-fascist cliques and with reactionary nationalist forces.

It is completely obvious that the intermediate goals of Beijing foreign policy strategy are contrary to the vital interests of the developing countries and to the policy of the majority of these countries in the international arena, and the PRC's struggle for their attainment therefore cannot aid in strengthening China's prestige and influence among the developing countries and will inevitably complicate these relations. This, however, is not always reflected overtly and acquires a political nature primarily because the Chinese leadership binds the developing countries with its economic diplomacy and active political tactics. Besides this, the developing countries must consider the fact that the majority of Beijing's intermediate foreign policy goals are supported by the developed capitalist countries, which are capable of exerting strong economic and political pressure on the developing countries.

A significant role in the PRC's economic relations with the developing countries is played by trade (it has been growing rapidly since the early 1970's; furthermore, PRC exports are growing approximately twice as fast as imports), as well as the offer of economic assistance, but this is declining. In general, however, the significance of the economic factor in PRC relations with the developing countries increased through the 1970's and will continue to do so in the 1980's. The reasons for this are that, in the first place, the Chinese leadership has set the goal of turning China into a modern and powerful state by the year 2000 in order to close the military and economic gap between China and the more developed countries in today's world. This cannot be done without imports of plants, equipment, machines and scientific and technical information. In connection with this, trade with the developing countries is of exceptional importance to the PRC because it provides a way of covering much of the deficit in the balance of trade with the developed capitalist states. This means that PRC exports to the developing countries will increase in coming years, and the Chinese leadership will make a vigorous attempt to use trade relations and economic assistance for broader economic penetration of the developing countries, necessary for the augmentation of exports. Just as before, dumping and commercial credit will be the principal ways of increasing exports to the developing countries and expanding economic penetration.

The more active economic contacts between the PRC and the developing countries are also largely due to the increasing interest in acquiring several raw materials from the markets of the developing countries: rubber, cotton, copper, phosphates and others.

The heightened significance of the economic factor in PRC relations with the developing countries is connected with the more important economic role of the developing countries in the world arena, with the energy and raw material crisis and with the struggle of these countries for the reorganization of international economic relations. Beijing is trying to direct the efforts of the Asian, African and Latin American countries into the subversion of economic cooperation with the socialist world instead of the resolution of fundamental problems connected with the establishment of a new international economic order or the escape of the clutches of neocolonialism.

Finally, a fourth reason for the increasing significance of the economic factor in PRC relations with the developing countries is the global and comprehensive character acquired by the struggle of the PRC against the USSR and the socialist community in the 1970's. The PRC's development of economic relations with the Asian, African and Latin American countries is intended to inflict economic injuries on the USSR and weaken its influence in these countries. The Chinese leadership had good reason to brand the Soviet Union the "biggest international exploiter and oppressor" and it is now trying to turn the reorganization of the international economic order against the USSR and the socialist community.



Despite the fact that the actual possibility of PRC economic pressure on the developing countries is relatively limited due to the economic underdevelopment of the PRC, it should not be underestimated. The developing countries are being drawn into the arms race more and more, which is reflected in increased military appropriations for the maintenance of their growing armies and the provision of these armies with modern weapons. In the second half of the 1970's, the developing countries' weapon imports increased by an average of 25 percent a year, and the cost of these imports amounted to more than half of the aid officially received from the West. Several developing countries are establishing their own defense industry, and some of them are approaching nuclear status. One of the chief causes is the neocolonial policy of imperialism, calculated to strengthen its influence in the developing countries, weaken their unity and derive increasing profits from the arms trade. In the 1970's, China not only supported this imperialist policy but even took an active part in it. It must be assumed that, in the 1980's and 1990's, China will strive to intensify the process of militarization and arms race in some of the developing countries which it apparently expects to eventually turn into sales markets for the products of its own growing military industry.

It appears that the threat posed to the developing countries by China will grow in coming decades. The reasons for this are the following: In the first place, PRC policy in the international arena is converging with imperialist policy and is receiving increasing support from imperialism; in the second place, the diplomacy and tactics used by the PRC in dealing with the developing countries are becoming more active; in the third place, the new model of socioeconomic organization engineered in the PRC will appeal more to the developing countries than Mao Zedong's "barracks socialism"--that is, the question of the effects of the Chinese socioeconomic model on the developing countries could reappear.

On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Beijing to depict itself as a participant in the world anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle, since all that remains of this participation is "leftist" rhetoric, while the Chinese leadership's practical policy in the international arena testifies that China is displaying the behavior of a chauvinistic, counterrevolutionary force, imperialism's ally and a special faction of imperialism in the struggle against national liberation, independence and social progress.

The PRC's rapprochement with the developed capitalist countries and its concentration on the "four modernizations" are giving rise to several new problems in Beijing's relations with the developing countries. It is becoming increasingly evident that the PRC's rapprochement with the developed capitalist countries was largely brought about at the expense of the interests of the developing countries, and this means that the PRC is sacrificing the interests of the developing countries for the sake of its own development. This will naturally have an effect on their relations with Beijing. At the same time, it is obvious that the PRC's desire to

rely simultaneously on the developed and the developing countries by uniting them in a single anti-Soviet front is internally contradictory and doomed to failure. It is evident that the economic and political conflicts between imperialism and the developing countries are constantly becoming more acute. Beijing, however, is refusing to acknowledge this and is trying to neutralize these conflicts by urging the developing countries to form a political anti-Soviet alliance with imperialism for a struggle against the socialist system.

Moreover, the hope of creating a "united front" of the developed capitalist and developing countries has made it necessary for Beijing to sacrifice many of its ideological premises and to make foreign policy moves that are discrediting PRC policy in the eyes of the developing countries. Therefore, mounting contradictions between PRC foreign policy and the interests of the developing countries and the declining prestige of China in the developing countries have been noticeable in recent years.

The policy of the PRC toward the developing countries is giving it definite political and economic advantages and it will therefore be maintained.

In conclusion, here are a few words about the prospects of PRC strategy in relations with the developing countries. On the global and long-range level, this policy line is hopeless. Naturally, it cannot and will not produce the results expected in Beijing. The Chinese leaders have not been able to involve the developing countries in an active struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and they have had even less luck in creating a united anti-Soviet front in the international arena. These Maoist plans are doomed to fail.

Beijing will be unable to carry out its plans on the regional level as well, although it might win some temporary victories through the use of its military and economic potential and other means of influencing the developing countries. These victories, however, will be temporary and shaky because the foreign policy line of the PRC, its strategy and its tactics in relations with the Asian, African and Latin American countries pursue chauvinistic and hegemonistic goals, contradict the basic tendencies in world development and international relations and are contrary to the fundamental interests of the developing countries.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 39.
2. "Long Live the Thought of Mao Zedong!" (in Chinese), Taipei, 1967, p 98.

3. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 3, Moscow, 1953, p 219.
4. PEKING REVIEW, 1967, No 24, p 24.
5. Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," RENMIN RIBAO, 3 September 1965.
6. BEIJING REVIEW, 1980, No 2.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 May 1978.

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## BEIJING: DESTRUCTIVE POLICY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 44-54

[Article by V. N. Borisov]

[Text] The Chinese leaders' break with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and their move toward great-power chauvinism completely changed the character of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the role of this policy in the international arena. This role, which was constructive in the first decade of the PRC's existence, is now becoming more and more destructive, and the effect of the PRC foreign policy line on international relations is becoming more and more negative and destabilizing.

The Chinese leaders, who once fought to ensure lasting peace and security in the Far East and the entire world, are now resisting detente, openly opposing the principles of peaceful coexistence, making widespread and increasingly frenzied attacks on the peaceful policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries and undertaking dangerous ventures with increasing frequency in the international arena.

Instead of cooperating closely with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, Beijing has conducted a policy of rabid anti-Sovietism and persistent struggle against the socialist community since the end of the 1950's.

The policy of united action by anti-imperialist progressive forces, to which the PRC originally adhered, has been replaced by persistent attempts to crush these forces and subordinate them to the hegemonistic ambitions of the Chinese leaders, and when these intrigues have failed, Beijing has concentrated on breaking up the socialist community, driving a wedge between the USSR and the other socialist countries and severing the natural ties that bind the socialist community with the young national states and the world national liberation movement. The feverish activity launched by the Chinese leaders for the attainment of these goals began with the proclamation of ultra-leftist slogans and the accusation of the main segments of the world communist movement of "revisionism." The Soviet Union,



the socialist countries and the communist and workers movement realize, however, that now that the Beijing leaders have turned to the left, they would inevitably have to turn to the right. Reality confirmed these predictions when the Chinese leadership stopped fighting against imperialism and began to aid and assist it.

China's break with the principles of socialist foreign policy took its most distinct and concrete form in Beijing's announcement of its state objective of creating the "broadest possible united international front," under the aegis of the Chinese leadership, to fight against the USSR and the socialist community.<sup>1</sup> This resulted in the complete reversal of international positions and the complete revision of views on major international issues on the regional and global scales.

In place of a scientific, class approach to international relations, the false and unscientific "theory of the two superpowers" and "theory of the three worlds" and slanderous lies about "social-imperialism" were invented and publicized in Beijing. One of the distinctive features of these scholastic constructions--which, incidentally, were largely unoriginal and were highly colored by the "creative thought" of Western bourgeois political scientists--is their basic tendency to completely ignore a fact that each Marxist regards as fundamental: The fact that the focal point of the entire contemporary era is the conflict between the two world systems--socialism and capitalism. They slanderously identify the socialist foreign policy of the USSR with the policy of the chief imperialist power, the United States, thereby performing a significant ideological and political service for imperialism. The "theory of the three worlds" goes even further in this: It actually declares that the two world systems into which today's world is divided are now supposedly ceasing to exist.<sup>2</sup>

These "theories" were necessary to the Chinese leaders primarily as a means of implying that Beijing had not committed any flagrant severance of ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community and had not betrayed the principles of socialist foreign policy, but had simply broken off relations with one of the "superpowers," and that was all! In this way, they imply, Beijing policy had become even more "consistent" because it took a stand opposing both "superpowers." But this was not the only function the theory of the "two superpowers" had to perform. An even more important function was the preparation of the soil, the creation of the appropriate platform, for rapprochement and alliance with yesterday's political opponents following the severance of ties with yesterday's allies. It was supposed to create the necessary conditions for alliance with imperialist forces.

In order to ensure the attainment of these goals, Beijing has had to "rework" the so-called concepts of the "two superpowers" and the "three worlds" in recent years. It is no secret that both of these "theories," in their original form, put the USSR and the United States in identical positions, observing a kind of "symmetry" in the approach to them. But this approach did not meet the political requirements of the Chinese

leadership, which was seeking a way to ally itself with imperialist forces and certainly, above all, with the United States. At this point, Chinese politicians moved from the "symmetrical model" to an "asymmetrical" one. They made yet another "discovery": It turned out that there was a significant difference between the "superpowers," consisting in the fact that the USSR is "attacking" the positions of the United States in the international arena, while the United States is only "defending itself." In this way, according to the Beijing theoreticians, a theoretical foundation was laid for the conduct of different and even opposite policies toward the "superpowers"--that is, the conduct of a hostile policy toward the Soviet Union and a simultaneous policy of merger with the other "superpower"--the United States. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council expressed Beijing's stand on this matter with maximum clarity: I hope, he said on 21 October 1977 to FRENCH PRESS AGENCY administrator G. Rousselieu, that the entire world will join in the struggle against the USSR--the "Third World," the "Second World" and even the "First World"--that is, the United States.<sup>3</sup>

These themes are still being heard. In the beginning of 1979, Deng Xiaoping, this time in Washington, made an appeal for the creation of a front, made up of the United States, Japan, Western Europe and China, against the USSR.<sup>4</sup> Echoing Deng Xiaoping's appeal, PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Song Zhiguang called upon the nations of the "Third World" to join Japan, the United States, Western Europe and China in the anti-Soviet union. "Everyone," Song Zhiguang said, laying down the law, "must help to block Soviet expansionism. America is now too weak to do this alone."<sup>5</sup>

The appeals to put together this kind of global anti-Soviet and antisocialist superbloc, which has been elevated, for example, in Hua Guofeng's speech at the First Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress], to the status of the "common strategic objective of the people of all countries,"<sup>6</sup> are apparently viewed by Beijing as a kind of catalyst in China's rapprochement with the leading capitalist countries.

The matter was complicated by the fact that by setting the task of turning China into a superpower equipped with all types of weapons, from nuclear missiles to conventional armaments, and striving to, as they say in Beijing, "win time from the enemy" for this purpose, the Chinese leaders are still adventurists, despite all of their talk about the evolution PRC foreign policy has supposedly undergone in the direction of "realism" and "peace." All of their views on the pressing international problems of the present day--problems of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, international detente, arms race limitation and disarmament--pose, just as they did in the past, a serious danger to other people.

The policy Beijing has built on these views represents an even greater threat to the peace and security of others. This policy is thoroughly defined in the report presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th

CPSC Congress: "Beijing's feverish attempts to wreck detente, prevent disarmament and sow suspicion and enmity between states, its desire to provoke a world war and warm its hands over it, represent a great danger to all peace-loving people. Beijing's policy is radically contrary to the interests of all people."<sup>7</sup>

This definition of Beijing's policy, presented at the highest forum of our party, is still completely accurate. This is attested to by such recent events as the Chinese aggression against heroic Vietnam, the constant pressure and provocations on the Sino-Vietnamese border, the interference in the internal affairs of Laos and Kampuchea and the subversive activity against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and several other Asian countries.

The exposure of Beijing's hegemonistic and adventuristic views on today's pressing problems is also acquiring particular importance now that the Chinese leaders are continuing to conduct a policy hostile to the cause of peace and are resorting more readily to aggressive acts but are obviously trying to maneuver and camouflage their stand on questions of war and peace to make them look as "respectable" as possible. These maneuvers have been absolutely necessary. The Chinese leaders are beginning to realize that many of their truly monstrous statements, which have been made public inside and outside China, are arousing more and more suspicions about Chinese policy in the world public, in all people who recognize that the outbreak of a new war would have an immeasurable dangerous effect on civilization. The Beijing leaders have said too much, they have been too candid in discussions of their plans and intrigues. Apparently, they now wish to somehow reduce the political losses incurred as a result of this excessive frankness. Although Beijing is trying to solve this difficult problem, it does not, judging by all indications, intend to renounce the essence of its militaristic platforms and forecasts. It will simply attempt to "retouch" some of the odious features of the old slogans, mottoes and "prophecies," make slight changes in emphasis and import, "explain" motives, etc. The purpose of all this is to pull the wool over people's eyes, to blunt the hegemonistic spearhead of Beijing policy, while retaining the emphasis on war, and thereby simplifying the acquisition of new allies for the implementation of great-power designs. This might be the reason for Beijing's recent attempts to suggest that its views have evolved in the direction of "peace," apparently proceeding from the belief that these maneuvers will cause people to forget the Chinese leaders' past remarks about questions of war and peace, or the hope that time will obscure the impression conveyed by these statements.

It is precisely for this reason that people should be reminded of at least some of these statements, particularly in view of the fact that no one in Beijing has denied them as yet. On the contrary, from time to time one of China's present leaders essentially repeats these statements in a slightly more neutral form.

This applies above all to the Chinese leaders' apologies for a new world war and predictions of its fatal inevitability. The reader will no doubt remember the Beijing leaders' remarks and aphorisms regarding this issue. Let us recall at the very least Mao Zedong's statement at the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Congress in May 1958: "If a war should break out, this will be a good thing. Then we can quickly put an end to imperialism. We think it would take 3 years to do this. In the presence of atomic bombs, the war could take a year less. And then there would be no more wars. If there is a war, then there will be fatalities. Death does not frighten us. If half of 600 million people die (the population of China at that time--V. B.), there will still be 300 million. It does not frighten us that half of mankind might die in the war. It does not even frighten us that only a third might remain."<sup>8</sup>

This statement is not in any sense just Mao's personal opinion. More than 7 years later, on 21 July 1975, Deng Xiaoping made the following remark in a conversation with Japanese newsmen: "A third massive world war cannot be avoided. It is possible that a certain number of people will die in this war. /But this war will simplify the resolution of the problems of oppressed nations and civilization. It will not be that bad/ (emphasis ours--V. B.)."

This view has not been consigned to the archives by Beijing. It is still part of the Chinese leadership's political platform, despite the significant changes in the composition of this leadership. The Chinese press is reporting, just as it did in the past, that "lasting peace is impossible under present historical conditions, and a new world war is inevitable." The world war, they assert in Beijing, "could break out at any time. The question is when this will occur, and not whether it will." The purpose of the Beijing leaders' line of reasoning and of their statements that war can be postponed but not escaped, and the purpose of Beijing's intrigues related to this line of reasoning are made clear by one of Deng Xiaoping's statements, dating back to 1977: "The outbreak of a third world war is inevitable. But if this could be postponed until the end of the century, we could seize the initiative, and this would be most beneficial to us."<sup>9</sup>

In summer 1978, PRC Minister of National Defense Xu Xiangqiang wrote the following on the anniversary of the PLA [People's Liberation Army]: "War is a normal phenomenon in the relations between the two worlds," "the third world war could break out any day," "war is also an extension of peace."<sup>10</sup> Chinese spokesmen are also preaching the inevitability of war from a rostrum as clearly unsuited for this kind of pursuit as the UN General Assembly, where they have repeatedly declared that war is inevitable and that "this does not depend on the will of the people." The postulates regarding the inevitability of war have also served as the basis of Beijing's present military doctrine, in accordance with which the coming war will be unprecedented in the history of mankind, that it will break out soon, that it will be massive in scale and even that it will be nuclear.<sup>11</sup>



All of this testifies that the Chinese leaders are still loyal to the idea of the inevitability of another world war. The only concession they are prepared to make is the possibility of the "postponement of world war." Moreover, they have stipulated as a condition for this postponement the creation of a "united international front" against the USSR. The true purpose of Beijing's maneuver is not so difficult to figure out. In the first place, this thesis allows the Chinese leaders to preserve the postulate regarding the fatal inevitability of war inviolable. In the second place, by recognizing the possibility of the war's postponement and by even appealing for struggle to effect this postponement, the Beijing leaders hope to depict themselves, but certainly only verbally, as "peaceful" while they are actually continuing to work on the exacerbation of international tension and conflicts between other countries, for which purpose the appeals for the "broadest possible international front" against the USSR and other socialist countries are being utilized energetically. In the third place, the thesis regarding the "postponement" of war cannot impede the Chinese leaders' present policy of comprehensive preparations for war, but, on the contrary, is stimulating this policy. If we consider the above-quoted words by Deng Xiaoping concerning the "beneficial" nature of "postponing" the war until the end of the century, it becomes particularly evident that Beijing's proposal regarding the possibility of postponing the war has nothing in common with the struggle for peace. It is indicative that, when Hua Guofeng talked about the postponement of war during his Western European tour, some of his listeners stressed that they believed it was necessary to prevent the war, and not only to postpone it.

Although Beijing officials have continued to assert the unavoidability of a new military cataclysm, they have not tried to reinforce these postulates with any kind of serious analysis of current affairs. The Chinese leaders do not notice, or do not want to notice, the tremendous historic changes that have taken place. They are ignoring the significance of the fact that the very nature of modern armaments has made it impossible to view war as a permissible foreign policy instrument, as it was at some time in the past, and that the exclusion of the possibility of war from social life is a vital public objective. In Beijing they do not realize, or do not want to realize, that the approximate balance of military potential between the two world systems has introduced extremely significant changes into world affairs, restricting the freedom of action by imperialist forces in matters of war and peace. The Chinese leaders are also ignoring the indisputable fact that the growing strength of the world socialist system is becoming an increasingly insurmountable obstacle for forces for war.

With a persistence worthy of better application, the Beijing leaders, who do not wish to see all of these present realities, are repeating their apocalyptic "predictions," apparently in the belief that repetition will serve as a perfect substitute for arguments based on an understanding of real life.

It is true that they have a favorite phrase which they repeat at every opportunity, apparently regarding it as irrefutable "proof" of the fatal inevitability of a new world war. This is the statement about the "inevitability of a battle between the two superpowers"--the United States and the USSR, an inevitability which supposedly stems from the fact that the "conflict between them cannot be resolved peacefully."<sup>12</sup> Strictly speaking, however, this does not prove anything. After all, the Beijing "theoreticians'" statement about the inevitability of a "battle between the two superpowers"--that is, the inevitability of a military confrontation between the USSR and the United States--is no more substantiated than their statements about the fatal inevitability of a new world war. This is nothing more than another way of denying the very possibility of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social political structures. This also does not prove that a new world war is a fatal inevitability; it merely proves that the Beijing leaders are still denying the principle of peaceful coexistence although they have never been reluctant to pretend to support it.

The formula about the "inevitability of a battle between the two superpowers" is not a scientific deduction, but simply a vivid example of how the Chinese leaders are trying to take advantage of the conflicts between the two world systems--socialism and capitalism. But it is one matter to proceed from the belief that the conflict between the two world systems is the central conflict of our era, and quite another matter to assert that military confrontation between these two systems is inevitable.

Another ridiculous aspect of the Chinese "leaders'" logic is that, as mentioned above, they essentially deny that the conflict between the two worlds systems is the fundamental conflict of our era and they even try to deny the very existence of the socialist and capitalist systems, but then they attempt to elevate the "inevitability of a battle" between these systems to the status of an absolute. This does not make much sense! But this does not disturb the Beijing theoreticians. They need the statements about the "inevitability of a battle between the two superpowers" to serve the requirements of their nationalist-chauvinistic policy, in order to bring about a confrontation between the USSR and the United States, to set these two major countries against one another, to start the bonfire of war and to "warm their hands" over this bonfire.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Beijing's provocative tactic is nothing new. As early as the late 1950's and early 1960's, when the Beijing leaders were preparing to make their open move to a great-power hegemonic policy and were striving to undermine the existing system of international relations, they attempted to exacerbate Soviet-U.S. relations and even to provoke a military confrontation. They insisted that the USSR have a "head-on" confrontation with the United States, "warned" it about the impermissibility of the policy of "appeasing" the United States, called the policy of developing Soviet-American relations on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence an act of "appeasement" and

constantly stressed that the "American imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers." All of this was said for a specific purpose--to pressure the Soviet Union into overt actions against the United States and to bring about a military confrontation between them.

The Beijing leaders did not limit this pressure to mere discussion. They also took certain practical steps to aggravate international relations in the Far East and in the region of the Taiwan Strait, which could have led, given the fact that the USSR and PRC were allies at that time, to military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Under these difficult conditions, the Soviet Union proved that it was a reliable stronghold of world peace. Its firm and unequivocal position had a sobering effect on U.S. ruling circles, which were conducting an obviously hostile line toward the PRC. Certain elements in these circles wanted to use this critical situation to strike a blow at the People's Republic of China. Part of the American military establishment wanted to drop nuclear bombs on mainland China at that time. What is more, the U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons against the PRC in connection with the Taiwan crisis was frankly stated in a letter sent to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee by U.S. Secretary of State J. F. Dulles.<sup>13</sup>

It was precisely the firm stand taken by the USSR, when it announced that the Soviet Union would give China all the help it needed in the event of a foreign attack and simultaneously expressed the opinion that the two sides involved in the conflict should find a common language and avoid armed confrontation, that the dangerous crisis began to ebb and was eventually overcome. At the same time, the Soviet Union made it quite clear to the Beijing leaders that their adventuristic actions and its shelling of the coastal islands, which Beijing undertook without feeling any need to consult with its ally or even to inform it in advance, could have a dangerous effect on peace in the Far East and in the entire world.

In our day history is repeating itself, so to speak, in reverse. The facts testify that the Chinese leaders have not abandoned their plan of bringing about a Soviet-American confrontation. What is more, they are vigorously and energetically provoking it. The only difference is that now they are trying to use their contacts with the American side to push the United States into actions against the USSR. It is interesting that the Beijing officials have not even taken the trouble to develop a new line of reasoning: The arguments being used by the Chinese politicians to convince their American partners that they must conduct a "tough" line against the USSR are as much like the arguments they once addressed to the Soviet Union as two peas in a pod.

In May 1978, for example, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua received the U.S. President's National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski in Beijing and assured him that the "threat of social-imperialism" necessitated "head-on" struggle and the "rejection of the policy of appeasement."<sup>14</sup> In this way, the vector of Chinese pressure has taken the

opposite direction, the pressure point has changed, but Beijing's goals are still the same. Just as before, it wants to bring about a clash between the United States and the USSR and thereby "win time" for "building up its strength."

In their attempts to attain this goal, the Chinese leaders are vigorously spreading various kinds of lies about the "Soviet threat," thereby voluntarily performing a service for the particular circles in the American establishment which are also not reluctant to use this false slogan. For example, to escalate tension, the Chinese press persistently "warns" the Americans: "Now that the Soviet Union is taking the offensive everywhere in the world and is accelerating the buildup of its armaments, the United States must make a choice. It must either look the danger in the eye and take effective countermeasures, or create the semblance of 'peace' and suffer a defeat if a war should break out."<sup>15</sup>

Naturally, these cheap provocative tricks are not worth much in themselves. But they are aiding imperialist forces, especially certain circles in the United States, in their efforts to complicate international relations, wreck detente and stimulate militaristic obsessions. And if these forces are to blame for the fact that "the international situation was, unfortunately, exacerbated noticeably in the late 1970's and early 1980's,"<sup>16</sup> much of the responsibility for this must be assigned to Beijing.

"We know," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "that the will of the people has cleared a path through all obstacles for the positive tendency in world affairs that has been given the meaningful name 'detente.' This policy has deep roots. It is supported by powerful forces, and this policy has every chance of remaining the leading tendency in relations between states."<sup>17</sup>

It is widely known that the Chinese leaders have invariably displayed a hostile attitude toward the process of international detente since the end of the 1950's. As early as September 1958, Mao Zedong tried to explain the reasons for the shelling of the coastal islands by telling A. A. Gromyko that "a comparison of things and events proves that international tension now (let us recall that this was 1958--V. B.), particularly in connection with the events in the Taiwan region, benefits our nations (Mao was referring to the socialist countries--V. B.) more than it does the imperialists.... The West believes," Mao Zedong said, "that the cold war is benefiting only it, but it is benefiting our countries more."<sup>18</sup>

Since that time, the Chinese leaders have spent more and more time attacking the process of detente, attempting to arouse disbelief in the very possibility of detente and constantly struggling to undermine detente. In this important matter, they have joined yesterday's forces, they have joined the camp of those who advocate the revival of the cold war, taking a more reactionary stand than even many objective bourgeois politicians.



Firing on detente, "with both barrels," Zhou Enlai said in his report at the Tenth CCP Congress in 1973: "Detente is a temporary and superficial phenomenon and colossal upheavals will continue to take place in the future. These colossal upheavals are a good thing for the people, and not a bad thing."<sup>19</sup>

Many years have passed, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have left the scene, but the hostility of the Chinese leaders toward the process of detente has not changed. In his report at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Guofeng repeated, almost word for word, what Zhou Enlai had said at the Tenth CCP Congress. "In just over a year," Hua Guofeng said, "the international situation has been marked by even greater upheavals and tension. The factors of war are still gathering strength."<sup>20</sup>

The Chinese periodical press is collecting statements by foreign opponents of detente, in whom Beijing sees close allies. With unconcealed approval, for example, the press cited the remark of an English Conservative, the grandson of the former Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill, who said: "Detente is a catastrophe,...it is another word for appeasement."<sup>21</sup>

Although Beijing still opposes detente, it has lately tried to embroider its position. The Chinese leaders maintain that they are not against detente in the strict sense of the term; they are also in favor of detente, but they are in favor of "real," and not "false," detente. Which detente do they find "false" and which is "real"? With no regard for the truth, the Chinese leaders are calling the actual process of detente, the result of the efforts of the world public, "false" detente. Beijing does not wish to recognize this detente, which took the place of the cold war era! It favors the kind of detente that would be accompanied by "head-on" struggle against the USSR and the creation of an international anti-Soviet, antisocialist front, so that there would be no "appeasement" in dealings with the USSR and other socialist countries. But after all, this "detente," if one could call it that, in the Beijing style would not mean the alleviation of international tension but, on the contrary, its exacerbation. And it is precisely this that the Chinese leaders want. The Beijing policy-makers have their own ideas of this. Detente is a movement away from war, and increased tension is a movement toward war. The Chinese leaders would be more pleased with the second alternative. This is why they were so delighted and could not conceal their malicious pleasure when the leaders of the United States and some other NATO countries embarked on a course hostile to detente sometime ago.

Despite the zigzags of history, however, the process of detente will clear a path for itself and its opponents will have to retreat. After all, detente is being supported by increasingly large segments of the world public, the socialist countries, the world communist and workers movement, the non-aligned countries, forces for national liberation and, finally, all objective people who realize that mankind has no reasonable alternative to detente.

China is still taking a negative approach, posing a threat to peace and security, in a major issue of our day--disarmament. It is no secret that since the end of the 1950's the Chinese leadership has been trying to ensure China's transformation into a military superpower by waging a persistent and constant campaign against disarmament and sabotaging the efforts of peoples and states to find ways of limiting and stopping the arms race and of accomplishing disarmament, as well as the steps taken in this directions. This applies to the problem of universal and total disarmament and to all aspects of the struggle for partial disarmament and the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons.

For many years, the Chinese leaders waged their campaign openly and without much caution, attacking the idea of disarmament, so to speak, head-on. In July 1972, for example, Zhou Enlai declared unequivocally that, under present conditions, "there can be no talk of disarmament."<sup>22</sup> The Chinese spokesman in the United Nations expressed his views on this matter just as pointedly but more "colorfully," by asserting that "talking about universal disarmament is simply stupid"<sup>23</sup> or that disarmament is "pure fraud"<sup>24</sup> and that "no illusions should be nurtured regarding disarmament."<sup>25</sup>

The list of such statements by Chinese leaders could easily be supplemented considerably. It is probable that they would fill many volumes. Besides this, it should be added that the Chinese leaders' militaristic line of building up weapon stockpiles has caused them to always strive to keep China outside the bounds of international agreements on arms race limitation and disarmament. As we know, China has not signed international agreements which bear the signatures of the majority of states in the world: the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the three spheres and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, ignoring the protests of the governments of many countries and paying no attention to the numerous warnings voiced by competent experts regarding the dangerous consequences of the continuation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, China is still conducting these tests. On the pretext of the need to develop nuclear weapons for "self-defense," the PRC objected to the treaty on the principles governing the activity of states in outer space and the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor. China refused to sign the convention prohibiting bacteriological and chemical weapons.

The question naturally arises: What is the reason for this persistence in keeping Beijing's hands free in matters pertaining to weapons, this desire to fully retain the "right" to continue absolutely unlimited nuclear tests at any cost, and the attempts to create other weapons of mass destruction? It must be borne in mind that by refusing to sign sweeping international agreements on arms race limitation and disarmament, the Chinese leaders are not only preserving their complete freedom to arm themselves to the maximum, but they are also maintaining their access to a dangerous instrument which they can use at any time to undermine the productive results of many years of time-consuming and difficult work by the majority of states in the world and the efforts of the world democratic public to put the disarmament mechanism in motion.

Some signs of a tendency toward slight "adjustments" in the Chinese approach to disarmament have recently been seen in Beijing. Evidently, Beijing officials are trying to draw some conclusions from the fact that the inflexible and excessively open stand taken by Beijing for many years in this area is not earning political dividends and is discrediting China more and more in the eyes of the world public. This is the reason for such Chinese diplomatic moves as participation in the work of the special UN session on disarmament and later, in 1979, the session of the UN Disarmament Commission, where the PRC submitted its "proposed elements of a comprehensive disarmament program," as well as China's decision to take part in the work of the Geneva Disarmament Commission, which had been ignored by Beijing for many years.

But a study of China's participation in the activities of the special session and the UN Disarmament Commission and an analysis of the above-mentioned proposal regarding the elements of the disarmament program indicate that all of the steps taken by China do not attest to any significant changes in Beijing's stand on the disarmament issue and do not prove that it intends to participate in constructive work to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problem.

Suffice it to say that the PRC has stipulated, as Chinese spokesmen have always done in the past, that a preliminary and essential condition for the implementation of any disarmament measure in accordance with plans must be the initial accomplishment of these measures by the Soviet Union and United States. This demand applies to nuclear disarmament, to the limitation of conventional weapons, to the prohibition of chemical weapons and to other measures. The plan proposed by China is worded in such a way as to accomplish the disarmament of only the USSR and the United States, leaving China unaffected by the disarmament process in the foreseeable future.

In this connection, it should also be noted that although the Beijing leaders have demanded the "disarmament of the superpowers," they have also always objected to any kind of Soviet-U.S. talks on questions of arms race limitation and disarmament. They have opposed and criticized agreements concluded by the USSR and the United States, including the SALT II treaty signed in Vienna in 1979. This is more proof of the fact that although China is demanding the "initial disarmament of the superpowers," it is actually striving to pile up obstacles to impede the curbing of the arms race.

Therefore, Beijing's maneuvers in connection with the disarmament issue are aimed at establishing some kind of legal "basis" for the Chinese leadership's policy of building up China's military potential by proposing a so-called "comprehensive program" but without making any significant changes in its position or its intention to continue sabotaging the efforts of other states in this area.

After examining Beijing's present stand on the issues of detente and disarmament, we can quite justifiably conclude that the position of the Chinese leadership on today's fundamental problems, despite Beijing's attempts to give this position a more respectable and solid appearance, has not undergone any significant changes.

The Chinese leadership's line of escalating international tension, its adventuristic hope of creating conflicts between other states and peoples, its preaching about the inevitability of war, its claims to the territory of almost all of its neighbors, its increasing tendency to play the role of international policeman and to rattle the saber, and its ambition to become a nuclear missile superpower conducting a hegemonic policy on the global scale pose a serious threat to peace throughout the world and are contrary to the interests of all states and peoples, including the Chinese people.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Hua Guofeng's speech at the First Session of the Fifth NPC (RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978).
2. "Speech by the head of the PRC delegation, Deng Xiaoping, at the special session of the UN General Assembly (10 April 1974)," Beijing, 1974, p 2.
3. M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies], Moscow, 1979, p 327.
4. Ibid.
5. Quoted in: DAGENS NIUHETER, 14 May 1979.
6. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 459.
8. "Long Live the Thought of Mao Zedong!" Beijing, 1967 (in Chinese).
9. Quoted in: BACKGROUND OF CHINA, 17 May 1978.
10. HONGQI, 1978, No 8; RENMIN RIBAO, 31 July 1978.
11. See, for example, the speech by PRC Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying on 9 May 1977.
12. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 November 1979.

13. K. T. Young, "Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967," New York, 1967, pp 142-143.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 May 1978.
15. Ibid., 1 January 1978.
16. "L. I. Brezhnev Replies to the Questions of a PRAVDA Correspondent," PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
17. Ibid.
18. M. S. Kapitsa, Op. cit., p 205.
19. "Tenth All-China Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Documents)," Beijing, 1973, pp 23-24.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 June 1979.
21. Quoted in: SHIJIE ZHISHI, 1979, No 1.
22. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 July 1972.
23. "Excerpts from the Speech of the PRC Foreign Minister at the 18th Session of the UN General Assembly," RENMIN RIBAO, 3 October 1973.
24. United Nations Document A(32) PV.13 of 30 October 1977, p 53.
25. From the speech by PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the special session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, quoted in the book: M. S. Kapitsa, Op. cit., p 354.

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## BEIJING-WASHINGTON RAPPROCHEMENT--A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF NATIONS

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[Article by V. I. Petukhov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The special relationship that has been intensively developed between China and the United States in recent years, based on the common hatred of the Beijing leadership and American imperialism for the Soviet Union and the socialist community, constitutes one of the major factors responsible for the present exacerbation of international tension.

Washington policy's abrupt move in the direction of unbridled escalation of the arms race and subversion of detente has been resolutely condemned by the broadest segments of the public in the majority of countries. In Beijing, however, the United States has found unconditional support. The present policy of the Carter Administration probably does not please anyone outside America as much as it suits the Maoist leaders with their great-power hegemonic ambitions and their insistence on a new world war. This is precisely the policy they have been urging on the United States for the entire period of Sino-American rapprochement, which began with the February 1972 visit to the PRC by then President Nixon. After all, one of the main goals the Beijing leaders have always been pursuing in PRC relations with the United States is to prevent the improvement of Soviet-American relations and to propel the United States and its allies toward fiercer confrontations with the Soviet Union. This goal stems from the Chinese leadership's general strategic plan--to push the United States and the USSR into an armed conflict which will cause these powers to regress considerably in their development, will undermine their strength and will thereby give technically and economically underdeveloped China a chance to quickly move ahead and take the leading place in world affairs.

It is easy to see that Carter's "crisis dramas," as Washington's new course is called in some Western countries, fits in perfectly with this policy. The Maoist leaders are rubbing their hands with joy at the prospect that the great-power frenzies of the American administration could put an end to detente and start a big fire.



The mounting aggressive, great-power tendencies in the policies of Beijing and Washington and their common desire to stop the growth of the socialist world's influence constituted the deciding factor which motivated the two sides to speed up the "diplomatic normalization" of relations between China and the United States. The object of this desire was certainly not the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, but the elimination of all obstacles to a Beijing-Washington alliance in international affairs on an anti-Soviet basis.

The Beijing leadership has been striving for this for a long time, naturally with a view to its own selfish goals, which do not coincide with the aims of Washington politicians. Huang Hua, PRC minister of foreign affairs, defined these goals in a confidential speech at the end of 1978: "We must draw the United States over to our side so that we can concentrate all of our efforts on the struggle against the chief enemy (that is, the USSR--V. P.).... We must create discord between the two superpowers to split them up." By proclaiming its objective of putting together a "broad international front" to confront the Soviet Union, the Beijing leadership resolutely focused its foreign policy line on rapprochement with the states of the imperialist camp and alliance with extreme anticommunist reactionary forces. This was the reason for Beijing's special interest in close relations with the United States as the main power center of world imperialism.

On the eve of the final stage of the Sino-American talks on "diplomatic normalization," two new features took a prominent place in Beijing policy, impelling it toward quicker conciliation with the United States and its allies (especially Japan). In the first place, in the beginning of 1978 an ambitious program was advanced for the modernization of the PRC economy and armed forces, based on the use of the advanced technology of the capitalist states and their financial assistance. In the second place, it was at this time that Sino-Vietnamese relations were sharply exacerbated and Beijing began to plan its aggression against the SRV, which also motivated it to seek support from the United States and the countries bound to it. Beijing was prepared to forego some of its principles and positions, particularly with regard to the Taiwan question, to win the approval of U.S. ruling circles.

For a number of reasons, the United States continued to display some restraint in the development of relations with China. A struggle took place in Washington's government spheres between the advocates of a "policy of equal distance" from the USSR and China, considering the need to continue detente in relations with the Soviet Union, and the advocates of intensive rapprochement with Beijing, even at the cost of certain concessions on the Taiwan issue and the assistance of China to arm itself against the USSR. This second tendency prevailed when the "hawks," represented by such figures as Z. Brzezinski and the agents of the military-industrial complex who agreed with his views, acquired the dominant influence in the American administration and led an attack on the policy of detente. It was no

coincidence that the conclusion of the Sino-American talks on the "normalization" of relations coincided with the elaboration of an entire system of measures by the U.S. Government to deteriorate Soviet-American relations and increase military pressure on the USSR and its allies. It was after the Washington session of the NATO Council in May 1978, when the members of this bloc approved the automatic growth of military budgets up to the end of the 20th century, which could be regarded as the initial milestone in the new course of the United States, that President Carter announced his intention to push for the regulation of Sino-American relations and sent Z. Brzezinski to Beijing to sound out the Maoist leadership's views on this matter. He proceeded to advise the PRC Government of his regulation terms, which were then placed at the foundation of the Sino-U.S. agreement on the establishment of full diplomatic relations in December 1978.

The agreement was the result of a compromise which reflected the desire of Beijing and Washington to accelerate mutual convergence on the threshold of the international complications planned by both sides. To this end, it was necessary to muffle the conflicts between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, which had been regarded as the main obstacle to mutual diplomatic recognition during all the years of Sino-American negotiations. Beijing had to make fundamental concessions on this matter and, in essence, reconcile itself to the status quo--that is, to the existence of the Taiwan regime independent of the PRC. When Washington was playing the "China card," however, it did not want to compromise any of its own imperialist interests in this matter of such great importance to China's prestige. The United States' official severance of diplomatic relations and renunciation of the military treaty with the Taiwan regime have not made any significant changes in Taiwan's status: It is still under American guardianship. The United States did not recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and has fully maintained, although on an unofficial basis, its trade, economic and other ties with Taiwan and is supplying it with weapons and military equipment to guarantee Taiwan's safety from a Chinese attack. In the knowledge of this U.S. support, the Taiwan regime has definitely refused to negotiate peaceful unification with the PRC. The Taiwan problem, therefore, has still not been solved.

Nonetheless, the official "diplomatic normalization" of Sino-American relations was accomplished. In essence, a new stage began in the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, marked by considerably broader bilateral political contacts, trade, scientific and technical cooperation and--something particularly dangerous in the sense of possible consequences--the establishment of military ties.

In the very first year following the establishment of diplomatic relations, America was visited by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the State Council, who was given a particularly grand welcome as the main advocate of Sino-U.S. rapprochement in Beijing; Vice Premier Fang Yi of the State Council, chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology; Vice Premier Kang

Shien of the State Council, minister in charge of the State Economic Commission; the ministers of the petroleum industry, the metallurgical industry, finance and foreign trade. In all, 308 Chinese delegations visited the United States in 1979. From the American side, official visits to the PRC were made by Vice-President W. Mondale, Secretary of the Treasury M. Blumenthal, Secretary of Commerce J. Kreps, President Carter's Special Trade Representative R. Strauss, and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare J. Califano. More and more delegations representing Congress, the business and scientific communities, propaganda media and various types of U.S. public organizations went to China. Besides this, around 40,000 American tourists visited the PRC that year.<sup>1</sup>

This lively exchange of visits was accompanied by a great deal of painstakingly planned work on both sides to activate intergovernmental contacts and to establish a special kind of cooperation between China and the United States. As a result, 15 agreements were signed on the governmental level in 1979 in regard to various spheres of bilateral relations, including a general trade agreement, in accordance with which China was granted most-favored-nation status in trade with America (this agreement was speedily ratified by Congress at the end of January this year), an agreement on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation and others.

But these agreements are not all. It is possible that the confidential agreements reached by Chinese and American leaders during the course of numerous reciprocal visits and negotiations, which generally took place in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy, are even more important. As a result of Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington, for example, the two sides agreed to periodically consult with one another on international issues, which presupposes the coordination of Sino-U.S. efforts in the world arena on the basis of their "parallel interests." The content of these consultations has not been reported in the press, but official U.S. spokesmen have stressed each time that the talks have revealed identical or parallel U.S. and Chinese "global strategic interests" and that the Beijing leadership supports Washington's views on many key aspects of world affairs. Washington, in turn, has recently endeavored to assure the Chinese leaders that it is willing to assist in the creation of a "strong China," backed up by the imperialist West.

American Vice-President W. Mondale's visit was a characteristic example of this. He went to Beijing in August 1978, just before the Soviet-Chinese negotiations began in Moscow, obviously for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the talks and preventing the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Mondale's speeches in Beijing were distinguished by unconcealed hostility toward the USSR and promising curtsies to China, calculated to keep it on a pro-imperialist platform. Playing up to the Maoists, the U.S. vice-president said: "The strength, security and modernization of China in the next decade will be in the U.S. interest.... If you gain strength in all areas, this will help to deter other countries that might want to impose their will on you." Mondale did not refrain

from addressing unequivocal threats to the USSR and its allies. He stressed: "We will assume that any nation which tries to weaken you or works toward your isolation in international affairs is taking a stand contrary to American interests."<sup>2</sup> In connection with this, Mondale advised the Chinese leaders to "establish concrete political ties for the purpose of guaranteeing mutual security" and "expand consultations on world affairs and strive for the attainment of the common goal."<sup>3</sup>

The United States did not limit itself to verbal appeals. While Mondale was in Beijing, he announced that the U.S. Government had decided to extend Export-Import Bank credit to China in the amount of 2 billion dollars for a period of 5 years and to negotiate the extension of additional credit if the Chinese side should request it. He stated that the Carter Administration would work toward congressional sanctions regarding the promotion of U.S.-Chinese trade and would institute guarantees and insurance to encourage American firms to invest capital in the Chinese economy. The vice-president and the Beijing leaders also discussed the possibility of American assistance in the re-arming of the PRC.

Questions connected with military cooperation were the main topic of discussion when U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown went to Beijing at the beginning of January this year. As a result of this visit, concerted military-political action by Beijing and Washington in the world arena was planned, and direct military ties began to be established between the two countries. According to reports in the press, the negotiating partners discussed, in particular, such forms of military contacts as regular consultations on matters of military policy, the exchange of intelligence and other classified information, reciprocal visits by Chinese and American top-ranking military officials and experts, U.S. assistance in the training of Chinese officer personnel and the delivery of terrestrial communications stations with artificial satellites to China for the purpose of military intelligence activity.

The talks between the PRC leaders and the U.S. secretary of defense centered around a matter of particular interest to Beijing--U.S. assistance in the modernization of Chinese armed forces and U.S. deliveries of military equipment and technology for military branches of industry. China is "prepared to buy weapons if the United States makes the right offer," Deng Xiaoping said in a conversation with American congressmen.<sup>4</sup>

At first the United States preferred not to show any particular interest in this matter, both in view of its own long-range interests in the Far East, which could be threatened by the reinforcement of Chinese militarism's positions, and the attitude of America's Asian allies, particularly Japan, which are disturbed by the prospect that their aggressive neighbor might augment its military potential. Evidently, the protests of peace-loving countries were taken into account, as well as demonstrations against the arming of China in the United States. When the move was made to a policy of open confrontation with forces for peace and socialism, however, the Carter Administration was less inclined to give any



consideration to these factors, and they have now been pushed into a position of secondary importance by temporary interests and considerations of immediate tactical gains. As a result it became clear that the widely publicized assurances of official U.S. spokesmen that America had no intention of supplying China with weapons were just a fig leaf to conceal Washington's actual intentions and moves.

Washington long ago lifted the veto on sales of weapons to China by other NATO countries--that is, it essentially sanctioned their participation in the augmentation of PRC military potential. At the suggestion of the United States, a NATO Assembly session in December 1978 adopted a decision permitting sales of weapons to China without any particular restrictions. This topic was also secretly discussed at the meeting of the U.S., English, West German and French leaders in January 1979 on the island of Guadeloupe. More attention has recently been paid to the requests of the Chinese militarists, as both the United States and the other Western European countries have begun to view China as something like the 16th member of NATO and a most desirable and promising partner.

Just before his visit to Beijing, U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown compiled a report, on the instructions of the administration, which investigates the possibility of giving China aid, at a total cost of up to 63 billion dollars, in the modernization of its armed forces. Judging by the report, however, there would be several difficulties in carrying out this plan in full. In the first place, there is doubt about the Chinese armed forces' ability to use large shipments of modern weapons and the technology that would be exported for the manufacture of these weapons. In the second place, some people in Washington are worried that the "traditional Chinese xenophobia" would restrict the possibility of America's "acting directly in concert with the Chinese on a broad scale." In the third place, aid to China would arouse the displeasure of the United States' Asian allies and other countries in this region. In the fourth place, it would go against American policy toward Taiwan, which would not be able to defend itself in the event of an attack by Beijing if the PRC's military potential should be augmented. In the fifth place, this aid could dangerously complicate relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and this still must be taken into account in Washington.

Nonetheless, the U.S. secretary of defense assured the Chinese leaders that the American Government would not remain uninvolved in the program of Chinese armed services modernization. For the time being, the United States is allowing its firms to sell the PRC "dual-purpose" equipment and "grey-zone technology"--that is, industrial commodities intended for civilian and military purposes. In 1979, for example, licenses were issued for the export of aerospace equipment, airplanes and spare parts for them, seismic oil and gas prospecting equipment, computers and other "dual-purpose" products to China for a total of around 250 million dollars.<sup>5</sup> The Chinese Government has requested U.S. shipments of the

latest types of combat equipment--fighter planes, military transport planes, tanks, various types of missiles, airborne electronic and radar devices for the air force, etc. The question of whether China should be supplied with this equipment is still being argued in Washington, but the Carter Administration's new policy line would suggest that the "hawks," who want to cooperate with Beijing, will probably win this argument as well.

Now that the United States has resolved to supply China with equipment, assigning China actual ally status, the U.S. Administration is trying to justify this course by implying that it is simply trying to give the usual assistance to a weak, backward and supposedly defenseless country, going almost so far as to argue that this will guarantee a balance of power and stability in the entire region surrounding China. In fact, however, this is not the usual kind of assistance, and it is certainly not aimed at guaranteeing stability in the interest of peace. This course is obviously aimed at undermining this stability, since the United States and its NATO partners are trying, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, to "thoroughly encourage and incite, first by means of economic bribes and now gradually by shipments of modern weapons, military equipment and technology as well, those leaders of one of the largest countries in the world who have openly expressed hostility toward the cause of detente, disarmament and stability in the world; those who make claims to the territory of many countries and organize provocations against them; those who have pronounced war inevitable and have launched active preparations for war."<sup>6</sup>

This course is connected with the interests of Western arms manufacturers who are eager to profit from the military-industrial business and to establish themselves in the Chinese market. But there is no question that it has been dictated more by political calculations than by commercial considerations. The United States and its allies are arming China so that it will continue to involve itself in confrontation with the Soviet Union and will aid in undermining the socialist system and strengthening imperialism's position. It is obvious that the West would like to channel Maoist China's aggression in the direction of the USSR, just as it tried to do in the 1930's when it set Hitler's Germany against the Soviet State. In their present flirtation with Beijing, imperialism's strategists are trying to ignore the fatal lessons of history, with no thought for how much this nearsighted policy could cost the West. As history teaches us, particularly the example of Hitler's Germany, those who make aggressive, hegemonic plans, make their own decisions as to the direction in which they will point their weapons as soon as they have acquired them. As the old proverb tells us, "a viper will often bite the one who takes it to his bosom." More farsighted individuals in the Western countries realize that Maoist China, with its great-power ambitions and its tradition of treachery, inherited from imperial times, must not turn its gaze upon the North, which is definitely beyond its strength, but, for instance, the West, the East or the South--that is, the



particular parts of Asia where the United States, England, France, and certainly Japan, have extensive interests. Beijing's armed adventure in Indochina was certainly food for serious thought, but Western politicians are trying to avoid this kind of thinking. Just as many other of Beijing's actions, it demonstrated that Mao's heirs are inclined to play the most reckless and irresponsible games in the world arena.

Today it is obvious that China has become one of the factors associated by U.S. ruling circles with their illusory hope of changing the strategic balance of power in the world and strengthening America's position. Even American experts who have not been put off balance by the present obsession with belligerence in their own country have noted, however, that, "given the present balance of power, it is not likely that alliance with China could increase the relative strength of the United States." Besides this, it would be naive to expect Maoist China to obediently follow the lead of its American partner and serve this partner's interests after China itself has acquired more weapons.

The great-power, hegemonistic nature of the Beijing leadership's behavior in the world arena testifies that it is using its partners, including the United States, for its own purposes and is striving to "play its own cards" with unpredictable consequences for other countries and for the entire world. Under these conditions, as the Soviet side has repeatedly pointed out, arming China and encouraging its expansionism is the same as risking the future of mankind and disregarding the interests of other people, including the Americans.

Nonetheless, the military-political cooperation between Beijing and Washington is taking on increasingly distinct features. It is ostentatiously being set up in opposition to the policy of detente and is being used actively by both sides as a means of intimidating the USSR and other peace-loving countries, as well as national liberation forces, and, to some degree, as a means of exerting pressure on the nations of the so-called "second world," particularly Japan. One of the distinctive features of this "unity" is that each partner is striving to use the other in its own interests, to create maximally favorable conditions for pushing the other partner into a conflict with the enemy, and to stand aside and hire someone else to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. In other words, this "unity" is permeated with the spirit of provocation, which makes the Sino-American alliance particularly dangerous to world peace.

Recent events have eloquently testified to this danger. The rapid convergence of China and the United States helped to reinforce their "parallel" aggressive activities in Asia, and this considerably complicated the situation in Asia and the rest of the world.

Conditions in Indochina were the first to be exacerbated. It is no secret that Deng Xiaoping publicly announced, during his visit to Washington at the beginning of last year, Beijing's intention to "punish"

Vietnam and "teach it a lesson." This intention was then carried out: Beijing was no longer merely the herald of war, but its instigator, the immediate aggressor in an operation launched against a socialist country. This was not done without Washington's approval. "There is almost no doubt," American journalist R. Ward wrote, voicing the opinion of the majority of political correspondents in the West, "that if China had not been assured of diplomatic support from the United States,...it could not have taken the risk of attacking Vietnam. The United States resolved to normalize its relations with China (and received its vice premier with all the honors due a head of state) at a time when it knew full well that China was planning an act of war against Vietnam... Our government never objected to any of Deng Xiaoping's hostile remarks about Vietnam."<sup>8</sup>

People in Washington apparently expected the Beijing adventure to result in a direct confrontation between China and the Soviet Union and eventually cover the path leading to better relations between them, and if the Chinese should get stuck in Vietnam, as the Americans had, this would tie Beijing to America even more closely. It was also taken into account that this would be a conflict between socialist countries, which was certainly in the interest of imperialism. For this reason, the U.S. Government displayed solidarity with Beijing, asserting that its action could be justified by its objections to the Soviet influence in Indochina (it should be noted that the U.S. Government had once concealed its own invasion of Vietnam by references to a struggle against the Chinese influence). This was a vivid example, this time on the American side, of the tactic of pushing one's partner into the flames of war, which is a characteristic feature of Sino-American cooperation in the world arena.

As a result of its aggression, Beijing suffered an unparalleled moral and political defeat. This also completely shattered the myth of the peaceful policy of the Chinese leadership, which Western propaganda had been spreading as a favor to China. "Now everyone can see," L. I. Brezhnev said, "that it is this policy that now poses the most serious threat to world peace."<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the provocative role played by Washington was exposed, and it became obvious that peace could be undermined by the military-political cooperation between Maoist China and American imperialism.

Washington performed a definite service for Beijing when it, along with its allies, kept the UN Security Council from passing a resolution condemning the Chinese aggression. Taking Beijing's side, the American Government refused to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam and to extend it the long-promised economic aid that it was obligated to pay as compensation for losses incurred as a result of the many years of American intervention. In conjunction with the Chinese leadership, the American Government launched a loud propaganda campaign against Vietnam in connection with the so-called refugee problem. On the pretext of "helping the refugees," the United States sent the ships of its 7th Fleet to the shores of Vietnam, which helped to prolong Beijing's armed

provocations on the Sino-Vietnamese border and encouraged the aggressor. American and Chinese propaganda worked in concert to exaggerate the myth of the "Vietnamese threat" to Southeast Asia in order to exacerbate relations between Vietnam and the other Indochinese states on the one hand, and the ASEAN states (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines) on the other. The covert cooperation in exerting pressure on the SRV thereby became a permanent factor in Sino-U.S. relations.

China and the United States united their efforts to influence the course of events in Kampuchea in their own selfish interests and to discourage other countries from recognizing its popular-democratic government and giving international assistance to the Kampuchean people, who had suffered tremendous losses and privations under the criminal regime of Beijing's proteges. Beijing and Washington are still supporting the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs, supplying them with weapons, equipment and food through Thailand and simultaneously opposing the expulsion of the agents of this long-deposed regime from the United Nations and other international organizations.

China and the United States are also acting on a "parallel basis" in Iranian affairs. It was not only the American imperialists who suffered a defeat in Iran when the shah's bloody dictatorship fell, but, to some degree, also the Maoists. After all, they were also flirting with the shah, developing a special relationship with him and encouraging feudal-monarchic Iran to join the anti-Soviet "international front." And after the shah went into exile, the Chinese special services worked with the CIA to undermine the anti-imperialist movement in Iran and to organize anti-Soviet provocations there. Beijing did not conceal its satisfaction with the Carter Administration's attempted show of military strength in the Persian Gulf.

The cooperation between the Beijing leadership and American imperialist reaction turned out to be closest in matters connected with Afghanistan. Beijing's tentacles had been stretching out toward this nation for a long time in the hope of turning it into a stronghold of Chinese espionage and diversionary and military activity in direct proximity to the Soviet order. Maoist agents were sent to Afghanistan, and all sorts of Beijing-guided ultra-leftist groups were formed there ("Shoalee Javid," the Yari Brethren Club, and others) to conduct anti-Soviet propaganda, fuel intertribal hatred and prevent the unification of Afghan revolutionary forces fighting against the monarchic regime and feudal reaction. Just as Washington, Beijing played up to the royal court in the hope of preventing, with its aid, the spread of Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

The Beijing leadership obviously disapproved of the popular revolution in April 1978: It recognized the democratic republic only 11 days after its declaration. The Maoists tried to use their few supporters in Afghanistan for a struggle against the new order. But the establishment of democracy in this country, the economic assistance and political support it

received from the Soviet Union, and the mutually beneficial and egalitarian cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan grew into an obstacle for Chinese penetration. Beijing antagonized democratic circles in Afghanistan when the great-power, expansionist ambitions and the pro-imperialist policy of the Maoist leadership became increasingly apparent.

Discredited, Beijing resorted to armed forms of struggle against the Afghan revolution. It chose the camp of the Afghan counterrevolutionary rabble in Pakistan as the base for its subversive activity. Here the Maoists began to train and arm gangs of mercenaries to be sent to Afghanistan, hoping to organize a pro-Chinese coup in Kabul with their help. For the Beijing leadership, which was distinguished by an extreme lack of principles, it may no difference that its basis of support in all of this hostile activity against the DRA was made up of inveterate reactionaries and anticommunists from among the Afghan feudal lords, successful merchants, court bureaucrats and others of this type who had been dispossessed by the revolution.

Naturally, the Maoists quickly found a common language with American reaction as well, which had never stopped its anti-Soviet imperialist intrigues in Afghanistan. This union was another of the negative results of the PRC-U.S. rapprochement. Their coordinated intervention in Afghan affairs essentially evolved into armed aggression, posing a serious threat to the independence of Afghanistan and to peace and security in Asia. The Soviet troops who came to Afghanistan at the request of its government blocked the aggressors' way, which understandably enraged them. The American Government hastened to coordinate to plans for future actions against the DRA primarily with Beijing, as the most suitable partner in this venture. In part, this was also connected with U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown's visit to the PRC. The two sides "displayed complete mutual understanding" and agreed on shipments of weapons and other types of military assistance to Pakistan primarily for the purpose of activating the sorties of Afghan mercenaries from Pakistani territory. The main role in this venture was assigned to China: The U.S. Government felt it was more convenient to act through China, so as to avoid excessive anti-American irritation in India and other peaceful countries and to transfer the blame for all consequences to its partner. It was also borne in mind that, for several reasons, it would be easier for Beijing than for Washington to agree with Pakistan on general interaction, as U.S. relations with Islamabad had been fairly cool, and even tense at times, in recent years.

The Beijing leadership is actually serving American imperialism in other areas of international struggle as well. It actively supports the U.S. course of escalating the arms race, strengthening NATO and deploying new types of American missiles in Europe. Beijing's increasing diplomatic and propaganda activity in this distant region is invariably intended to prevent the implementation of the historic decisions of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation, stir up the European capitalist



states against the USSR and the states of the socialist community, and keep Western Europe dependent on the United States.

In the Far East, Beijing is cooperating closely with Japan and is striving to draw Japan into the orbit of its own anti-Soviet strategy and to exacerbate Soviet-Japanese relations. It supports the plans of Tokyo ruling circles to preserve the U.S.-Japanese military alliance and build up Japan's weapons in accordance with Washington's demands. At the same time, the Maoists are trying to divide the Japanese democratic forces that are leading the struggle against the military alliance with America and for the independence and neutrality of Japan. Beijing approves of the maintenance of U.S. military bases not only in Japan, but also in the Philippines, Thailand and several other Asian and Pacific countries. In spite of the well-known UN decision regarding the transformation of the Indian Ocean zone into a zone of peace, as demanded by India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and other littoral states, Beijing favors stronger U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and, in particular, the enlargement of the U.S. naval base on the island of Diego Garcia. The Chinese Government is actually collaborating with Washington in diplomatic maneuvers calculated to undermine Soviet-Indian relations.

In the Middle East, the Beijing leadership has essentially expressed solidarity with the conciliatory line of Egyptian ruler Anwar Sadat, who has made a separate deal with Israel. In addition, China is supplying Egypt with weapons. It is helping to deepen the rift between Arab countries, thereby serving Washington and its policy of unconditional support for aggressive Zionism. Beijing has eagerly interacted with the United States in African affairs as well, supporting the schemes of pro-imperialist agents against the progressive states and movements of this continent. It approved of the U.S., French and Belgian intervention in Zaire and expressed its willingness to join the NATO powers in assisting their proteges in the African countries.

At the same time, Beijing is making every effort to incite the United States to attack socialist Cuba: Chinese propaganda quite often gloats about the inability of the United States, with all its power, to make short work of Cuba. The Americans, however, are pleased that Beijing is waging this constant propaganda campaign against Cuba in an attempt to undermine the unity of the socialist states and to turn the non-aligned countries against them. Press organs closely associated with U.S. ruling circles applauded the Maoist display of energy in connection with the conference of non-aligned countries in Havana last fall, when the Beijing leadership used its contacts with some participants in an attempt to divide the movement for non-alignment and to replace its traditional platform of anti-imperialist struggle with the idea of "struggle against the two superpowers"--or, to put it more precisely, struggle against the USSR.



This is only a brief review of the interrelations between China and the United States and the new aspects of their military and political cooperation that are increasing the danger of international complications. It is a well-known fact that Beijing is developing special contacts on an anti-Soviet basis not only with the United States but also with its allies--Japan, the European NATO countries (particularly England and the FRG), Australia and others. During this particular stage, however, Sino-American convergence is evidently the chief objective and the practical basis for the "international anti-Soviet front" the Beijing leaders are promoting. As the discussion above indicates, this convergence is of a definitely destructive and destabilizing nature from the standpoint of the interests of detente and stronger peace. In connection with this, questions arise about the stability of this cooperation between the Beijing ruling clique and American imperialist reaction, the limits of this cooperation and its possible future effect on the international situation.

The answers to these questions must be sought first in the general development of international affairs and the present balance of power on the global scale. Sino-American convergence is taking place at a time when the influence of international forces for socialism, democracy and peace is increasing. The growing economic and defensive strength of the Soviet Union and all the states of the socialist community, and their success in defending the cause of peace and security are constantly limiting the possibility of attaining great-power hegemonic goals, both for Maoist China and for American imperialism.

Under these conditions, it is difficult for belligerent reaction to make short work of the policy of detente, which is in the vital interests of the people. "This policy has deep roots," L. I. Brezhnev said. "It is supported by strong forces and it has every chance of remaining the leading tendency in relations between states."<sup>10</sup> But this means that those who want to bury detente today and return mankind to the cold war era will sooner or later have to take a more sober look at present realities, which dictate the need for peaceful coexistence. America's long-range interests will ultimately bring Washington politicians to the conclusion that the most reasonable alternative for the United States is the alternative of negotiations with the Soviet Union and the improvement of relations with this country, as its chief partner in the world arena. We can assume that the Beijing leaders will also eventually realize that confrontation with the Soviet Union is a futile cause and is extremely injurious to Chinese national interests. The improvement of relations with the Soviet Union by either country, on the other hand, will make the present aggressive and provocative essence of Sino-American rapprochement aimless.

We should also remember the objective fact that there are several conflicts in Sino-U.S. relations--conflicts which are even now impeding the process of rapprochement, and in the future, under certain conditions, could create new friction in these interrelations.

These conflicts are far from limited to just the Taiwan problem, which, as pointed out above, has not been solved and which still represents not only the object of divergent and incompatible Chinese and Soviet views, but also a source of international tension, since the fate of Taiwan will affect the interests of several Asian and Pacific countries. There are other, seemingly less pronounced, conflicts and differences of opinion, but these are also permanent and unchanging. We will list a few of them.

First of all, the aggressive expansionism that is characteristic of the United States and of Maoist China is increasing mutual distrust, and in the future, as PRC military and economic potential grows, will unavoidably lead to fierce competition.

Elements of this competition can already be seen today in the two sides' approaches to some global and regional matters. The United States sees Beijing's claims to a leading role in the "Third World" and its attempts to use the developing Asian-African and Latin American countries to strengthen its own influence in the world arena as a direct threat to U.S. geopolitical ambitions. "China is still regarded as one of the United States' chief competitors, and in some Asian and Pacific regions it could become the principal competitor. Statements by Beijing leaders indicate that their strategic goal is to undermine the positions of both 'superpowers'--first the Soviet Union and the United States. This must be taken into account by Americans." "We must always remember," the influential American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR remarked, "that China is pursuing its own selfish goals.... One fine day, when China is a strong power in the military and economic sense, its interests could conflict with Western interests."<sup>11</sup>

In this situation, Washington, despite its desire to play the "China card," is not likely to aid in making China too strong.

Secondly, as a result of the prolonged armed U.S. intervention in Chinese internal affairs and the former U.S. policy of blockading and isolating the PRC, deeply antagonistic feelings developed, and traces of them are still present in the Chinese public mind, despite the changed character of official relations. This is why the present course of rapprochement with the United States is not supported by the masses, which makes the course unstable and subject to unexpected changes, particularly if fundamental changes take place in the Beijing leadership. The Chinese leaders must give some consideration to the mood of the public, and the U.S. Government is uncertain of the value of long-range agreements with the PRC because it is not convinced that the Beijing leadership's positions are completely solid, particularly the faction identified most closely with America. This is attested to, in particular, by its stand on the Taiwan issue.

Thirdly, relations between China and the United States are influenced by the differences in their socioeconomic structures and ideologies, which are complicating the convergence of the two countries. For example, the

willingness of the United States to help China modernize its economy was connected with the expectation of putting this economy under the control of American monopolies, drawing the PRC into the orbit of capitalist economic relations and distorting the social bases of the Chinese State. In view of this prospect, discussions of the relationship with the United States are arousing serious differences of opinion in the Beijing ruling clique, which are due to the Chinese society's traditional identification with socialism. Something else is just as important: This identification means that the doors will always be open for the regulation of relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union. The possibility of this turn of events frightens U.S. ruling circles, as it would mean the failure of their plans to use China in the interests of imperialism and a radical shift in favor of socialism in the global balance of power.

During the present stage in the development of Sino-American relations, both partners are striving to blunt these conflicts and are moving away from them, so as not to disrupt the process of mutual convergence which has now been given priority in Beijing and Washington foreign policy. This is why it will be absolutely impossible to diminish the threat posed to the cause of peace by this convergence--after all, it is stimulating belligerent actions on both sides.

It would be absolutely wrong to assume that China is still too weak to have a significant effect on international developments or to endanger world peace. "It does not necessarily have to be the enemy of detente with the greatest military strength who pushes mankind to the verge of thermo-nuclear catastrophe. The most dangerous is not often the strongest, but the most reckless. When Hitler's Germany started World War II, it was not the strongest imperialist power. But it was in this country that the most adventurous and foolhardy leadership took shape, acting in accordance with the chauvinistic and hegemonistic ideals of Hitlerism, which naturally evolved into the policy of aggression and war."<sup>12</sup> The same great-power and hegemonic ideals govern Maoist policy, which has also become a policy of aggression and war. Ample proof of this can be found in the numerous aggressive acts committed by the Chinese social-chauvinists in the last two decades--against India, the USSR, Mongolia, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand and other countries. The PRC was to blame for 19 of the 30 military conflicts that have taken place in Asia since World War II. Last year's armed attack on Vietnam by China proved once again "the extent of the irresponsibility with which Beijing regards the fate of the world, and the criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership puts weapons to work."<sup>13</sup>

The danger is mounting not only as a result of Beijing's direct military-political interaction with Washington in the world arena. As the discussion above demonstrated, China's convergence with the United States and other imperialist countries is also taking the form of cooperation in regard to some of the Chinese State's domestic problems, particularly the problem of modernizing its economy and armed forces. In this respect, the policy of the Beijing leadership, which took shape under the influence of

convergence with the imperialist world, is leading to the widespread penetration of the country by foreign capital. The law on joint enterprises passed by a session of the All-China National People's Congress in June 1979 guarantees capitalist monopolies particularly favorable terms for activity in China. Special zones are being established in some parts of the PRC, where foreign capitalists have the right to establish their own enterprises, buy land, exploit cheap manpower, conduct duty-free trade and send all of their profits out of China in the form of currency. In view of China's economic and political weakness, this could lead to the seizure of key positions in this nation by capitalists, which could have the most serious consequences from the standpoint of future international developments.

All of this indicates that the state of affairs created by Beijing's policy of convergence with imperialist forces could give rise to serious complications in the world arena. This would affect the interests of many peaceful countries and, naturally, China's neighbors above all. This could also threaten the vital interests of the Chinese people themselves. The main threat would be the danger of China's involvement in a major war, which could come about as a result of the Beijing leadership's provocative and adventurist policy. This would crush the people's hopes of overcoming economic difficulties and elevating the material standard of living, which is still extremely low. After all, the program of "four modernizations," which has been discussed in such great detail by the Chinese leaders, is actually aimed at the intensive buildup of military potential and completely ignores the need to improve the living conditions of the masses. The militarization of the country, to be accomplished with the aid of the capitalist powers, and the military ventures undertaken by the Maoist leadership are absorbing huge sums and are blocking the path to the normal development of the PRC national economy by exacerbating the social and political instability of the Chinese State and the Chinese society. Finally, there would be the danger that the socioeconomic structure of the PRC would be deformed by the intrusion of foreign capital, an increase in the political and ideological influence of the West, and the involvement of China in capitalist economic ties.

Let us stress, therefore, that the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism, against the policy of the present Beijing leadership and against its conspiracy with belligerent imperialist circles will be of tremendous value in defending peace and universal security and, moreover, in giving internationalist support to the interests of the Chinese people themselves.

#### FOOTNOTES

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6. From Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's replies to the questions of America's TIME magazine--PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.
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CSO: 1805



RESULTS OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 69-82

[Article by V. N. Fetov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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INQUIRY INTO THE REHABILITATION OF PENG DEHUAI, HERO OF THE CHINESE  
REVOLUTION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 83-91

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

## JAPAN: HEAVY BURDEN OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 92-101

[Article by Professor K. M. Popov, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Specialists disagree in their assessments of the state of the Japanese economy at the turn of this decade. But they are almost unanimous in the conclusion that the era of high rates of economic development has ended and that a new era has begun--the era of slow development. In other words, the economy has reached a turning point. According to various estimates, under favorable conditions the rate of industrial production in coming years will not exceed 5-6 percent a year, although in the pre-crisis era, from the early 1960's to 1974, the average annual rate of industrial production was 14 percent (in leading branches of heavy industry), 15 percent in ferrous metallurgy and the chemical industry and 20 percent in machine building.

The simple phrase "slow rates of development" signifies extremely complex and pronounced sociopolitical, economic and technical processes.

Throughout the pre-crisis period of almost 20 years, Japan developed with extreme speed. During this time, tremendous production potential and numerous large enterprises, not suited for operations under the conditions of low rates of development, were established. The approach of the crisis necessitated radical and immediate changes in the entire industrial structure in line with the slower rates of development and the lower productivity of industrial production. Under these conditions, it became much more difficult to sell products. In the 1970's, no foreign expert on Japanese affairs, with the exception of some progressive writers, could have predicted the possibility of "overheating" as a result of accelerated development, the difficulties that could arise, and the negative aspects of economic growth. The most optimistic predictions clearly prevailed.

Famous American historian Arnold Toynbee went to Japan in the late 1960's and wrote about the "Japanese miracle" in a series of articles published in the Japanese and English press. He tried to find an explanation for it in the "unique Japanese personality."

French journalist Robert Guy predicted a "radiant future" for Japan. He began his book "Japan, the Third Great Power," published in Paris in 1969, with a chapter entitled "The Race to the Year 2000." The author wrote about the "extraordinary dynamism" that was supposedly characteristic of the Japanese, and about the "extraordinary scales" of industrial and infrastructural development. He predicted that Tokyo would be a metropolis with a population of 38 million by 1985. "The entire Japanese population," he said, "is racing into the future. All Japanese citizens, even if they do not become wealthy, will still ultimately benefit from the prosperity of their nation and the progress of Japanese society."

The realities of the 1970's shattered the myth that Japan was approaching the creation of a "state of universal prosperity." The crisis of 1974-1975, which was particularly severe, showed how easily the people who had visited Japan had been deceived and had not comprehended the facts of the situation, the difficult conditions in the country. They did not foresee the consequences of exaggerated industrial development, which was being accomplished primarily in the interests of the dominant classes.

#### Results of Japanese Economic Development Up to the Beginning of the 1980's

The latest severe crisis had a much more negative effect on Japan than on other industrially developed capitalist countries. The crisis began in Japan at the end of 1973. The peak of the crisis lasted around 15 months (10-12 months in Western Europe and 6-7 months in the United States). The crisis in Japan was not only the most lengthy, but also the most severe. Japan had the highest indicator of production decline--20 percent (the decline ranged from 9 to 13 percent in Western Europe and measured 15 percent in the United States).

The period of severe depression following the crisis was also longer in Japan--around 25 months. The pre-crisis level was reached in June-July 1976 in the United States and the FRG, in fall 1976 in Western Europe, and not until March-April 1977 in Japan.

An important feature of the crisis in Japan and the subsequent depression was their broader scope in various spheres of national life--sociopolitical and cultural as well as economic. This is why economic indicators alone cannot fully reflect the actual severity of the crisis. When we study its causes, degree of influence and consequences, we must examine them comprehensively, as a group of interconnected factors.

At the same time, the recent definite economic growth and the rise of production indicators in Japan do not mean that the crisis is over. This cannot be regarded as real recovery, affecting various aspects of national life. It would be more correct to say that economic recovery as a whole (with the exception of a few production branches) is not only extremely slow, but also uneven and unstable.

Assessing the nation's immediate prospects just before the beginning of 1979, the Japanese press expressed the hope that this year would be the best since the crisis. It is true that the rate of industrial production was somewhat higher in the first half of this year than in the previous year, but, with isolated exceptions, growth rates declined in the second half of the year. Official forecasts predicted that the GNP growth rate would be 6 percent or even 7 percent, but actually growth did not exceed 5.7 percent.

In 1979 the export growth rate slowed down dramatically. Total exports amounted to 103 billion dollars as opposed to 97 billion in 1978. This means that the increment was 5.6 percent (21 percent in 1978). At the same time, there was a sharp rise in import figures--110 billion dollars, in contrast to 79 billion in 1977. This was an increase of 40 percent but the physical volume of imports did not increase. Oil purchases alone cost 33.4 billion dollars, or around one-third of the total cost of imports. Expenditures on imported oil were almost 10 billion dollars higher than in 1978. The average increase in the price of imported goods was almost 30 percent.

Another important event of 1979 was the first negative balance of trade, in the amount of 8 billion dollars, in recent years. The balance of payments was even worse--the deficit was 16.6 billion dollars, as opposed to a positive balance of 5.9 billion the previous year.

In connection with currency difficulties and the fluctuation of the yen exchange rate, currency reserves decreased from 33 billion dollars to 20 billion just in 1979--that is, a decrease of 18 billion dollars, or 38 percent.

Phenomena of this kind were new in the Japanese economy. There is no question that these unfavorable processes will affect the nation's economic development in 1980 and in subsequent years.

Although the government is taking various steps to reduce the rate of inflation, it is still rising: Wholesale prices have risen 7.3 percent, and retail prices rose almost 4 percent. The inflationary process here, however, has been much less intense than in other capitalist countries.

In terms of several indicators, there was some production growth in industry in 1979, particularly in heavy industry and the chemical industry, as shown in the table below.

The increased output of several metals in 1979 resulted from increased demand in the domestic market and export expansion. It reflected the increased demand for ferrous metals in the world market.

Nonferrous metallurgy is still in a depression. Japan holds second place in world copper and aluminum production, but market conditions have been unfavorable for these commodities and their output increased only slightly in 1979.



### Japanese Industrial Production

	1975	1978	1979
Electrical power (billions of kilowatt-hours)	383	453	481
Coal (millions of tons)	19	19	19
Pig iron (millions of tons)	77	78	84
Steel (millions of tons)	100	102	112
Aluminum (millions of tons)	1.0	1.0	1.0

Machine building is experiencing considerable difficulties, mainly connected with export problems. For the first time in many years, the automotive industry, which is one of Japan's leading branches and had been developing at a rapid rate, had an extremely low vehicle output growth rate in 1979. In 1978 the industry produced 9.3 million motor vehicles, and in 1979 the figure was 9.6 million--that is only a little over 4 percent more.

Ship building, the key branch of Japanese machine building, is still experiencing difficulties although orders for commercial vessels have recently increased somewhat.

In light industry the process of recovery was just as slow in 1979 as before. This was due to lower demand in the domestic market and increasing difficulties in foreign markets.

The demand for products of the electrical engineering industry--radios, television sets, tape recorders and so forth--fell noticeably, but there was a simultaneous slight rise in the demand for microelectronics, electronic watches, special precision instruments, etc.

Japanese agriculture also felt the effects of the crisis and depression. This sector is dominated by small commercial farms; farms with less than 1 hectare of land account for around 70 percent of the total. Inflation is having a serious effect on them. There has been a significant rise in the cost of mineral fertilizers and agricultural implements, and conditions are more difficult for the sale and transport of products. It is more difficult to enlist the aid of agricultural cooperatives.

The situation in agriculture has been complicated. Whereas the nation was previously suffering from a chronic shortage of rice--one of the staples of the Japanese diet--now there is a surplus. Something like a "rice boom" is going on, stocks of rice are growing, but the demand has hardly risen at all because the urbanites have begun to eat bakery goods. The effects of this were felt quite strongly in 1978 and 1979. The government had to take emergency measures--on the one hand, it had to find new ways of using rice for industrial purposes and, on the other, it had

to limit the planting of rice by subsidizing those who planted less rice instead of paying for the enlargement of rice fields.

In Japan, rice is sold mainly in special government shops, where the harvested rice arrives from procurement centers. The "rice subsidies" have been discussed several times in parliament. The opponents of government aid to rice growers are demanding the reduction of these subsidies, but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party cannot agree to this because it relies considerably on the support of rural inhabitants.

Most of the peasants with small plots cannot even satisfy their own needs with what they grow on their minuscule holdings and this is why seasonal work is developing rapidly, with peasants leaving their farms for temporary paying jobs. The more wealthy rural inhabitants are moving to the suburbs and managing truck gardens, where they use progressive farming methods for the cultivation of year-round vegetables, fruit and flowers. The development of animal husbandry has stimulated some to open mixed fodder enterprises for the sale of fodder to livestock breeders.

There has recently been a tendency to establish agroindustrial complexes in the suburbs--not the large complexes seen in the United States or Western Europe, but slightly smaller ones with more primitive equipment. This tendency has been actively supported by government, municipal and cooperative organizations. This is most in the interest of the wealthy rural inhabitants.

The total state budget for 1980/81 has been set at 42,588,000,000,000 yen--that is, 10.3 percent higher than the budget for 1979/80 (the fiscal year begins on 1 April).

Taxes and loans constitute the basis of budget revenues. The tendency toward higher taxes, both national and local, is arousing particularly strong public resistance. As for the loans, the proportion accounted for by them in the budget has increased so much in recent years that the government decided to discontinue this practice in the present fiscal year and to keep the total loan figure at the previous level, particularly since earlier loans have not had the expected impact.

Borrowed capital accounts for 33 percent of the 1980/81 budget, as opposed to 39 percent in 1979/80.

Budget expenditures on military items are almost 4 times as high as in 1973. The so-called appropriations for "aid" to the developing countries have risen again. In 1979-1980 most of the industrially developed Western countries tried to reduce this "aid," but Japan took the opposite course, widely advertising its intention to increase this "aid" and to simplify its terms (to lower interest rates, grant certain privileges and extend the repayment period). The size of so-called "gifts" has also increased.

Just as in past years, the state budget is extremely strained and testifies to the difficult financial position of the nation, which provides no grounds for optimistic predictions for the next few years.

#### **Burdensome Legacy of Accelerated Development**

The consequences of "accelerated development" are present in the social and political spheres of Japanese life as well as the economy.

The direct results of Japan's "accelerated development" were the chronic underloading of production capacities and their partial ruin, more pronounced disparities in the distribution of productive forces, increased dependence on imported fuel and raw materials, reduced employment and increased unemployment.

The general structural economic crisis in Japan was largely a crisis of overproduction in heavy and light industry. This was the result of the excessive and haphazard development of the production system and the nation's industrial base. In times of crisis and depression, the workload of production capacities is far from full. In addition, some of the equipment at a number of enterprises is obsolete and, therefore, inefficient to use. This particularly applies to leading branches of heavy industry--machine building and ferrous metallurgy.

Most of the industrial enterprises in Japan are small and medium-sized firms (some of them are independent firms located in the provinces, but there are also many so-called subcontractors, closely connected with large enterprises). In terms of the value of production output, however, the dominant position in industry is occupied by large plants and combines, generally equipped with the latest technology. The operation of many small and medium-sized enterprises turned out to be inefficient under crisis conditions. It was these enterprises that had to cease operations at the time of the "bankruptcy wave," and many of them had to scrap their equipment.

Although ferrous metallurgy suffered less than other branches during the "peak" years of the crisis, it still experienced many shocks. There were around 70 blast furnaces in the nation. Most of them were obsolete and their productivity was low. During the crisis, their fate was a foregone conclusion.

A few years ago the Japanese press reported a series of events in Kamaishi, a city located northeast of Tokyo. This was the small old city where the first European-model glass furnace in Japan was built in 1849. This marked the beginning of the establishment of a metallurgical combine which was once regarded as the "leader of Japanese metallurgy." In the postwar years, when intensive construction work on new metallurgical plants was going on, the Kamaishi enterprises began to lose their importance, although many inhabitants of the provincial city depended on them for their livelihood.

When the crisis began, the administrators of the company decided to close the plants because they were obsolete and inefficient. This was in the interest of the metallurgical company but it doomed most of Kamaishi's inhabitants to hard times.

In place of the old plants near Tokyo, a metallurgical combine of the latest design, almost completely automated, with a small staff of workers and employees, was erected on a man-made island in the shallows of a bay.

Hard times have also come to the ship building industry. In this industry, not only the small enterprises that once existed in many Japanese port cities have ceased to operate, but also large shipyards, particularly the ones that built super-power tankers, the demand for which has fallen sharply.

The devastation of the production system also affected the chemical industry and several branches of light industry, although to a lesser degree. The oldest branch of the textile industry--the cotton industry--suffered considerably, and many small and medium-sized enterprises closed, particularly in the provinces.

These examples illustrate the severe damages "accelerated development" inflicted on production itself and on the people actively employed in this sphere. There can be no question that the Japanese people had to pay an extremely high price for this "accelerated development" in the egotistical interests of monopolies.

#### Sharply Expanded Dependence on Imports

Japan is more dependent on imported oil and raw materials than any other capitalist country. The degree of dependence on imports is 25 percent on the average in the United States, 53 percent in France, 70 percent in the FRG, 75 percent in Great Britain and 83 percent in Italy. The degree of Japanese dependence is extremely high--98-99 percent in some cases, and 100 percent in the case of several important raw materials, including fuel oil.

In many world raw material markets, Japan is among the top consumers--this applies to iron ore, manganese, many rare and precious metals, uranium, coking coal and bauxite, as well as such commodities as cotton, wool, fodder grain and even wood (Japan is one of the heavily forested countries, but it can only satisfy half of its demand for wood). As large-scale production developed, imports of the raw materials it required grew more intensively.

At the turn of the decade, under the conditions of increasing international complications, new important tendencies pertaining directly to purchases of raw materials were seen. The cost of imported raw materials depended mainly on commercial conditions in the past. Now, however, this is not

always the deciding factor. Commodities have taken on "political overtones," and the possibility of acquiring them depends largely on the international situation and on many political trends. This became particularly clear at the time of the world energy crisis. To a considerable degree, this was the result of the U.S. policy of dictating its will and demanding that its closest allies support its aggressive plans. The catastrophic effects of this policy on Japan were not taken into account.

Another new tendency is also significant--the attempts of the developing countries, the main suppliers of raw materials in the world capitalist market, to create associations of raw material exporting countries. For example, they have already founded associations of natural rubber producers, tropical lumber suppliers and several others. These associations look to make use of OPEC's experience in the coordination of pricing policies and the elevation of prices in line with world market conditions. The Asian UNCTAD countries have been particularly active in this field. Special attention is being given to the need for the so-called "stabilization" of prices. Attempts to raise raw material prices in the future will complicate the possibilities and conditions of imports even more.

Japanese power engineering is strongly dependent on imported oil. In the earlier stage of its economic development, Japan imported almost no oil, and its own resources constituted the major energy balance--hydraulic power and coal. The turning point came in the 1960's, when imported oil became the basis of power engineering. Heat and electric power stations were erected in large cities and industrial centers, and their capacity was highly impressive--50 million kilowatts. The production capacity of refineries for the processing of imported oil exceeded 300 million tons a year. These refineries were working at almost full capacity even during the crisis.

Japan imports slightly less oil than the United States: Before the crisis it imported from 220 to 250 million tons a year. In 1979 it imported 230 million tons (the FRG imported around 90 million tons, and Italy and France imported slightly more).

The 19 nuclear power plants in Japan are completely dependent on imported uranium. Uranium is imported from various countries--Canada, the United States, Niger and South Africa.

Liquefied gas is imported from Alaska, Canada, Brunei, and some Persian Gulf countries, mainly Kuwait, as well as South Africa and Australia.

The leading branch of industry--ferrous metallurgy--is highly dependent on imports. Japan is the largest importer of iron ore: It imported around 100 million tons in 1979, or twice as much as the United States and the FRG imported. Imports of manganese and coking coal are also quite high. Imports of the latter have reached 60 million tons. The significance of this figure can be judged from the fact that all of Western Europe imports approximately the same amount of coal.



The extreme dependence of Japanese industry on foreign "food" for the swollen production system has created an unsteady import foundation and dependence on many diverse and contradictory economic and political conditions.

#### Problem of Employment and Unemployment

For the almost 20 years of "accelerated development" in Japan, there was virtually no unemployment, there was often a shortage of labor, and young people moved from rural areas to the cities. Almost anyone could find a job. The situation changed dramatically in 1974 and 1975. Labor exchanges and registration centers appeared. In 1975 the number of unemployed reached 1 million. Urban workers were threatened by the possibility of losing their jobs. In 1979 there were 1,176,000 totally unemployed people in Japan--more than in the FRG and just slightly less than in France or Great Britain. Although people in Japan believe that the national economy has entered the recovery phase, this has not led to a considerable drop in unemployment. The number of persons employed in industry has not risen, and is even displaying a tendency toward reduction.

Reports in the Japanese bourgeois press often state that the number of unemployed is not that great in comparison to the total number of employed individuals. But the important thing is not the quantity of unemployed, but the composition of this group. Experienced, highly skilled workers are in a better position. At many large enterprises where production growth is expected in the future, steps are being taken to retain the necessary staff. Young people are in a completely different position. It has been increasingly difficult for them to find jobs. This particularly applies to young people with a higher education, and they are entering the labor market in larger numbers each year. A recent tendency has been the move of the labor force from the cities to rural areas.

Only members of trade unions are recorded in official statistics, and they account for only one-third of all employed individuals. Employees of small and medium-sized enterprises are in difficult position, and it is precisely these individuals who carry most of the burden of crises and depressions. This category is not even reflected in statistics. The materials of labor organizations usually point out the fact that the actual number of unemployed is much higher than the figures published in the official press.

In the foreign bourgeois press, statements can be found to the effect that the Japanese masses are completely satisfied with their position because Japanese workers supposedly want much less than American or Western Europeans, and that the Japanese have grown accustomed to their primitive dwellings, extremely modest furnishings and meager diet. Soviet scholar V. N. Khlynov, the author of "Rabochiy klass Yaponii v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii" [The Japanese Working Class

at a time of Technological Revolution], notes that progressive Japanese scientists are taking a new approach in their works in regard to the traditional view of living conditions, and in regard to so-called poverty. They believe that the time has come to define and assess the standard of living of the Japanese working population on the basis of absolutely different criteria, that material, social and spiritual aspects must be regarded as a single entity when the new poverty in today's world is being examined, and that it is a mistake to reduce the entire issue to a question of wages, when a broad variety of factors must be taken into account, as these determine the standard of living of today's man, whose requirements are far removed from what they once were.<sup>1</sup>

One of the negative consequences of the "accelerated development" of industrial production was the inefficient distribution of productive forces in the nation. The basis of its economic potential was the main industrial belt on a narrow coastal strip on the Pacific Ocean, and on the Sea of Japan in the South, where the factories, plants and combines built during the years of "accelerated development" are concentrated. Large-scale construction took place on the narrow territorial base of the old industrial centers of Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka-Kobe and Yabata (northern Kyushu). Just a relatively short time ago, 10-15 years ago, these centers were separated by "green intervals"--farmlands, orchards and flower gardens. All of this has disappeared. As a result of excessive urbanization, many new satellite cities have appeared and a dense industrial belt has taken shape. Its length, from Tokyo to Nagasaki, is over 1,000 kilometers, and its width is quite insignificant--from 30 to 60 kilometers, and slightly more in rare instances. The result has been severe pollution of the environment and the appearance of entire smog zones (for example, the Kitakyushu metallurgical complex or the city of Yokkaichi, which is in a disastrous state brought on by the waste of the petrochemical combine located in the center of the city).

Whereas pollution problems were once local issues, pollution is now a nationwide political problem. No candidate in a municipal election can expect to win if he ignores pollution in his campaign.

#### Japan--The Junior Partner of the "Imperialist Trio"

Among the different processes characteristic of the present stage in the general crisis of capitalism, there is the tendency toward further and even more energetic convergence between the Japanese economy and the economies of the United States and the main industrially developed countries of Western Europe, primarily the FRG. The process of convergence, accompanied by mounting conflicts, was quite intense even in the era of Japan's accelerated economic development.

1. See V. N. Kalynov, "Rabochiy klass Yaponii v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii," Moscow, 1978, p 202.

The new branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry have taken the top positions in the Japanese economy. The convergence of economic structures has benefited the state-monopoly system in Japan. The process has been accompanied, however, by conflicts which have given rise to significant difficulties. Not all of the earlier disparities were alleviated by government intervention, and now new, equally complex conflicts have now begun to take shape.

Numerous publications about Japan have said a great deal about the few indicators which make it one of the leaders of the capitalist world, but have given little attention to the disparity in the scales of production and trade.

Between 1960 and 1975 the U.S. share of capitalist production declined from 47 to 39 percent, the Japanese share rose from 5 to 9 percent, the FRG share was approximately the same, Great Britain's share was 6 percent, the French share was 5 percent and Italy's share was almost 3.5 percent. Japan's share of world trade is relatively low: It hardly reached 4 percent in 1960, and by 1975 it had risen to 7 percent, which was slightly higher than the shares of France and Great Britain but much lower than the shares of the FRG (14 percent) and, in particular, the United States (74 percent). Japan is lagging far behind its partners in capital exports: its total overseas assets (monetary and physical) were estimated at 36.2 billion dollars in 1978, while FRG assets were 48 billion and U.S. assets were 70 billion.

As a result of the convergence of economic structures, the variety of Japanese export goods (and the designation of export capital) is quite similar to the variety of goods exported by its chief partners. Therefore, the junior partner of the "imperialist trio" occupied a dual position: On the one hand, Japan has been an ally and, on the other, it has been a rival or competitor.

When the United States encouraged Japan to participate in multinational monopolies, it limited the activity of Japanese monopolies to its own benefit.

In the latest version of American imperialist strategy, special attention is devoted to the so-called "renovation" of the international system by means of uniting U.S. political and economic interests and relations with those of Western Europe, particularly its main industrial nation--the FRG--and those of Japan.

On Washington's initiative, a tripartite commission was created after lengthy preparations by American experts. The purpose of the commission was to determine the fundamentals of cooperation in connection with the changing international situation, particularly the intense struggle of the developing countries for a new economic order in the world. It was then that the "three centers" took shape in the imperialist camp. This

did not settle any of the conflicts in this camp, and it even heightened its instability and the rivalry between these partners. The American policy of dictating its will, which became particularly distinct in the international complications of the turn of the decade, inflicted perceptible damages on the state of the Japanese economy and led to its further involvement in U.S. global strategy. The United States has insisted on a sharp increase in Japanese military expending, on the accelerated militarization of this country and on the kind of qualitative upgrading of Japanese "self-defense forces" which will allow them to take on much of the functions of the American armed forces in Asia. When Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Okita visited Washington on 20-21 March 1980, American spokesmen, according to reports in the press, "sharply demanded" the augmentation of Japanese military potential.<sup>2</sup> They insisted that Japanese defense appropriations should be equivalent to 1 percent of the gross national product by 1981, which would mean an increase of more than 245 billion yen in comparison to this year's already extremely high level of military spending.

When Japanese ruling circles resolved to continue strengthening their military ties with the United States, they also made an active search for ways of effecting rapprochement with China, particularly in the hope of penetrating the Chinese market. When Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira visited Beijing in early December 1979, an agreement was concluded on the extension of credit to China within the next 6-7 years, approximately in the sum of 1.5 billion dollars and on the most preferential terms--3 percent per annum for 30 years--for the working of a bituminous coal field and the construction and remodeling of three railroads and two seaports. Japanese economic aid will be used in several projects stipulated in the program of "four modernizations" and, in the final analysis, will help to augment Chinese military potential and to make the hegemonic policy of the Beijing leadership even more rigid. Over the long range, this will certainly lead to fiercer fighting between Japan and China for the dominant position in East and Southeast Asia, which both countries regard as their natural sphere of influence.

Japan entered the 1980's with the heavy burden of numerous economic and political problems, which can only be resolved by the fundamental revision of domestic and foreign policy, the renunciation of the course toward militarization, the refusal to support the aggressive ambitions of the United States and Beijing, and the establishment of truly friendly relations with all countries.

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2. See SANKEI SHIMBUN, 22 March 1980.

## AFGHAN REVOLUTION AND BEIJING'S TREACHEROUS POLICY LINE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 102-109

[Article by Yu. V. Agranov]

[Text] Current revolutionary processes in the world are separating the forces supporting the national liberation struggle from those advocating its suppression. The Chinese leaders have turned out to be among those who oppose progressive democratic reforms in Afghanistan. Now the examples of their betrayal of people's struggles for liberation, as in Vietnam, Kampuchea, Chile, Angola, Ethiopia and other countries, have been supplemented by a new example--Beijing's broad-scale subversive activities against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Whereas the Beijing leadership was quite recently playing up to the national liberation movement in an attempt to extend Chinese hegemony to it and was praising the movement as "the most important force striking directly at imperialism"<sup>1</sup> in order to make the United States regard the PRC as the leading force in Asia, now China is striking at the revolutionary and progressive movements itself, in close conjunction with American imperialism.

The scales and nature of Beijing's subversive activity against the Afghan revolution and the extent of its interaction with forces for imperialism and reaction testify to the Chinese leaders' new shift to the right. The present counterrevolutionary essence of Chinese policy was most distinctly reflected in their attitude toward the April revolution in Afghanistan and the process of its subsequent development.

By engaging in subversive activity against Afghanistan in connection with events in this country, the Chinese leadership is pursuing far-reaching goals: It wants to curb the development of positive processes in international relations, launch a frontal attack on the policy of detente with the assistance of the United States, escalate the arms race, destabilize the situation in the Middle East and South Asia and create a more favorable atmosphere, from Beijing's standpoint, there for its own expansionist plans and hegemonic ambitions in this part of the world, and use the



Afghan events as a pretext for striking at the positions of socialism and the national liberation movement.

For the attainment of these goals, Beijing is relying primarily on interaction with imperialist forces, especially the United States. The Afghan theme was the leading topic at the Chinese leaders' talks this January with U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, during the course of which the existence of "common strategic goals" was underlined. When Brown spoke in Beijing, he declared: "We could take concerted action in the area of defense as well as the diplomatic sphere."<sup>2</sup> Zhang Wenjin, PRC deputy minister of foreign affairs, went to Washington this March to continue the "thorough discussion of the Afghan question." In the words of American officials, this was "the first working visit ever made to the United States in connection with this kind of issue."

The dangerous tendencies of the developing alliance between American imperialism and Chinese hegemonism and the continued reinforcement of their conspiracy against peaceful nations are even more distinct when viewed against this "Afghan background." In their attempts to play regional and world policeman, Beijing and Washington are stopping at nothing to suppress national liberation forces, interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and impose their will on these states.

The Chinese leadership is also supporting and vindicating other actions that are hostile to the national liberation movement and the cause of peace and security, such as the buildup of American naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the establishment of a new system of military bases on foreign territory, the creation of "rapid deployment forces," the energization of military bloc activity, the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in several Western European countries, and so forth.

The Chinese leadership viewed the Afghan events as a "convenient" excuse to provoke a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union at a time of international tension. Expanding the sphere of mutual understanding with the American administration, the Beijing leaders are studying the peculiarities of its present policy line and are making every effort to create tension in relations between the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community on one side and the West on the other, never abandoning their long-cherished hope of pushing the United States and the USSR into a military conflict.

The Chinese leadership is making a massive effort to depict the events in Afghanistan as a "threat" to peace in Asia and the rest of the world, as something just short of the principal cause of tension in international relations, and as a result of Soviet policy. When Egyptian Vice President H. Mubarak was in Beijing this January, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council made a speech containing some allegations borrowed from Western sources: He implied that the USSR intended to "break through to

the south, to the Indian Ocean, in order to control sea lanes and seize oil deposits." By spreading lies of this kind, the Beijing officials clearly want to provoke the imperialist powers, especially the United States, into aggravating relations with the Soviet Union, interfering more openly in Afghan affairs and escalating tension in this part of the world.

The causes of this tension should not be sought in Soviet policy, but in the tendency of Beijing and its imperialist partners to resort to aggressive hegemonic actions in various regions, including the provocative and increasingly extensive intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and other countries of this zone.

When Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was interviewed by a PRAVDA correspondent, he said: "The statements implying that the Soviet Union has some kind of expansionist plans in regard to Pakistan, Iran or other countries in this region are also absolutely false. The policy and mentality of the colonizer are alien to us. We are not longing for the land of others and we are not yearning for the wealth of others. It is the colonizers that are being drawn by the smell of oil."<sup>3</sup>

It is obvious that Beijing also needed all of the commotion over Afghanistan to conceal its shameful conspiracy with imperialism and reaction against the national liberation movement and the cause of peace and security and to divert attention away from the actual causes of complications in international affairs and in the situation in Afghanistan.

Beijing's attempts to arouse passions over the nonexistent Afghan question by involving as many states as possible in the discussion of this matter, including debates in international organizations, in order to distort and exaggerate the events taking place in that country, naturally cannot conceal the real purpose of Chinese policy in this region and its destabilizing role.

From the very beginning, the April revolution in Afghanistan aroused obvious displeasure and irritation in Beijing. This was due to the fact that events in the DRA were taking a turn different from the one desired by the Chinese leadership. The card which the imperialists and Beijing hegemonists had been gambling on was beaten. The Chinese leadership's plans to encircle the Soviet Union's southern flank with chains of hostile regimes, or "arcs of hostility," fell through. This is why Beijing immediately joined in the intrigues against the Afghan Government, in the subversive activity being conducted in Afghanistan in close conjunction with imperialist special services.

Beijing agents and Maoist elements concentrated on destabilizing the situation within the country, starting various types of disturbances and, when conditions were right, trying to nullify the gains of the April revolution. Beijing used the illegal antigovernmental and Maoist groups "Shoalee Javid"

and "Setame Melii" and the reactionary "Moslem Brethren" organization to conduct subversive activity to undermine the bases of the democratic order in Afghanistan.

Chinese agents took part in the organization of counterrevolutionary disorders in Herat in March 1979 and in Kabul this February. "What happened in the Afghan capital on 27 February," the KABUL NEW TIMES reported, "is a scandalous example of flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of a peaceful state--Afghanistan--by American imperialism, its Chinese allies and Pakistani reactionaries."<sup>4</sup> It turned out that some of the members of the gangs that mugged and killed civilians and were liquidated by the Afghan people's regime had been specially trained under the supervision of Chinese advisers. The secret rebel warehouses uncovered by Afghan authorities in Kabul, Herat and other cities contained many weapons made in China.

Beijing chose Pakistani regions near the DRA border as the main bases for training rebels and terrorists for subversive activity in Afghanistan. There are 20 special camps and 50 support points in these regions, where bandits undergo special training under the supervision of Chinese and American advisers.<sup>5</sup> Beijing and Washington have taken on the full responsibility of maintaining the counterrevolutionary rabble from the "Moslem Brethren" organization. The Chinese side recently gave "Afghan refugees" in Pakistan 300,000 dollars in financial assistance.<sup>6</sup> Whole formations of thousands of rebels and bandits, armed with modern weapons and trained in terrorist tactics, were transported to Afghan territory. At least 15,000 mercenaries underwent special training in 1979 alone.<sup>7</sup>

Huge shipments of modern weapons from China have made their way to gangs of mercenaries and counterrevolutionaries in Pakistan--air-to-ground missiles, mortars, recoilless rifles and large quantities of small arms, including AK-47 automatics. In June 1979, more than 8,000 tons of military equipment from China arrived in the port of Karachi on the Pakistani vessel "Rustam," after which it was transported to the Peshawar region and turned over to the gangs fighting in the DRA.<sup>8</sup>

Soon after the April revolution, Beijing took special steps to complete the building of the Karakorum highway. The decision to build this highway was made in 1965. This road, which connects Kashgar (PRC) with Havelian (north of Islamabad), is strategically important. The opening ceremony in June 1978 was attended by President Zia-ul-Haq and Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council, who made a special trip to Pakistan for this purpose. Immediately after the highway was opened, it was used for the intensive transport of military freight from China to Pakistan.

Beijing's subversive activity against Afghanistan broke out in a stronger form at the end of 1979. Beijing launched an undeclared war against the DRA, using various methods of struggle--political, diplomatic, economic and military. "After the failure of its policy toward Vietnam," reported

Beirut's AL-KAIDA, "when the Beijing leadership was unable to break the will of the courageous Vietnamese people, China turned its strength against progressive regimes in other countries, particularly Afghanistan."<sup>9</sup>

The Chinese leadership launched vigorous anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet activity with the aid of a hastily engineered "united front," made up of China, the United States, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Beijing's subversive activity was noticeably more active within the Moslem movement. It played up to the countries belonging to this movement in every way possible in an attempt to penetrate the movement and, if possible, to gain control over it and subject it to the interests of its own hegemonic policy.

To expand the scales of the so-called "antihegemonic struggle"--that is, the struggle against forces for socialism and the national liberation movement--the Chinese leadership tried to connect the events in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, depicting its subversive activity against these countries as an "important part of the fight against hegemonism."

The Beijing leadership even took several steps calculated to produce a show of strength. According to reports in the English press, 10-12 divisions and 4 squadrons of MIG-21 planes were transferred from Central China to Xinjiang.<sup>10</sup> China began to vigorously build up its troops near the Afghan border. Some Chinese troops even crossed the border into Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

Beijing was particularly enraged by the limited contingent of Soviet troops which entered Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government and in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty on friendship and cooperation of 5 December 1978 and Article 51 of the UN Charter to defend the country against foreign aggression. The international assistance given to Afghanistan by the USSR was a strong obstacle in the way of Beijing's hegemonic and interventionist policy. On 30 December 1979 the Chinese Government issued a statement containing fierce attacks and threats (!) addressed to the Soviet Union. The assistance given to Afghanistan by the USSR was described as "willfulness with impunity" in China.<sup>12</sup> Beijing is now proposing the use of "all effective means" to "restrain and punish the Soviet Union."<sup>13</sup> To stir up anti-Soviet hysteria even more and to justify the expansion of subversive activity, PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Haifeng said on 31 December 1979 that the Soviet Union's assistance of Afghanistan had allegedly "threatened the security of China."<sup>14</sup>

The purpose of Beijing's hostile treatment of the Soviet Union is absolutely clear: It wishes to denigrate proletarian internationalism and the assistance given by the USSR to liberation movements and progressive forces in order to divert the attention of the world public away from Chinese hegemonism in Asia.

The Soviet Union's assistance of Afghanistan wrecked the plans of the American imperialists and Beijing hegemonists to deprive the DRA of freedom



and independence. At a press conference held in Kabul at the end of January for Afghan and foreign journalists, Chairman Babrak Karmal of the DRA Revolutionary Council, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, declared: "The frustration of the plans being carried out against independent Afghanistan by U.S. imperialists in conjunction with Beijing and the Sadat and Begin regimes is one of the most important results of this latest stage of the April revolution."<sup>15</sup> If Beijing and Washington had been able to carry out these plans, a horrible tragedy would have awaited Afghanistan, similar to what took place in Kampuchea under the pro-Beijing executioner Pol Pot, or in Chile, where a fascist junta seized power with the assistance of the CIA.

Beijing's subversive activity in connection with the Afghan events has another aspect as well. By involving Pakistan more and more deeply in its own dangerous plans aimed against the DRA, Beijing is once again trying to push Islamabad into hostile behavior toward India. On the one hand, Pakistan is viewed by the Chinese leaders as a bridgehead and base for subversive activity against Afghanistan, but, on the other, it has been assigned the role of a sort of counterbalance to India and is expected to have a restraining effect on the policy of this country. China has no interest in regulating Indo-Pakistani relations and is even doing everything within its power to preserve and increase the tension between these countries.

The situation in which the South Asian states are opposing one another fits in with Beijing's hegemonic ambitions in this region. This is why Beijing, which verbally advocates the normalization and development of relations with the South Asian states, is actually making persistent efforts to divide the nations of the subcontinent and start fights between them, using Pakistan as its instrument of subversion, and is striving to encircle India with a "hostile ring." It is not surprising that India's peaceful policy, which has been called an important positive factor in international life, is viewed by the Beijing leadership as a massive obstacle blocking the implementation of Chinese hegemonic plans.

Pakistan was chosen by China--and, incidentally, by the United States--primarily because of its convenient strategic location, which makes it possible to use its territory for extensive subversive activity. Judging by the tone of the latest Sino-American talks, Beijing and Washington have worked out a joint plan in which Pakistan has been assigned the main role in the game revolving around the Afghan events, in the conduct of subversive activity and in the destabilization of relations in the region. This "joint strategy" of Beijing and Washington poses a serious threat to the security of all states in the Middle East and South Asia.

In their endeavors to involve Pakistan in this dangerous game, which could have serious consequences for the cause of peace, the Chinese leaders are pushing this country back into the position it occupied in 1971. The Pakistani leadership's progression in this direction, however, is neither in the interests of Pakistan nor in the interests of other South Asian countries.



Islamabad has recently become the meeting place for the coordination of Beijing and Washington policy in this region. Pakistan is alternately visited by high-level American representatives, as, for example, National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski, and Chinese officials. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua was in Pakistan from 18 through 22 January. He not only met with the Pakistani leadership but also visited Afghan rebel bases in the Peshawar region, where he made inflammatory statements, openly appealing for subversive activity against the government of the neighboring country.

Beijing has used the Afghan events as an excuse for the intensive buildup of Pakistan's military strength. China is becoming the main supplier of weapons to the Pakistani army. As President Zia-ul-Haq admitted, China has given Pakistan assistance in the amount of 2 billion dollars since 1966.<sup>16</sup> Beijing is sending Islamabad tanks, airplanes, rifles, other weapons and ammunition in quantities far exceeding the needs of the Pakistani army. Pakistani naval forces are using ships from China. Several enterprises have been built in Pakistan with Chinese assistance for the manufacture of military equipment, including a plant for the production of tank motors and spare parts.

The character Beijing wants its relations with Pakistan to acquire can be judged from the schedule of trips to Islamabad by various Chinese delegations. In 1979 Pakistan was visited by military delegations headed by PLA Air Force Commander Zhang Tingfa (March-April) and PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Zhang Caiqian (October), and in the middle of March this year the latest military delegation from the PRC, headed by President Xiao Ke of the PLA Military and Political College, went to Pakistan. The purpose of these visits was to coordinate efforts in the delivery of weapons to Afghan counterrevolutionaries, as well as in the further expansion of Chinese military aid to Pakistan.

China's augmentation of Pakistani military-economic potential under cover of the Afghan events represents a frankly hostile challenge to India. Speaking in Uttar Pradesh in February, Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi said that "danger is approaching India's borders," connected with the efforts of the United States, China and Saudi Arabia to arm Pakistan "to the teeth." This behavior is threatening the stability and security of South Asia.<sup>17</sup>

Beijing is turning Pakistan into a "powder keg" with the idea of blowing it up in its own interests whenever necessary with the aid of a fuse it holds in its hands. Under the conditions of China's alliance with the United States, this is supposed to give Beijing an opportunity to exert pressure on India. "What would happen if China began to take alarming measures on our borders?" Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi asks in her PARIS-MATCH interview. "The Chinese have already issued territorial claims to our country, and not only to territory they occupied in the past, but also to other provinces. And we are not even speaking here about the Southeast Asian countries."<sup>18</sup>

China recently resumed its intensive military preparations in Central Tibet. On 4 March of this year, the TIMES OF INDIA published a map showing the Chinese missile base in Nagchu, located 300 kilometers north of Lhasa and equipped with 90 missiles. Considering the location of these missiles, it is not difficult to guess the targets. As the INDIAN EXPRESS pointed out, "long-range missiles will be capable of hitting New Delhi and 20 other Indian cities."<sup>19</sup>

Beijing's expansionist plans are viewed in New Delhi as a serious and immediate threat to India's security. In a France-Inter broadcast on 10 November this year, Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi said that China "poses a threat" to her country because it "is nurturing expansionist hopes which have already made India suffer." More than once in the past, China has demonstrated its extremely hostile feelings for India and "is still making claims to India's territory." It is no secret that China has not renounced its claims to part of India, measuring 130,000 square kilometers, is still holding on to more than 30,000 square kilometers of Indian territory it occupied in 1962, is provoking antigovernmental demonstrations by the Naga and Mizo tribes, and so forth.

India's serious worries about the behavior of the Chinese leadership, which have recently been voiced more than once by the Indian Government, are quite natural and understandable. India, the largest power in this region, has consistently conducted a policy of peace and it is not indifferent to the provocative troubles Beijing started in direct proximity to its borders on the pretext of the Afghan events. Recent events have corroborated that Beijing's policy is not really in the interests of the developing countries.

The dangerous and provocative maneuvers of imperialism and Chinese hegemonism can only be deterred by the firm resistance of their intrigues and the resolute frustration of their dangerous plans.

#### FOOTNOTES

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2. NEW YORK TIMES, 8 January 1980.
3. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
4. KABUL NEW TIMES, 2 March 1980.
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CSO: 1805

THE 34TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND BEIJING

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 110-121

[Article by V. K. Gusachenko]

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CSO: 1805

**IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL COLLAPSE OF MAOIST GROUPS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES**

**Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 122-134**

**[Article by R. M. Aslanov, candidate of historical sciences, and B. A. Bolotin, candidate of historical sciences]**

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805



ANTI-MARXIST THEORIES OF JAPANESE BOURGEOIS SOCIAL SCIENTISTS REGARDING  
THE ESSENCE OF CLASSES AND CLASS STRUGGLE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 135-146

[Article by B. V. Pospelov, doctor of historical sciences]

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EXAMPLES OF PROLETARIAN SOLIDARITY (COMMEMORATING THE 55TH ANNIVERSARY OF  
THE BEGINNING OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1925-1927)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 147-154

[Article by R. A. Mirovitskaya, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

## THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BORDER BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 153-169

[Article by V. S. Yasenev and A. G. Kruchinin]

[Text] The history of the formation of the present Soviet-Chinese border covers a period of almost 300 years of Russian relations first with the Chinese State proper, and then with the Manchurian Taich'ing (Ch'ing) Empire. The first diplomatic contacts between Russia and China were established at the very beginning of the 17th century, when vast territories lay between them, consisting of numerous feudal holdings and lands inhabited by various nomadic and seminomadic tribes. At the time the Russians began to explore and develop East Siberia. The borders of the Chinese State, the Ming Empire (1368-1644), were north of the Great Wall of China and essentially ran along the wall, so that crossing the wall, as the reports of the first Russian embassies in China testified, was the same as entering China. Chinese officials explained that the wall was the boundary between the Chinese State and the "Mungal land."<sup>1</sup>

As we know, Ming China was at war almost continuously from 1618 through 1644 with the Manchurians who had inhabited the southern part of what is now northeast China. In 1644 the Manchurian Ch'ing Dynasty took the throne in Beijing, the Chinese people had to bear the weight of a foreign yoke, and the Chinese State was destroyed.

The Ch'ing Empire was a military-feudal regime of Oriental despotism, and it conducted an aggressive policy in the 17th-19th centuries against Korea, the Russian cis-Amur zone, Mongolia, Jungaria, Tibet, Kashgaria, Vietnam and Burma.<sup>2</sup> Today's Chinese social-chauvinists are the heirs of these despots. To substantiate their "rights" to the territory of neighboring countries, they are searching for evidence in China's earlier history.

The present Beijing rulers maintain that the Amur zone was part of China even during the Ming era, and that the Ussuri was one of China's "internal rivers." According to this interpretation, the settlement of the cis-Amur and coastal zones by Russian explorers is viewed as "intrusion into Chinese territory."<sup>3</sup>

History books published in China in the late 1950's, however, contained maps on which the geography of Russian and Chinese territories in the Far East were depicted quite differently. In Peng Ming's book "The History of the Sino-Soviet Friendship," for example, the following statement can be found: "By the 1680's, Russia had extended its dominion to Siberia and then to the Amur. The Chinese Emperor K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty also extended his kingdom to the Amur."<sup>4</sup> Although the author does not specify the precise point at which the territories of the two empires met, it is clear from the context that the Ch'ing Empire only reached the banks of the Amur in the 1680's, and that the Russians were already there.

It is a fact that in the 1640's, when the Manchurian empire was waging aggressive wars against the Chinese State proper, Russian explorers and the peasant "homesteaders" who followed them were making their appearance on the banks of the Amur. Soon Russian settlements and stockades (or forts) appeared in the cis-Amur zone and on the Pacific coastline. Several large settlements were founded on the right bank of the Amur as well as on the left: the Albazinsk Fort in 1651, Kumarsk (on the right bank of the Amur) in 1654, and Krasnogorsk in 1658. The city of Okhotsk and Anadyrsk Fort were founded in 1648 and 1649.

The spontaneous exploration of the region by peasants and Cossacks was followed by government colonization. The Russian State began to take local tribes with no government under its protection. By the beginning of the 1680's, the cis-Amur territories explored by the Russians became part of the Russian State and were known as the Albazinsk Province.<sup>5</sup>

When the Russians reached the cis-Amur zone, it was inhabited by the independent tribes of the Daur, Dvuchers, Evenks, Nanaitsy and Nivkhy, whose patriarchal structure was disintegrating.<sup>6</sup> There were not many of these inhabitants, and in the mid-17th century they numbered, according to available data, only 40,700 (32,300 in the cis-Amur zone, 4,000 on the coast and 4,400 on Sakhalin Island). In this way, Russia acquired title to vast territories which were almost uninhabited and unexplored. Before the Russians arrived, the local tribes were not subject to the Ch'ing Empire or any other state. When Russian settlers and authorities arrived in the cis-Amur and coastal zone, there were not Manchurian or Chinese authorities and there were no Chinese or even Manchurian inhabitants.

In order to conceal the indisputable historical facts and to substantiate the allegation that the Russians arrived to the Amur when it had long been in Chinese possession, Maoist historians and the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs are dating the "Chinese presence" in the cis-Amur and coastal zone back to the first decade of the 15th century. "In the beginning of the 15th century," a document of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, "China under the Ming Dynasty established hundreds of administrative units on various levels--'tuchihhueishih-szu,' 'wei,' 'so' and others--in the region stretching from the Onon River in the west to K'ueitan Island in the east and from the Uda River in the north to the Sea

of Japan in the north. The famous Horgos 'Iudihueishih-sau' was founded in 1409 in T'ien near the mouth of the Heilongjiang River. The officials and officers of these administrative bodies were Hans, Nuzhens (that is, Manchurians) and people of other Chinese nationalities."<sup>7</sup>

In reality, Ming China, the border of which essentially ran along the Great Wall, attempted to establish control over the legacy of the Mongolian Empire in the northeast nominally, on paper, more than physically. By mentioning the Uda River, for example, Beijing officials are trying to create the semblance of a "historical boundary" specified in the Nerchinsk Treaty. In fact, however, there were no administrative units of the "sau," "wei" or "so" types in this region, just as there were none in the trans-Baykal or Sakhalin.<sup>8</sup> The plan to set up these "wei" and "so" units only took the form of an attempt to found a "chimi" zone in the central regions of Manchuria, inhabited by the Jurchens, the Manchurians' ancestors--a territory for the "containment" of barbarian tribes to protect the borders of the Ming Liaodong from raids by these tribes. The "chimi" lands were not part of the empire.<sup>9</sup> What is more, this was a system of temporary measures. The Jurchens were not only liberated from Ming China's guardianship, but they even set up their own state and took command over China.

According to Manchurian-Chinese and Russian historical sources of the 17th century, the boundary of the Manchurian holdings then ran through the central regions of Manchuria along the line of the fortifications called the "Willow Palisade." This line lay approximately 600-800 kilometers south of the Amur and far to the west of the Ussuri. The territory beyond the "Willow Palisade" was not part of the Manchurian state.<sup>10</sup>

The assertion of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "from the first half of the 17th century, when the Manchurians became the ruling nationality in China, these regions were still under the jurisdiction of China under the Ch'ing Dynasty, which appointed officials and officers to guard these regions, recruited soldiers and collected taxes,"<sup>11</sup> has absolutely nothing in common with the facts.

According to Chinese sources, even regular trade between the Manchurians and the tribes of the southern cis-Amur zone did not begin until the 1660's. According to tradition, this trade was regarded in Beijing as the payment of "tribute" by representatives of the "barbarian" tribes, although this was certainly not the case.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the Manchurian rulers did not allow trade with the "barbarians" to be conducted within the empire. The Ningut outpost, north of the "Willow Palisade," was used for this purpose. The Ningut garrison was manned by exiled functionaries and criminals. It had no authority to perform administrative or judicial functions with regard to the cis-Amur tribes.<sup>13</sup>

Even in its south Manchurian lands (just as the rest of China) and sparsely populated territories, the Ch'ing monarchy tried to drive the Manchurians out of the cis-Amur zone in the 1680's. It is this Ch'ing



imperial expansionist policy that the Maoists are interpreting as...a national liberation struggle by the Chinese people. Without any hint of embarrassment, they assert: "In the second half of the 17th century, China had several battles with colonizers from tsarist Russia, but these were wars in which China resisted invading aggressors."<sup>14</sup>

In 1685 and 1687 the Ch'ing government made two attempts to seize the cis-Amur zone by force. This zone, known as the Albazinsk Province, was an administrative unit of the Russian State. The Russian city of Albazin was twice subjected to a siege. When these hostilities began, the Russian State only had a few cossack brigades in the cis-Amur and the Albazin garrison was manned by a few hundred soldiers. Nonetheless, they repulsed the Manchurian invasion within 10 months.<sup>15</sup>

The military failure in Albazin, the Ch'ing Empire's preparations for war with the Jungar Khanate to seize Mongolia and, in particular, the empire's internal difficulties forced the Ch'ing government to finally agree to peace talks with Russia. Emperor K'ang-hsi sent the Russian Government a document, requesting that an embassy be sent to the Amur to conclude a peace agreement. The embassies were to meet in the Russian city of Nerchinsk.

A delegation headed by Boyar F. A. Golovin came from Moscow for negotiations, accompanied by a brigade of only 1,500 soldiers. The Ch'ing ambassadors, on the other hand, arrived in Nerchinsk with 12,000 troops, prepared to exert military pressure on the Russians if they should refuse Manchurian demands.<sup>16</sup>

The talks began on 12 August 1689 and took place in a tense atmosphere. The Manchurians categorically refused to accept Golovin's proposal regarding the establishment of the border between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire along the Amur. They demanded the concession of the entire Albazinsk Province and even a large part of the trans-Baykal.

When the Russians refused these demands, the Ch'ing delegation resorted to force. From 14 through 27 August 1689 their troops literally laid siege to Nerchinsk. Realizing that even if he could defend Nerchinsk, he did not have enough troops to drive the Manchurians out of the cis-Amur zone and engage in lengthy battles, F. A. Golovin had to agree to give up part of the province. In an attempt to guard against Ch'ing claims to Russian holdings along the lower reaches of the Amur and on the coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk, Golovin declared that he was not authorized to negotiate the delineation of property outside the bounds of the Albazinsk Province. The Russian Delegation also denied the Ch'ing request to give up the "Yasach Murats, Evenki and Mongols" and recognize that the Mongols were Chinese subjects.

The treaty, which was later called the Nerchinsk Treaty, was concluded in August 1689. It was recorded in Russian, Manchurian and Latin. The treaty consisted of seven articles. The first, second and third delineated

the border between the Ch'ing Empire and the Russian State. According to the first article, the boundary was to run from the upper reaches of the Gorbitsa River to the sea along the "Stone Mountains." It was not clear which mountains and which sea were referred to in the treaty. The vast region below the cis-Amur--that is, the territory south of the Uda River--and other adjacent lands were left undelineated "until some other propitious time."<sup>17</sup>

The second article of the treaty established the border along the Argun' River. The third article decided the fate of the Russian city of Albazin: "The city of Albazin, which was built by His Majesty the Tsar, will be razed to its foundations, and all the people living there, with all of their military and other equipment, will retreat to the territory of His Majesty the Tsar and will not leave the slightest trace or the slightest object behind."<sup>18</sup>

The Manchurian ambassadors took an oath to swear that the Ch'ing Empire would not settle the Albazinsk territory.<sup>19</sup> In this way the Ch'ing government limited its sovereignty in the lands it had seized from Russia.

Since none of the Russians spoke Manchurian and no member of the Ch'ing delegation could speak Russian, the negotiations were conducted through Jesuit interpreters. Although the Jesuits demanded bribes from the Russians, they worked against their interests.<sup>20</sup> This was one of the reasons that the geographical points of reference in the Russian, Manchurian and Latin texts of the treaty differed.

No maps were affixed to the treaty because the two sides did not have enough geographic knowledge of the delineation zone. We must agree with prominent French historian G. Cahen's statement that "the Russo-Chinese border was therefore established in one section, and this was the first step in this area. But there was no precise delineation in any region northeast of Nerchinsk for the simple reason that this region was completely unknown. The 'Stone Mountains,' 'Holy Nose' and even the Uda River were actually no more than vague geographic terms for both sides; this region had not been explored enough as yet and had not been depicted on any maps.... The Nerchinsk Treaty actually established the border in only a small section of a vast nation."<sup>21</sup>

Manchurian officials implied that the Russians had "voluntarily given" the Ch'ing emperor vast territories during the talks in Nerchinsk. A report of the Ch'ing Empire's State Council, composed in the name of Emperor K'ang-hsi, contained the indicative admission that "the lands lying northeast of the expense for several thousand li never belonged to China or were part of our empire."<sup>22</sup>

The differing texts of the Nerchinsk Treaty make it an extremely flawed document. The delimitation of the border in this treaty was absolutely unsatisfactory in view of discrepancies in the text and the vague

geographic points of reference it specified. The boundary line was virtually nonexistent.

Contrary to the facts, Maoist authors maintain that the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 was fair, "although the Chinese side made substantial concessions for the sake of establishing peace and reaching an agreement," while the Russian State included, according to the treaty, lands "east of Baykal, which had once belonged to China, and the Chinese territory of the Uda River basin." They allege that the "Albazinsk war" was a "just Chinese war against the aggression of tsarist Russia."<sup>23</sup> When the Nerchinsk Treaty was made public, the Ch'ing government was already misrepresenting it by arbitrarily omitting not only the preamble but also the end of the first article on the nondelineated territory, and quite groundlessly extended the border all the way to the sea on maps, including even Sakhalin Island as part of the Ch'ing Empire.<sup>24</sup> These tricks were also used by Kuomintang historians. Now the Chinese side is not only misrepresenting the purpose and significance of the treaty and arbitrarily interpreting its articles, but is also publishing "historical" maps which reproduce this falsified version of the Nerchinsk Treaty border.<sup>25</sup>

In 1691 the Ch'ing Empire, continuing its practice of waging aggressive wars, seized northern Mongolia, and the Manchurian Court began to request the demarcation of Russian and Ch'ing possessions in this region in an attempt to secure the empire's title to these conquered lands by means of international legal documents.

As a result of new talks on the boundary between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire, held in 1726 and 1727, the preliminary Burinsk Treaty was signed in August 1727. It marked the boundary from the Abagaytu volcano (where this line merged with part of the Argun' border set in the 1689 Nerchinsk Treaty) to the Shabin-Dabaga pass in the Greater Sayansk Range. The Burinsk Treaty was a separate article of a general document defining the political and commercial relations between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire. This document, which was ratified through an exchange of copies on 14 June 1728 near the city of Kyakhta, was called the Kyakhta Treaty.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to the borders defined in the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689, which remained unmarked, the border in the Khalkha-Mongolia region was marked by special joint Russo-Manchurian commissions which compiled maps and descriptions of the border.<sup>27</sup> Border guards and signs were set up along the boundary.

The seventh article of the Kyakhta Treaty reiterated the terms of the Nerchinsk Treaty regarding the lands (near the Uda River) which remained undelineated.<sup>28</sup> In this way, Russian diplomacy reserved the right to raise the question of the final delineation of the cis-Amur territories at a more propitious time in the future.

Throughout the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, the Russian Government tried to establish the real border in the Amur zone, but the Ch'ing Government refused to discuss and settle the matter.

The gradual settlement of Siberia by Russians and the development of its economy and trade necessitated the immediate resolution of the issue of the Far Eastern border. On the economic level, the cis-Amur and coastal zones were closer to Russia, giving East Siberia access to the Pacific Ocean. The English and French colonial wars against the Ch'ing Empire and their actions in the Pacific Ocean against Russia during the Crimean War created the danger that the lower reaches of the Amur and coastal zone would be seized by the Western powers. This forced Russian authorities in East Siberia to take preventive measures. In 1849 a geographic expedition headed by G. I. Nevel'skiy dispelled all doubts that ships could sail along the Amur and explored the strait between Sakhalin Island and the mainland. The territory of the former Albazinsk Province and the undelineated lands below the cis-Amur zone remained uninhabited and unexplored. In the lower reaches of the Zei River, the Manchurians broke the oath they had sworn when the Nerchinsk Treaty was signed by founding a few settlements.

In 1856-1860, at the time of the second "Opium War" waged jointly by England and France against China, the Ch'ing Government found itself in a difficult position and expressed interest in a stronger relationship with Russia. The Ch'ing Court saw Russia as a possible ally in the struggle against the intrusions of the Western colonial powers. The tsarist government was the only power which forbade its citizens to trade in opium in China.<sup>29</sup> Whereas the Nanking Treaty, which was imposed on the Ch'ings by England by force of arms, was unfair, the Kul'dzhin agreement concluded by Russia with the Ch'ing Empire in 1851 regulated the trade of Russian merchants in Kul'dzhe and Chuguchak on the basis of equality. The third article of this treaty stressed: "This trade has been made possible by the mutual friendship of the two powers, and therefore neither side can collect duties."<sup>30</sup> In addition, the convergence of Russian and Ch'ing holdings in Central Asia and Kazakhstan necessitated the demarcation of territories in this section as well.

The Crimean War revealed the complete collapse of feudal Russia's economic and political system. The defeat suffered in this conflict with England and France demonstrated that tsarist Russia should use essentially peaceful and diplomatic methods to solve its problems in the Far Eastern and Central Asian theaters of foreign policy. These methods were effective due to certain factors, some of which were connected with the interests of the Ch'ing Empire.<sup>31</sup>

As a result of lengthy tsarist diplomatic efforts, Governor General N. P. Murav'yev of East Siberia and an authorized representative of the Ch'ing Empire, T. Shan, signed the Aygun' Treaty on 28 (16) May 1858. The first article of this treaty stated: "The left bank of the Amur River, from the Argun' River to the mouth of the Amur, will be a possession of the Russian State, and the right bank, all the way to the Ussuri River, will be the possession of the Taich'ing State; all of the lands and territories beyond the Ussuri River to the sea will be jointly owned by the Taich'ing and Russian states, just as they are now, until such time as the two states should delineate the border here."<sup>32</sup>

When the treaty was signed, the Russian representative agreed that citizens of the Ch'ing Empire who had voluntarily settled near the mouth of the Zei would remain here and would still be under the jurisdiction of the Ch'ing government. This was not an admission of any kind of Manchurian rights to this territory, but simply granted the Manchurian Court's citizens the right of extraterritoriality in this Russian region. The total number of Manchurian subjects living near the mouth of the Zei was only 3,000 in the mid-19th century.

The Aygun' Treaty was concluded in the interest of both sides because it was directed against encroachment upon the Amur zone by the Western European powers. This was reflected in the preamble and the first article--on navigation along the Amur, Sungar' and Ussuri, allowing only the ships of Russia and the Ch'ing Empire to sail these rivers.

The Aygun' Treaty did not contain any unfair articles. Nonetheless, Beijing now includes it among the treaties "unfair" to China.<sup>33</sup> In May 1858, Gu Yun writes, the united forces of England and France invaded China, seized Tianjin and threatened Beijing. Russia wanted to join England in a war against China and even sent an "aggressive army of several hundred well-armed soldiers" to the site of the treaty talks, as a result of which I Sha' had to sign the Sino-Russian Aygun' Treaty with N. N. Murav'yev.<sup>34</sup> In spite of Gu Yun's efforts to include the Aygun' Treaty among the "unfair" agreements, he was unable to prove this. Following the Ch'ing example, he discarded the preamble prior to publication; as for the articles of the treaty, although he declared that they only appeared to be simple but actually "reflected Russia's greed," he could not provide any kind of concrete analysis of the provisions of the Aygun' Treaty.

At the time when the Aygun' Treaty was concluded, an authorized representative of Russia was in Tianjin--Ye. Putyatin, who had been sent there to negotiate the terms of commercial and political relations with Ch'ing China and to discuss border questions. Two weeks after the Aygun' Treaty was signed, Putyatin, who had not heard that the talks in Aygun' had ended successfully, signed the Tientsin agreement on the general principles of interrelations between the two countries.

The ninth article of this agreement pertained to territorial problems. In this article, authorized representatives of the Ch'ing Empire admitted the need to establish the precise border between the two states in several locations. "The uncertain sections of the border between China and Russia," it stated, "will immediately be investigated on the spot by authorized individuals...and their conclusions will make up a supplementary article to this agreement. When the boundaries are set, detailed descriptions and maps of the territories in question will be compiled and will serve both governments as irrefutable border documents in the future."<sup>35</sup>

In light of this article, it is clear that the Maoists have absolutely no grounds for alleging that "the Chinese borders were precisely and clearly



defined before the Western imperialist powers invaded China in the middle of the 19th century."<sup>36</sup> The Tientsin agreement did not stipulate any other border terms. Nonetheless, even this provision of the Tientsin Treaty is included by the Maoists among the treaties "unfair" to China. In this way, they imply that the Soviet-Chinese border was established by "unfair" treaties.<sup>37</sup>

In connection with its temporary success in the war against England and France, the Ch'ing Government tried to put the return of the left bank of the Amur to Russia in question, to declare the Aigun' Treaty invalid and to thereby risk the serious aggravation of relations with Russia.

The situation did not change until 1860, when Anglo-French troops advanced on Beijing. The difficulties connected with this and the continuing Taiping rebellion forced the Ch'ing Government to reconsider the need to strengthen its relationship with Russia and settle border problems.

Now the Maoists are making every effort to discredit Russia's actions during this period and to misrepresent and cast doubts upon the legality of the agreements concluded at that time by the two states. They allege: "Taking advantage of the Anglo-French invasion of China and seizure of Beijing, tsarist Russia, after inventing a pretext for performing some kind of mediating services and threatening that 'the war could easily flare up once again,' forced the Ch'ing Government to sign the 'Sino-Russian Peking Treaty' on 14 November 1860, in accordance with which the Chinese territory of approximately 400,000 square kilometers east of the Wusulijiang River had to be signed over to Russia."<sup>38</sup>

What is the real history of the Peking Treaty? Russian envoy N. P. Ignat'yev was sent to Beijing to settle disputes between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire by diplomatic means. China's submission to English and French influence was inconvenient for Russia and, therefore, Ignat'yev tried to relieve their pressure on the Ch'ing Government, which justifiably viewed Russia as a counterbalance to the Western European states.

On 2 (14) November 1860, N. P. Ignat'yev and Ch'ing representative Gong signed the Peking Treaty, which reaffirmed all of the terms of the Aigun' agreement and, besides this, specified that the jointly possessed Ussuri territory (Primorskiy Kray) was a Russian possession.

The first article of the Peking Treaty stated that, in confirmation and elucidation of the first article of the Aigun' Treaty and in execution of the ninth article of the Tientsin Treaty, "the eastern border between the two states, from the confluence of the Shilka and Argun' rivers to the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, will run down along the Amur River. The lands on the left bank (north) of the Amur River will belong to the Russian State, and the lands on the right bank (south), to the mouth of the Ussuri River, will belong to the Chinese State. Farther down, from the mouth of the Ussuri River to Lake Hingkai, the border will run along

the Ussuri and Sungach rivers. The lands on the eastern (right) bank of these rivers will belong to the Russian State, and on the western (left) to the Chinese State. Then the border between the two states will cross Lake Hingkai from the source of the Sungach River and will run to the Belen-he (Tur) River, from the mouth of this river along the mountain range to the mouth of the Hubitu (Khubtu) River, and then along the mountains between the Hunchun River and the sea to the Tumenjiang River. Here as well, lands in the east will belong to the Russian State, and in the west to the Chinese. The border will run into the Tumenjiang River 20 Chinese versts (11) above the point where it flows into the sea.... After the boundary has been marked, the border will be immutable."<sup>39</sup> The first article also referred to a map, on which the border was depicted with a red line and its direction was indicated by the letters of the Russian alphabet from "A" to "Y."<sup>40</sup>

On 16 June 1861, after the boundary had been marked, the two sides signed a supplementary article to the Peking Treaty. In accordance with this, the maps mentioned in the first article of the treaty were exchanged, stamped with state seals and signed by representatives of the two sides.<sup>41</sup>

The first article of the Peking Treaty also stipulated that "if settlements of Chinese citizens should exist in these locations, the Russian Government promises to leave them there and permit them to continue their work in the fishing and fur trades."<sup>42</sup> This means that the Ch'ing Government did not even know whether there were any of its citizens in Primorskiy Kray. There was no settled Chinese population or Ch'ing authorities in this region at that time.

Contemporary Chinese propaganda and "scientific" publications describe the behavior of tsarist Russia during the signing of the Aigun' and Peking treaties as "aggression against China," and to prove that the cis-Amur zone and coastal region "belonged" to China, they have even tried to give the Soviet cities in this region Chinese names they never had (Boli for Khabarovsk, Haishengwei for Vladivostok, and Hailanpo for Blagoveshchensk). The Chinese place-names were used here only after Chinese hunters arrived in the second half of the 19th century and, paying no attention to the Russian titles of these populated points, gave them their own "slang" names. Now the Chinese side is trying to make use of this fact for its own falsifications. But these attempts are groundless. As V. K. Arsen'yev, outstanding Russian expert on the Far East, wrote, "the Ussuri and Amur region acquired its Chinese population second-hand--from the coastal Sungar' and its tributaries.... These refugees could not go back to their homeland and could not return to the Sungar' because they would have had to pay with their blood for their escape.... The Beijing Government's knowledge of the Chinese who had voluntarily settled in the Ussuri region is reflected in the first article of the Peking Treaty."<sup>43</sup>

The Aigun' and Peking treaties completed the lengthy process, covering more than 150 years of the delineation of the border between tsarist

Russia and the Ch'ing Empire in the Far East. The articles of these international documents returned to Russia part of the cis-Amur territory it had abandoned under pressure during the talks in Nerchinsk in 1689. In addition, the Peking Treaty set the boundary in the particular parts of the Far East which had remained undelineated or, according to the words of the Aigun' Treaty, had been "jointly owned until demarcation."

It should be noted that one of the ways the Chinese side has distorted the boundary settlements in these treaties was the failure to mention the Aigun' Treaty at all in some Chinese works on foreign policy. The Peking Treaty, on the other hand, was called the "Treaty on the Eastern Border Between China and Russia Along the Ussuri River," and it was dated 16 June 1861--that is, the time when the supplementary article was signed on the exchange of maps and descriptions of the border in the Ussuri region.<sup>44</sup> The article itself is mentioned here under the subtitle "Memo on the Establishment of the Sino-Russian Border Along the Amur" of 28 July 1861.<sup>45</sup>

The delineation of the Russo-Chinese border in the Far East in the middle of the 19th century must be examined in connection with the stages and nature of the convergence of Russian and Manchurian possessions in the Amur basin in the second half of the 17th century and the terms of the Nerchinsk Treaty. This kind of examination provides an accurate picture of the establishment of the border in this region and refutes the lies in Chinese and Western historical literature about Russia's "seizure" of the territory of the Ch'ing Empire. The truth is that the Ch'ing Empire, using the 1689 treaty as a cover, tried to seize a large part of the Russian cis-Amur zone, but was then compelled by the treaties of 1858 and 1860 to return this territory and to give up all claim to the coastal zone of the Far East, which it had never owned, and to agree to the establishment of a border precisely marked by actual points of reference.

The facts about the establishment of the Far Eastern section of the Russo-Chinese border, the contents of treaties and maps prove that the Chinese version of these events is completely groundless.

In 1882 the Ch'ing Government (apparently not without some instigation on England's part) laid claim to part of the coastline of Pos'yet Bay for the purpose of taking possession of the entire left bank of the Tumyn' River. In 1886 this section of the border was redefined. An inspection conducted at that time confirmed the accuracy of the demarcation in other sections as well, particularly the accuracy of the mark "E" established at the mouth of the Ussuri near the village of Kazakevichevo. On 4 July (22 June) 1886, a general protocol on the border inspection in the coastal zone was signed on the natural boundary of Novokiyevsk, near Hunchun.<sup>46</sup>

The provisions on territorial matters recorded in treaties, protocols, maps and descriptions are still completely valid. As a 29 March 1969

Government announcement stressed, "the Soviet Government insists on the strict and undeviating adherence to these provisions by the two sides.

If the PRC Government agrees, then there are no grounds for friction and conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border."<sup>47</sup>

The Peking Treaty marked the line of the future boundary between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire in Central Asia.

The Manchurian-Chinese conquerors' campaigns into Central Asia, especially the Jungaria region, began at the end of the 17th century. Secret preparations were made for the aggression against the Jungar Khanate for a long time. "For several decades, our dynasty investigated the situation in Jungaria...preparing for war in the hope of destroying the Jungars," Ch'ing historian Ho Ch'iu-t'ao remarked.<sup>48</sup>

As we can see, this "approach" to the "Jungarian problem" completely refutes the present Beijing story that "Jungaria, located to the east and south of Lake Baykal, consisted of nomadic Chinese tribes of Dyrat-Mongols. The Ch'ing Dynasty's pacification of Jungaria was an internal Chinese affair and had no connection with the issue of the Sino-Russian border."<sup>49</sup>

After conquering the Jungar Khanate and seizing East Turkestan, the Ch'ing Empire reached the boundaries of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the 1760's.<sup>50</sup> Its military expansion, however, took a southwesterly direction toward Tibet.

The Ch'ing administration in occupied East Turkestan and Jungaria (the province of Xinjiang was later formed here) established contacts with neighboring and Central Asian territories. These ambassadorial and commercial contacts with the Kazakh and Kirgiz feudal lords are now being integrated as some kind of "cassal" relations in Beijing in line with authoritarian foreign policy dogma.

By the middle of the 19th century, the convergence of the two empires in Central Asia necessitated the establishment of the boundary between Russia and Ch'ing China in this region as well.

The Soviets are flagrantly distorting the historical precedents for the delineation of the border in Central Asia. They are trying to imply that the western border of China under the Ch'ing Dynasty was originally "divided" in two sections: the northern, namely north of the Irtys River and Lake Baikal, in the Altai region and the Sayansk Range; and the southern, including Xinjiang and Southern Siberia and the territory east and south of Lake Baikal in the Far East region.<sup>51</sup> The present Beijing falsifiers are trying to say that the lands in which the Ch'ing Empire unilaterally laid claim were actually its territories and are depicting the process of the joint establishment of the border as a series of Russian "usurpations" of "Chinese" territory.<sup>52</sup> The Peking Treaty and subsequent Russo-Chinese agreements defining and clarifying the boundary line are described as anti-<sup>53</sup>

Finally, the second article of the 1860 Peking Treaty stipulated, with a view to the specific positions of Russia and Ch'ing China in Central Asia,

that the border line between the two states from Shabin-Dabags Pass, the east western line of reference established in the Kyakhta agreement. "Following the configuration of mountains, large rivers and existing Chinese pickets," would stretch to Lake Zaysan in the southwest, then to the Tenger-Shan Range and then along these mountains to the lands of the Kokand Khanate.

Since the Peking Treaty had only specified the boundary line in general terms, negotiations began at the end of 1861 to clarify the line. They ended on 24 September 1864 with the signing of a protocol in Chuguchak (Chirchik) on the scale border from Altay to Pamir. The Ch'ing delegation tried to take advantage of the fact that the Chinese text of the treaty contained an error (the character "south" had been omitted from the compound word "southwestern") and demanded a change in the border that would be based on obvious geographic points of reference and would lead the border to the west rather than the southwest.<sup>54</sup> It is on these "grounds" that the Ch'ing diplomats also laid claim to huge territories in Kazakhstan and demanded that the existing cities of Lepinsk, Avaguz and others be razed to the ground. Besides this, the Chinese side tried to insist on the delineation of the boundary on the basis of pickets which were sometimes located beyond the permanent picket lines.<sup>55</sup>

Russian Diplomacy was able to deny these unfounded requests. The border was established with consideration for natural boundaries and the actual geographic position of the two sides. The Chuguchak Protocol of 1864 stipulated that the temporary Chinese pickets in the Ulvaautaysk, Kobdinsk, Tarduntaysk and Iliysk districts would have to be transferred to points within the bounds of the Ch'ing Empire after the border posts had been installed.

The implementation of the Chuguchak Protocol was impeded by the Dungan-Kazakh rebellions that broke out the same year in Xinjiang (1864-1878). It was a strong echo of the great Taiping peasant war and attested to the failure of the Ch'ing Empire's national-colonial policy in Jungaria and East Turkestan, which were mainly inhabited by Turkic-speaking ethnic groups of the Muslim faith. Ch'ing rule collapsed in these regions and several independent feudal states came into being.

The Ch'ing authorities requested the Russians to help in suppressing the rebellions, but the Russian government refrained from sending out its troops at first. It was not until the rise of the Jety-Shaar state in East Turkestan, Yakub-bek, an agent of the English, tried to conquer another independent feudal dominion--the Taranchin Khanate in the Iliysk district--that Russian troops entered this district in 1871 and encountered no resistance from the local population. Actual control over this strategically important region guaranteed the tsarist government the possibility of controlling the situation near Russian possessions in Central Asia and Turkistan and of preventing England from strengthening its position here.



According to the terms of the Petersburg Treaty, concluded 12 February 1881 on the return of Iliyskiy Kray, the Russian Government demanded that the Ch'ing authorities "take suitable measures to guard the inhabitants of the district, no matter what tribes they belong to or what faith they profess, against damage to their person or property...during the time of troubles now going on in this district and afterward." According to the third article of the treaty, the inhabitants of the district were given the right to "remain in their present homes" or "move to Russia and take Russian citizenship."<sup>57</sup> In accordance with the treaty, a small western section of the kray was ceded to Russia "for the settlement of kray inhabitants who take Russian citizenship and therefore have to leave the lands they owned."<sup>58</sup> The rest of Iliyskiy Kray, the larger portion, was returned to China.

This kind of concession of territory by one state to another to safeguard the interests of the territory's inhabitants is not contrary to international law. More than 70,000 Uighurs, Dungans and Kazakhs who had escaped the excesses of the Manchurian-Chinese butchers settled in the internal regions of Semirech'ye and in the newly annexed zone.

The Russ.-Chinese border set in the St. Petersburg Treaty began at the Badkhistan mountains, followed the Khargos River to its confluence with the Ili River and then to the Uzuntau mountains, where it met the border defined in the Chuguchak Protocol.<sup>59</sup>

According to the eighth article of the St. Petersburg Treaty, the boundary was changed in Russia's favor near Lake Zaysan and the Chernyy Irtys'kh river (Zaysan became a Russian internal lake), and this was done at the suggestion of the authorized Chinese representative at the talks.<sup>60</sup>

When the Kokand Khanate became part of Russia in 1876 and a section of it was renamed Ferganskaya Oblast' in the Turkestan general-governorship, it became necessary to delineate the border between this governorship and East Turkestan, which was envisaged in the ninth article of the treaty.

This provision of the 1881 St. Petersburg Treaty specified the actions of the two states during the demarcation of the boundary in the Pamir region. According to the protocol signed by Russian representative V. Medinskiy and Ch'ing representative Sha in Novyy Margelan (now the city of Fergana) in 1884, the boundary between Russia and the Ch'ing Empire was extended to the Yordel' Pass in the Sarykol'sk range.

The Marxists are now asserting that "in the region of Pamir, tsarist Russia violated the 'description of the state boundary between China and Russia in the Kashgar region' of 1884—that is, the Novyy Margelan Protocol of 1884—by occupying more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory."<sup>61</sup> In connection with this falsification, the statement of the Soviet Government of 13 June 1960 says: "But the protocol of 22 May 1884 has absolutely no connection with the Pamir region, of which the Chinese side is speaking,



extortion and force, but we happily accept all points pertaining to the conditions of good-neighbor relations and economic agreements. These we cannot repudiate."<sup>64</sup>

In line with V. I. Lenin's statements, the "Address of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to the Chinese People and the Governments of South and North China" of 25 July 1919 listed the specific treaties which the Soviet State had declared invalid and those whose cancellation it hoped to negotiate with the Chinese Government.

The agreements declared invalid by the Soviet Government were all of the secret treaties concluded by the tsarist (and provisional) government "with Japan, China and former allies" of Russia. The government proposed talks on the cancellation of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1896, the Peking Protocol of 1901 and all Russian agreements with Japan from 1907 through 1916. The address announced that "the Soviet Government renounces all conquests made by the tsarist government when it took Manchuria and other regions away from China. Let the people inhabiting these areas make their own decisions as to the particular state in whose boundaries they wish to make their homes."<sup>65</sup>

All in all, it is evident that the Soviet Government and the head of this government, V. I. Lenin, did not consider the border provisions recorded in Russo-Chinese treaties, including the Argun', Peking and St. Petersburg treaties, the Chuguchak Protocol and others, invalid or subject to cancellation.

The attempts of Beijing falsifiers to cast doubts upon the historically determined boundary between the USSR and China contradict the entire system of international relations in today's world and the vital interests of the two great neighboring populations and are therefore destined to fail. This does not mean, however, that they will collapse automatically of their own accord. The higher interests of friendly relations between the two great populations, the interests of peace and detente in Asia, demand the further systematic exposure of Maoist falsifications about the history of the Russo-Chinese border and China's borders with other neighboring countries, falsifications which represent one of the major means employed by the Beijing leadership to create a dangerous atmosphere of chauvinistic obsession in the PRC.

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## PLANS FOR A NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF PACIFIC COUNTRIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 170-175

[Article by S. N. Nikonov]

[Text] The serious discussion of the idea of forming a new regional organization has recently aroused interest in the Pacific countries. Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira is considered to be the initiator of the idea, which has been called the concept of the "Pacific Community." The reason was his first speech in parliament in January 1979 after he took on the responsibilities of the head of the Japanese Government. At that time, Ohira said: "I feel it is my duty to promote the further development of relations of friendship and cooperation with the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific countries, as well as the Latin American countries."<sup>1</sup>

The idea has aroused interest because it concerns the formation of a regional organization in the vast zone of the Pacific basin and proposes a large number of countries with differing levels of economic development as its possible members. Many questions have naturally arisen in connection with the planned organization. In particular, questions about the role of the developed capitalist states, especially the United States and Japan, in this organization, its basic goals, the position envisaged for the developing countries, and so forth.

Attempts to form regional organizations in the Pacific basin were made in the past as well, but they were limited to the creation of narrow and restricted groups, most of which pursued primarily political goals and expressed the interests of American imperialism.

In 1951 a military bloc uniting the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) was founded on the initiative of the United States. Its founding was preceded by U.S. attempts to unite the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific basin in a broad military-political group modeled on NATO. However, the pointedly negative attitude of the Asian people toward the plans and the reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to enter into allied relations with Japan, their recent World War II enemy, limited the

American plan to the creation of a "tripartite security pact"--ANZUS--at that particular time.

In 1954, again under the pressure of American imperialism, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded. It was a military alliance on a broader scale. It took in England, France, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines in addition to the ANZUS partners. Along with the U.S. security agreements with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, this made up an entire system which was basically intended, according to the plans of its American engineers, to "contain the communist threat," or, in other words, to combat the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and maintain regimes obedient to imperialism in the countries of this region.

In 1966 another group was formed at a conference in Seoul--the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), a regional organization taking in Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea and Japan. The officially declared purpose of this organization was the expansion of economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between partners. In fact, however, the general purpose of the group can be judged by the fact that all of the members were also members of SEATO, ANZUS or ANZAM.<sup>2</sup> Besides this, many of them were bound to the United States by bilateral agreements of a military nature and by participation in American imperialism's aggression against the Vietnamese people.

The United States was not an official member of the group, but it tried to create a broad military-political bloc on the basis of ASPAC with the aid of its allies and partners in other organizations and to draw Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore and Burma into this bloc under the guise of economic and cultural cooperation.

The defeat suffered by American imperialism in Vietnam and the withdrawal of such countries as France and Pakistan from SEATO eventually led to the dissolution of SEATO and ASPAC.

In the beginning of the 1960's, more vigorous efforts were made to form regional economic groups in Asia and the Pacific. In May 1963, for example, the Japan Institute of Economic Research, representing the business community, compiled a report on tendencies toward economic cooperation in the Far East, proposing the organization of at least one conference a year on the governmental level for five Pacific states (Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). According to the plans of the authors of this report, the agenda of the conferences could include such topics as the development of economic and cultural contacts and the prospects for broader cooperation by the Pacific countries.<sup>3</sup>

In November 1965, another private Japanese organization--the Japan Center for Economic Research, headed by S. Okita, now Japan's minister of foreign affairs--compiled a report entitled "The Pacific Common Market and South-east Asia," proposing the creation of a "Pacific free trade zone" by

analogy with the Common Market in Europe. This zone was supposed to unite the five economically strongest countries in the Pacific region at first, and then be expanded by the inclusion of the developing countries.<sup>4</sup>

To promote the idea of the "Pacific free trade zone," spokesmen for the Japanese Center for Economic Research made several trips to the United States and other Pacific countries, where they discussed the creation of such a zone with economic experts. During this stage, Australia and New Zealand were not overly receptive to the idea. They said that the cancellation of customs restrictions within the "Pacific free trade zone" would only benefit Japan and the United States, which maintained broad contacts with all countries in the region, while trade within the Canada-Australia-New Zealand triangle was extremely limited in nature.<sup>5</sup> In 1968 the Japan Center for Economic Research proposed the creation of an intergovernmental body--the Organization of Pacific Trade, Assistance and Development (OPTAD), which would be of a consultative nature and would concern itself with the coordination of the policies of Far Eastern countries in the areas of trade, capital investments and aid to the developing countries. This proposal was supported by the United States and Australia.

In the beginning of 1979, Senator J. Glenn, chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted a report to Congress, containing recommendations pertaining to the creation of OPTAD. Its members were to be the "market economies": the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore), South Korea, Taiwan and Hongkong, Papua New Guinea, as well as small countries in the Southwest Pacific. The report stated that this organization would be a "useful forum for the development of a coordinated approach to contacts with the communist countries." According to the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, the United States was supposed to play the "leading role in the creation of regional structures."<sup>6</sup>

This clearly indicates the goals the United States was pursuing. The abovementioned magazine had this to say about the report: "Many Japanese are afraid that the United States wants to establish its economic supremacy." Evidently, the idea expressed in the magazine could be extended: not only economic, but also--and primarily--political supremacy.

The magazine cited an extremely indicative statement by a competent, as the magazine described him, Japanese spokesman: "We are worried that the Americans are motivated by feelings of desperation, possibly stemming from their political failures in the Far East, and that they are trying to form a pan-Pacific organization for the wrong reasons, in an attempt to atone for what is now going on in Indochina and is the result of their past military ventures."<sup>7</sup>

The American Congress did not accept the report. Nonetheless, the formation of a regional organization is still being considered in the United States.



The activity of the Pacific Economic Council, founded in 1968, is closely connected with the idea of establishing a "Pacific Community." This organization holds annual conferences attended by spokesmen for the business communities of the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

The arguments set forth by U.S. and Japanese economists in favor of the new Pacific regional organization are interesting. They were summarized in an article by M. Donowaka, assistant chief of the Department of Europe and Oceania of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in KEIZAI TO GAIKO at the end of last year. In particular, he states that the Pacific countries are rich in natural resources and are distinguished by rapid economic development. The economies of the European countries, on the other hand, have been experiencing a slump, particularly after the oil crisis of 1973, and industrialization and modernization are future objectives in the African and South Asian countries. To confirm the dynamic nature of the Pacific countries' development, data on their trade volume are cited. As Yale Professor H. Patrick said on 18 July 1974 at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations, the volume of trade between the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea rose from 15.1 billion dollars in 1965 to 104.8 billion in 1976, not counting bilateral trade between the United States and Canada.<sup>8</sup>

But one thing is absolutely clear: The main motivating factor in this matter is not the interests of the economic development of the Pacific countries, but political goals. Whereas the concept of the Pacific community was once discussed on the nongovernmental level, at conferences and symposiums of scientists and representatives of the business community, it has lately become the topic of conversations between political figures.

At present, the character and composition of the planned organization are not completely definite. Nonetheless, these matters are being discussed in depth.

In November 1979 an impressive "Pacific cooperation study group," created on the personal instructions of Prime Minister M. Ohira, prepared a preliminary report on the prospects for creating the Pacific community and submitted the report to the head of the Japanese Government. It states that past and present regional organizations have set limited objectives, have united a few countries and have generally been of a private, nongovernmental nature. The future community, on the other hand, would have the objective of "genuine cooperation by the Pacific states in the majority of spheres of activity in the interests of the comprehensive development of countries in this region."

The report specified the distinguishing features of the future Pacific community, which were not characteristic of earlier regional organizations. Above all, the community will unite a much larger group of countries, and

these will have little in common in terms of history, culture, economics and other areas. Besides this, the states making up the "community" will conduct an "open and liberal" policy. Membership in the "community" will not restrict the sovereignty or independence of members and, finally, the future "community" will not necessitate the liquidation or limitation of the activities of existing regional organizations, including ASEAN.

Reports in the press about the planned "Pacific Community" and the report of the "Pacific cooperation study group" have specified the objectives of the organization.

Firstly, deeper mutual understanding between states by means of broader exchange in the areas of science, education, information and culture, and the simplification of procedures pertaining to entry and exit, immigration and naturalization.

Secondly, broader and deeper cooperation in the joint development of energy and raw material sources and in the resolution of the food problem.

Thirdly, assistance in the development of all countries of this region by means of aid to the developing countries belonging to the community, particularly on the part of the United States and Japan.

Fourthly, broader economic cooperation and the organization of joint capital investments in the economies of other states, improved currency and finance systems and easier access to the domestic markets of each member of the community

In November 1979 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on the contents of the report of the "Pacific cooperation study group." It says that this report does not reflect the official views of the government. "At the same time," the press release states, "in view of Japan's interest in developing cooperation with the Pacific countries, the government will take the recommendations of this report into account in foreign policymaking and will study the reactions of official and public groups in the states concerned."

Obviously, the group's preliminary report is declarative in nature and emphasizes the need to propagandize the appeal of the future community to the developing countries in the region. It says nothing about the administrative bodies of the community and the mechanism for putting this kind of multilateral cooperation in action. In a SANKEI SHIMBUN interview, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Okita declined to respond directly to a question about the plans of the Japanese Government in connection with the projected community, saying that this question would be discussed at an international conference on Pacific solidarity planned for March 1980.<sup>9</sup>

The first practical step toward the creation of the "Pacific Community" was Japanese Prime Minister Ohira's trip to Australia and New Zealand this

January. In talks with the heads of these governments, M. Ohira persistently brought up this question. Speaking at a luncheon in his honor in the Victoria National Art Gallery, M. Ohira said: "From the geographic standpoint, we now occupy important spots at the northern and southern ends of the Pacific basin. Our nations are unique, and I therefore feel that we have an important role to play in the creation of a new Pacific culture and that the strengthening of our friendship through Pacific cooperation will unquestionably promote stability, peace and development."<sup>10</sup>

Ohira's initiative found support in Australia and New Zealand, and this was recorded in joint communiques on the results of the Japanese leader's visit. In particular, the Japanese-Australian communique states: "The prime ministers discussed the possibility of close cooperation between the Pacific countries. They stressed the importance for Australia and Japan of continued concerted action for the further development of broad cooperation among the Pacific countries."

"In this connection, they agreed that the concept of the 'Pacific Community' is an important long-range goal, and they expressed their intention to continue developing it in the future on the basis of a broad regional consensus."<sup>11</sup>

The leaders of the three countries reached an agreement on a symposium to be held in Canberra this fall for representatives of all countries interested in the creation of the "Pacific Community."<sup>12</sup>

Which nations will be invited to join this new regional association? According to the REUTER AGENCY's reports from Canberra, the composition of the projected community was also discussed by the Japanese and Australian heads of state. In particular, the agency reported that the two prime ministers had agreed that this association should be open to Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, the Southeast Asian countries and the small countries of the South Pacific. In addition, YOMIURI reported, citing a statement by a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, that the Japanese Government was also considering the possibility of inviting China and South Korea to join the organization, as well as the states of the Indochinese peninsula, including the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.<sup>13</sup>

Prime Minister Ohira also declared that he would not object to the inclusion of the Soviet Union and China in the community. He made this statement at a meeting of the Budget Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives on 5 February this year.<sup>14</sup>

The idea of the "Pacific Community" has aroused widespread interest throughout the world, and not only in the Pacific countries. The views on this idea and the approaches to it differ widely, just as the goals being pursued by its presumed chief members--Japan and the United States--also apparently differ.

No official U.S. statements have been issued as yet in support of the idea. The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, M. Mansfield, said in an interview in Hongkong's FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW: "The concept of the 'Pacific Community' is an idea whose time will come, but it must be given serious consideration because it could be of great value and of considerable potential."<sup>15</sup>

As SANKEI SHIMBUN reported, U.S. Congressman L. Wolff, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, said in a press conference in Tokyo that the implementation of this idea could aid in the maximum use of Far Eastern potential and advocated the immediate formation of the community.<sup>16</sup>

Assessing the U.S. stand on this matter, France's LE MONDE stated: "The Americans are not holding back either, and they are apparently giving more and more thought to the plans for the creation of the 'Pacific Community,' which will strengthen their position in this region."<sup>17</sup>

Statements in support of the idea were made in China. When the head of the Japanese Government visited Beijing in December 1979, M. Ohira and Liu Qinfeng, as recorded in the joint communique, "gave special attention" to the situation in Asia and the Pacific. The Chinese side expressed great interest in Japan's proposed "Pacific Community." According to Japan's YOMIURI newspaper, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the Chinese State Council received a delegation from the Japanese House of Councillors in Beijing and appealed for Sino-Japanese cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.<sup>18</sup>

Beijing's position is completely understandable. After all, it is Beijing that is now advocating the buildup of the American military presence in Asia, is encouraging Japan to rearm itself and to play a more prominent role in the system of military cooperation with the United States, and is appealing, as the Chinese ambassador in Manila recently did, for the creation of a united "anti-Soviet front."<sup>19</sup>

People in Beijing would obviously applaud the creation of the kind of new Pacific Community that would aid in China's even closer convergence with the United States and Japan, right up to the official organization of a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington military alliance.

But Southeast Asian countries, particularly the members of ASEAN, are expressing some apprehension in connection with the idea of the "Pacific Community." This apprehension is motivated by the fact that the creation of this kind of regional organization could turn into a new variation of the Japanese "great sphere of co-prosperity" of World War II and a means of establishing U.S. and Japanese control over their economies, and also that it would weaken ASEAN as a regional organization.

Quite understandably, people in these countries are wondering whether membership in this organization, which might be pro-Western in view of the

major role that will be played in it by such countries as the United States and Japan, will be compatible with the principles of the non-alignment policy. Doubts of this kind are completely justified, just as the belief that membership in the organization will complicate the attainment of the main political goal of the ASEAN countries--the creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia.

It is true that some people in these countries support the idea of the "Pacific Community" and believe that it could be useful if "it can promote further economic development and freer trade."<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, Japan is disturbed by the apprehensions of the Southeast Asian countries. It is interesting that Japanese statesmen have repeatedly declared that the projected organization will not be political in nature and will certainly not be military. This is the reason for the difference between the Japanese and U.S. lists of possible members of the organization. In this respect, Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira voiced an interesting comment in the National Press Club after the end of his visit to Australia and New Zealand. In particular, he said that the idea of creating the "Pacific Community" consists in forming a regional organization on the basis of economic and cultural relations, and not political and military ties. "This," Ohira said, "must not be a restricted and isolated organization. It must be open and liberal."<sup>21</sup>

The Southeast Asian countries, however, are still apprehensive, and this is not surprising. The people in these countries realize that the policy of hegemonism in Asia, which is threatening these people, stems from the United States and China. Their "partnership" and "parallel strategic interests," which were discussed publicly by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown in Beijing this January, are deeply hostile to the vital interests of the Asian people and pose a real threat to their independent and separate development. If we also consider the fact that Japan--the most economically developed state in Asia--is bound to the United States by a military treaty and to China by a friendship treaty, the grounds for this apprehension are more than adequate.

Japan's consent to the participation of Japanese naval ships in the multilateral maneuvers conducted in the central Pacific by the United States, Australia and New Zealand--that is, the ANZUS countries--did not escape notice either. Japan's participation in these maneuvers was interpreted as a result of more active U.S. attempts to draw Japan into the general system of military blocs and use Japanese armed forces in its own aggressive global strategy.

All of this is taking place against an interesting background: firstly, the continuing U.S. and Chinese pressure on ASEAN for the purpose of turning it into a military group; secondly, the attempts to galvanize the so-called "Manila Treaty" of 1954, which was the basis of the dissolved SEATO military alliance.



As we have already mentioned, the initiators and supporters of the "Pacific Community" idea have not reached complete agreement in regard to its character, structure and terms of membership. All of their suggestions have been quite vague and imprecise. The attitude of other Pacific countries toward the idea will depend largely on the approach taken in the definition of the community's purposes and objectives. In any case, one thing is clear: If this organization is formed as a restricted group directed against the interests of the socialist countries, which could integrate the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania in the capitalist system of the "Pacific Community" and isolate them from other developing countries, its future will be quite doubtful.

Lasting peace in Asia and the progress of the countries of this region cannot be made possible by the formation of new restricted groups and blocs, but will require broader bilateral and multilateral contacts between all countries and populations without exception on the basis of deeper trust and broader mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. JAPAN TIMES, 26 January 1979.
2. ANZAM--A military-political group formed in 1949 by England. It took in England, New Zealand, Australia and Malaysia.
3. KEIZAI TO GAIKO, 1979, No 11.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 21 December 1979.
7. Ibid.
8. KEIZAI TO GAIKO, 1979, No 11.
9. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 10 November 1979.
10. JAPAN TIMES, 19 January 1980.
11. Ibid., 17 January 1980.
12. Judging by all indications, it was this symposium that S. Okita was referring to when he spoke of an international conference in March 1980.
13. YOMIURI, 22 January 1980.

14. Nihon Keizai, 6 February 1980.
15. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1979.
16. Sankei Shimbun, 10 January 1980.
17. Le Monde, 21 January 1980.
18. Yomiuri, 10 January 1980.
19. Daily Express, 12 February 1980.
20. Straits Times, 24 October 1979.
21. Japan Times, 23 January 1980.

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CSG: 1805

BASIC STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSTWAR JAPANESE LITERATURE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 176-183

[Article by N. I. Chegedar', candidate of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

LIU ZERONG'S MEMORIES OF V. I. LENIN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 p 184

[Article by K. V. Shevelev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CS0: 1805

MEETINGS WITH THE GREAT LENIN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 185-187

[Article by Liu Zerong]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805



## BOOK REVIEWS

### THREE DECADES--THREE POLICIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 188-192

[Review by V. A. Arkhipov of the book "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" by M. S. Kapitsa, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 576 pages]

[Text] The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China has undergone several abrupt reversals during the 30 years of this country's existence, as a result of which China, which once acted in concert with the nations of the socialist community and with all forces for peace and progress, has now allied itself with imperialist reactionary circles on an anti-Soviet platform hostile to the socialist countries and has chosen the path of confrontation with socialist forces, as reflected in the Chinese aggression against socialist Vietnam. China has become imperialism's direct accomplice and junior partner and a dangerous seat of a new world war.

In his voluminous new work "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies], published by Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow State University Professor M. S. Kapitsa, prominent expert on the history of international relations in the Far East, analyzes the reversals and metamorphoses of Chinese foreign policy over a 30-year period, thoroughly discusses the numerous events in which this policy played a part, discusses the reasons for the sharp reversals of Beijing foreign policy, and demonstrates how, in the midst of all these zigzags and reversals, the "overlapping" strategic line of the Sinocentric, nationalist and chauvinistic ambitions of the Chinese leaders was preserved and developed. In his discussion of the Chinese leadership's activity in the international arena, which could be so dangerous to the cause of peace and international cooperation, the author demonstrates its destructive purpose, its limited possibilities and the numerous failures and futility of Beijing's great-power hegemonic intrigues in the foreign policy sphere.

As a result, the reader is presented with an extremely detailed and systematically painted portrait of Chinese foreign policy, combining an encyclopedic grasp of historical material with the theoretical analysis of this material and an attempt to interpret all of these facts from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint. The very title of the book designates a distinctive feature of the development of Chinese foreign policy in the last 30 years.

The author examines the three stages in the evolution of this policy, each of which lasted approximately 10 years. In the first decade, the PRC generally acted in concert with the socialist community, in the second decade its policy leaned "to the left," toward the petty bourgeois revolutionary track, and in the third it made an abrupt turn to the right, moving from leftist extremist, pseudorevolutionary positions to overt military and political alliance with imperialism. In a discussion of this tendency, the author states that "Beijing's policy was colored during each stage by the balance of power in the leadership, new postulates were used to assert and justify this policy, and it performed particular tactical functions. In all stages, however, the strategic goal of the Beijing nationalists remained the same: the transformation of China into the main power in the world, dictating its will to other states and ensuring the advantageous resolution, in its own interests, of problems, both those which had supposedly been inherited from history and those which would arise in the world arena and affect China."

Now that more and more new mountains of anti-Soviet lies and falsifications are piling up in Beijing and the well-known facts about Soviet-PRC relations during the first years after the triumph of the revolution in China are being hushed up, a vivid and detailed description of the actual relationship is of great value to the Soviet reader and, in particular, to the foreign reader. Stressing that the Soviet Union invariably conducted a Leninist foreign policy toward China and its people, and gave them internationalist assistance in their struggle for national independence and social liberation, the author presents abundant factual material on these matters, with an emphasis on the period directly preceding the victory of the people's revolution in China and on the first years of the PRC's existence, in his first chapter--"The Formation of the People's Republic of China. Its First Foreign Policy Steps." The book contains, in addition to well-known facts, references to a great deal of new information taken from archives and made available to the academic community for the first time (excerpts from I. V. Stalin's conversations with Jiang Jinguo and Mao Zedong, as well as from the conversations of Soviet ambassadors in China, A. A. Petrov and N. V. Roshchin, with Mao Zedong and Jiang Jinguo, passages from the proceedings of the Moscow conference of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States and England in December 1945, excerpts from I. V. Stalin's conversations with U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes, and others).

Some of the attempts by current Beijing propaganda to slander the policy of our country toward China can make people forget that the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the PRC immediately after its founding and to establish diplomatic relations with it, which consolidated the position of people's China in the international arena during that difficult initial period.

It will be impossible to erase from history or hush up the fact that, in the first difficult moments of the young republic's establishment in China,

the Soviet Union gave the Chinese people all-round assistance and support, both in defending the conquests of their revolution against attacks by imperialism and Chinese reactionary forces and in restoring the national economy and developing construction, as a result of which several modern industries, previously nonexistent in this country, were quickly founded in China. It also assisted them in transport construction, in the training of national scientific, technical and engineering personnel and in the education of large groups in the mass worker professions.

The Chinese people cannot be forced to forget that, in this difficult time, it was precisely the Soviet Union that signed a Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the People's Republic of China, which played a tremendous role in reinforcing the PRC's international positions and its security. At that time, even the Chinese leaders admitted and emphasized this fact. For example, when Mao Zedong was ratifying the treaty on 11 April 1950, he said: "The new Sino-Soviet treaty and agreements will serve as legal reinforcement of the friendship between the great populations of China and the Soviet Union.... They have simplified our work in the sphere of domestic construction and the joint resistance of possible imperialist aggression for the sake of preserving world peace" (p 33).

The PRC's policy of active cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, its struggle against imperialism and colonialism and its statements against aggression and for the preservation of peace led to the rapid recognition of the young people's republic by many states and to the expansion of its international ties. This policy played an important positive role in international relations at that time, which was, as we know, the cold war era. This policy served the general cause of world socialism and the struggle to preserve world peace and, above all, strengthened the position of the Chinese people, guaranteeing them favorable conditions for the institution of urgently needed socioeconomic reforms and for broad-scale economic construction.

This was the precise belief of the overwhelming majority of Chinese communists who took an internationalist stand. This is how the Chinese workers viewed the friendship with the USSR and other socialist countries. It was this that lay at the basis of the well-known decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress, which stated that the CCP "advocates a foreign policy aimed at the preservation of world peace and peaceful coexistence by countries with differing structures.... The party will focus its efforts on the development and reinforcement of friendship with countries in the camp of peace, democracy and socialism, headed by the Soviet Union, will strengthen the solidarity of proletarian internationalism, will study the experience of the world communist movement, will support the struggle of communists, progressive elements and the working public in all nations to guarantee the progress of mankind, and will instill the spirit of internationalism, as expressed in the appeal 'Proletarians of all nations, unite!', in its members and people."<sup>1</sup>

1. "Proceedings of the Eighth All-China Congress of the CCP (15-27 September 1956)," Moscow, 1956, pp 510-511.

Mao Zedong and his followers also appeared to be supporting this line. It later became known, however, that Mao's remarks about friendship with the Soviet Union were two-faced and hypocritical; at that time, he still had to consider the wishes of the particular circles in the CCP Central Committee which supported the development of friendly relations with the USSR (p 89). In fact, however, Mao Zedong and his group were already cherishing the hope of forcing their own hegemonic platform on the socialist countries and using this as a basis to put their own great-power, chauvinistic and Sino-centric plans in action. By the end of the 1950's, Mao Zedong's nationalist group had triumphed in the fierce struggle within the party and had begun preparations for an abrupt change in PRC domestic and foreign policy.

Discarding the general line worked out by the party and ratified by the eighth congress, and ignoring the objective economic laws and experience of socialist construction in the fraternal countries, the Maoists declared the adventurist policy of the "Great Leap Forward," which was supposed to guarantee an economic basis for the conduct of a hegemonic policy in the international arena. A revision of foreign policy began at the same time, and four key objectives were set:

The submission of the socialist countries and the world communist movement to Maoist hegemony, and the use of them as an instrument for expanding the zone of Chinese influence;

The imposition of the Maoist course on the Asian and African countries and the creation of a bloc made up of these countries and ruled by the PRC;

The escalation of international tension, the instigation of several local wars and, while staying out of these wars, the eventual provocation of nuclear war between the USSR and the United States;

The conclusion of bargains with imperialism if dictated by China's nationalist interests (p 167).

After failing in its attempts to force its ultra-leftist and adventurist line on the USSR and the socialist camp, the Mao Zedong group decided to sever relations with the world socialist system, betray the principles of socialist foreign policy and openly fight against the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The CCP's isolation from the international communist movement allowed Mao Zedong and his followers to establish a great-Han nationalistic course in the party and redirect national development with a view to the creation of a militaristic state, which was supposed to help the Chinese leadership carry out its hegemonic plans.

The vital, fundamental interests of the Chinese people were subordinated to the great-power policy and the petty bourgeois doctrines of "barracks communism," which were embodied in voluntaristic experiments such as the "Great Leap Forward." The implementation of this line, its failures and the related mounting struggle within the Chinese leadership led to the

Maoist "Cultural Revolution," which resulted in the destruction of the political system of popular democracy and the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China. The country was stricken by a lengthy sociopolitical crisis and economic recession. Even the Chinese themselves are now admitting something that the CPSU and other fraternal parties were warning them about from the very beginning: Beijing officials are admitting that the "Great Leap Forward" created chaos in the Chinese economy and brought China to the verge of economic collapse, and that the "Cultural Revolution" was a "feudal-fascist dictatorship."

All of this was accompanied by a further move toward chauvinism and adventurism in PRC foreign policy. As early as 1962-1966, the evolution of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy line provided more evidence that it had never engaged in theoretical discussions or debates concerning the interpretation of individual premises, but simply launched an unconcealed campaign against Marxist-Leninist doctrine and against the unity of world revolutionary forces fighting for peace and against imperialism. When the Caribbean crisis reached its height in 1962, the PRC did not support revolutionary Cuba, but, on the contrary, tried to arouse passions over the Cuban question, made harsh and completely false attacks on the Soviet Union and its principled line and actually tried to provoke a military confrontation between the USSR and the United States. At that same time, Chinese troops were engaged in broad-scale acts of war in the Himalayas and were invading India. This expansionist action by the Chinese militarists against non-aligned India was more than just a vivid example of the rapacious and aggressive appetites of the Beijing hegemonists. It aggravated the international atmosphere on the Asian continent and, to a certain degree, diverted the attention of the world public away from U.S. provocations against Cuba.

Quoting from correspondence between the CPSU Central Committee and the CCP Central Committee, the author conclusively proves that the Soviet side undertook a massive and serious effort, doing everything within its power, to overcome differences and normalize relations between the two countries. Our party's sincere desire for normal Soviet-Chinese relations is expressed in the letters of the CPSU Central Committee. But the CCP leaders had different goals and intentions. Beijing launched an extensive anti-Soviet campaign in the press and over the radio. Carrying these differences over into the sphere of intergovernmental relations, it began to curtail economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts. This was accompanied by increasing provocation on the Soviet-Chinese border and the open declaration of territorial claims to Soviet land in the Far East and Central Asia.

Beijing's line during the time of the aggressive U.S. war in Vietnam helped to expose the true nature of its nationalist, egotistical and hegemonic policy. The author cites numerous facts which testify that the Beijing leaders were then most concerned about the possibility of using the selfless struggle of the Vietnamese patriots in their own selfish great-power interests, and that the stand taken by Mao and his group, their various



hints and candid statements to Washington emissaries regarding their intention to "not get involved," and their persistent and ostentatious refusal to join the socialist countries in assisting Vietnam essentially all encouraged the U.S. imperialists to continue and expand the war in Indochina (p 238).

The author recalls that during the war in Vietnam, "the PRC rulers were setting up obstacles to impede the transport of combat equipment and specialists from the USSR to the DRV and were trying to diminish the significance of Soviet assistance. This was done at a time when the USSR was providing the DRV with missiles, artillery and other modern weapons, ammunition, radar devices, motor vehicles, ships, industrial equipment, food and medicine. Our Vietnamese comrades valued Soviet assistance highly and insisted that it played a tremendous role in strengthening the defensive capabilities of the DRV and repulsing American aggression" (p 238).

At that time the PRC leadership was issuing ostentatious anti-imperialist appeals and declarations. As time went on, however, it became increasingly obvious that this was all camouflage, since the PRC had already decided to considerably expand its ties with the capitalist countries at the expense of the socialist countries. One example of this was the double-dealing practiced by Beijing in its treatment of the Vietnamese people who were defending their freedom and independence. In our day, now that new documents pertaining to this period have come to light, including some published in the SRV, the purpose of the Chinese leadership's policy, conducted while these leaders were making secret preparations for rapprochement with the imperialist powers, is absolutely distinct.

The actual purpose of Beijing's line was discerned by imperialist spokesmen, who were not misled by the extremist phrases of the Chinese leaders, which were "ultra-revolutionary" to the point of hysteria and which reached their peak during the period of "Cultural Revolution," at which time the Mao Zedong group, obsessed with the idea of great-power chauvinism, temporarily forgot to conceal its hegemonic ambitions and, openly violating the universally accepted standards of international law, began to engage in flagrant and widespread intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It was at this time that the Red Guards vowed to hoist the "banner of Mao" throughout the world, while the Chinese press reported that "the Chinese people are morally prepared to fight to the finish for the return of the lost territories once owned by China" (p 385). It was at this time that excesses were committed against foreign embassies and their personnel in Beijing. It was at this time that the preaching of the fatal inevitability and "usefulness" of a new world war took its most overt and inflammatory forms, accompanied by frenzied attacks on the process of international detente and any initiatives aimed at disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. None of this, however, as Professor M. S. Kapitsa points out in his book, kept imperialist spokesmen from welcoming the "Cultural Revolution" and its results. They did this primarily because the PRC was then put in a position of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

"Officials in Washington feel that Mao is serving American interests because his efforts to galvanize the Chinese masses are more likely to involve China in a conflict with Russia than with the United States of America," the WASHINGTON POST reported in February 1967 (p 318).

In our opinion, a particularly interesting section of M. S. Kapitsa's work is the two last chapters, in which he summarizes and analyzes information about Beijing foreign policy in the last decade and thoroughly examines the foreign policy doctrines and theories of the Chinese leadership. In this decade, Beijing made a sharp turn to the right, to the development of close relations with the imperialist powers, to alliance with them in the international arena, accompanied by the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. This is perhaps the first time that the foreign policy line of the present leadership, formed in Beijing after Mao Zedong's death, has been systematically investigated in Soviet historical literature. It is no wonder that these important chapters, devoted to the most urgent issues, matters of life and death, take up almost half of the book. They are distinguished by an abundance of factual material and help the reader to understand the essence and details of China's present line in the international arena. What do these facts tell us?

In the last decade, it became absolutely obvious that the Chinese leaders, guided by their hegemonic ambitions, had first moved to the "left" but were now on the right, keeping company with imperialist and reactionary groups of all sorts. Immediately after the Ninth CCP Congress, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders worked toward rapprochement with the imperialist states, the socialist camp was declared nonexistent, the USSR was branded "enemy number-one" and the population was intimidated by references to "a possible attack from the north at any time", fueling hatred for the Soviet Union, the Chinese rulers went so far as to instigate armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border in 1969. Proceeding from the belief that favorable opportunities for the realization of Beijing's hegemonic plans could only be created by a confrontation between the two world systems or, even better, a fight to the finish between the USSR and the United States, but only on the condition that Beijing could remain uninvolved in this fight, the Chinese leaders desperately resisted any step away from war and provoked the exacerbation of the international atmosphere. They became more persistent in their appeals for a "united broad international front" against the USSR and the socialist community—that is, they propelled their new imperialist partners and their allies in the direction of more frenzied struggle against the USSR and the nations of the socialist community. This trick was neither new nor original for the Chinese leaders. They had tried to put it in action—in reverse, so to speak—in 1958, when they provoked the Taiwan crisis. The only difference was that they were then trying to push the USSR into battle with the United States. As we know, they were unable to do this. According to the calculations of the Chinese leaders, the acute military and political tension between the two systems could start a world war, which they feel would be, in view of China's demographic

parallelism, least debilitating for it, but would undermine the USSR, the United States and Western Europe, thereby paving Beijing's way to world hegemony (p. 140).

"International tension," the author says, "is necessary to Beijing as a means of mobilizing the population for the intensive buildup of Chinese military strength while the standard of living remains extremely low for a long period of time. According to the Chinese leadership's plans, tension, including regional friction, will weaken the global positions of its opponents. For example, the Middle East crisis should seriously divert the attention and material resources of the United States and USSR, while the conflict situation on the South Asian subcontinent, in Burma, should bind India's hands as an influential force in Asia and in the 'Third World' as a whole" (p. 140).

The present international situation provides abundant new material to corroborate and illustrate the author's beliefs, conclusively demonstrating that people, especially the people of the Asian countries, can expect from Beijing's great-power, hegemonic ambitions and its policy of alliance with imperialism, including U.S. imperialism. It is indicative that the Chinese aggression against the SEV began on the day after Deng Xiaoping's return from his trip to the United States and Japan. And what about U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown's recent trip to Beijing? Did it not illustrate the tendency to develop American-Chinese military cooperation aimed against the interests of the Asian people? All of the talk about the "common strategic goals" of China and the United States and about their identical views on the situations in the Middle East and South Asia, which was followed by action to supply Pakistan with weapons, the trips to this country by Z. Brzezinski and PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua, who hurried to the Pakistano-Afghan border, and the more intensive transport of weapons over the Karakorum highway all testify to an American-Chinese conspiracy, which has already aroused legitimate alarm in many Asian countries, including, of course, India.

Insisting on the maintenance and reinforcement of the American presence in Asia and the Indian Ocean zone, it is in favor of the establishment of new American bases in these regions, and it has actually taken the side of the American Administration in the touchy issue of the American pressure on Iran. The Chinese mass media have not said a word about the naval fleet of unprecedented dimensions that the United States has sent to the Persian Gulf zone. Beijing did not voice any objections in the United Nations to the American proposals regarding so-called "sanctions" against Iran.

The hypothesis that Beijing policy has not undergone any significant changes since the death of Mao Zedong and the suppression of his closest associates--the so-called "gang of four"--is logically set forth and corroborated in the book by means of a thorough analysis of the basic components of Beijing's present course in the international arena. Moreover,

It is not likely that any such changes will be made even after this February's Fifth Plenum of the CCP Committee, at which time another group of individuals who achieved prominence as a result of the "Cultural Revolution" was excluded from the Chinese leadership. The desire to build up national military potential still lies at the basis of the modernization policy proclaimed by the present Chinese leadership. When the modernization program was being discussed, the author writes, the views of military circles, demanding that industrial development be subordinated to the objective of the intensive augmentation of military potential, prevailed (p. 342).

In the foreign policy sphere, Mao Zedong's heirs are still insisting on the inevitability of a new world war and on the subversion of detente. Some of their attempted maneuvers with regard to major international problems--for example, the suggestion that the new world war could be "postponed" and their desire to be included in the discussion of disarmament issues--have not changed the essence of their platform but are of a tactical nature, as the author argues and proves in corresponding sections of the work being reviewed. The immutability of Beijing's chief strategic aims, stemming from the great-power hegemonic ambitions of the Chinese leadership, is attested to by all of its foreign policy actions and affiliations. Alliance with imperialism, ambitions to conquer and rule, claims to leadership among the developing countries, and hatred for the socialist world--these are the components of Beijing's present course in the international arena. This course could be extremely dangerous for the cause of peace in Asia and the rest of the world. It does not promise the Chinese laboring people anything good, and will doom these workers to new sacrifices in the name of the impossible reactionary and hegemonic ambitions of the Chinese leaders.

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## ARGUMENTS AGAINST MAOIST DISTORTION OF THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 p 193

[Review by M. S. Ukraintsev of the book "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Tsentral'noy Azii v XVII-pervoy polovine XIX v." by B. P. Gurevich (editor-in-chief; Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences S. L. Fikhvinskiy), Moscow, 1979, 311 pages]

[Text] Questions connected with the history of the people of Central Asia are arousing increasing attention in connection with the PRC's more active and dangerous policy in the northwestern part of this region. The Beijing leaders are making absurd claims to the territory of the Soviet Union, particularly in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. At the same time, Chinese leaders are displaying an overtly expansionist interest in the Mongolian People's Republic. Lately, as the events in Afghanistan demonstrated, China, using Xinjiang as a bridgehead, has embarked on the further expansion of the sphere of its hegemonic ambitions in Central Asia.

To justify this kind of intrigue, Maoist propaganda and some Chinese historians have looked back into the history of the Central Asian people. They have tried to idealize Chinese policy, especially the Manchurian-Chinese conquests, on the one hand, and, on the other, are striving to distort and denigrate the policy of Russia, which began in the 17th century to play an increasingly important role in the historical fate of the Central Asian people.

Several little-researched topics pertaining to this vast region are discussed in V. P. Gurevich's recently published work "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Tsentral'noy Azii v XVII-pervoy polovine XIX v." [International Relations in Central Asia from the 17th Century to the First Half of the 19th]. Citing an extremely broad range of sources, the author traces the stages of the invasions of Mongolia, Jungaria and East Turkestan by the troops of the Ch'ing Dynasty between the late 17th century and the 1750's. The conquerors destroyed the independent domains of Mongols, Uighurs and other nationalities. The fate of the Jungar Khanate, destroyed along with its entire population, was particularly tragic. At that same time, Ch'ing China tried to extend its expansion to some parts of Kazakhstan, Central



Asia and South Siberia. These plans failed, however, and the Manchurian Chinese conquerors had to retreat to the Xinjiang empire they had established in the region formerly known as Jungaria and East Turkestan.

An important role was played at this time, as the author demonstrates, by Russia's firm position in defense of the Kazakhs and other ethnic groups. Some of them had already taken Russian citizenship by that time. Many Kazakhs, Altais and Oirats found refuge from the brutal excesses of the Manchurian punitive expeditions in Russian-fortified areas of Kazakhstan and South Siberia. This saved them from being annihilated by Ch'ing Dynasty troops.

In the 1760's, however, the danger of invasion by Ch'ing China's armed forces again arose on the borders of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This even led to an attempt by some of the then Moslem states and holdings to create an anti-Ch'ing military coalition with Afghanistan's powerful ruler, Ahmed-Shah, as its leader. It is interesting, as the author points out, that Ch'ing Dynasty ruling circles viewed the Afghan shah as nothing more than their "vassal." Later, this probably would have served the great-Han chauvinists as a pretext for including Afghanistan among China's "lost lands."

The nature of the interrelations between Ch'ing China and the people of Kazakhstan and Central Asia after the Manchurian Chinese conquerors had established their stronghold in Xinjiang testifies, as the author demonstrates, that the Ch'ing government was never able to gain control over the Kazakh, Kirgiz and Uzbek people and other Central Asian nationalities. These interrelations did not go beyond the bounds of the conventional foreign political contacts the Ch'ing Empire maintained with other states and territories in Asia. The conclusions drawn by the author from Russian and Chinese sources of information prove that the Maoists' claims to some kind of "historical Chinese rights" to Kazakhstan and Central Asia are absolutely groundless.

The author describes how the historical prerequisites were established for the delineation of the Russian-Chinese border in Central Asia, a process which was completed at the end of the 19th century. Here, just as in the Far East, the Russo-Chinese border took shape as a result of a lengthy and complex historical process, which was connected with the entire history of the creation of the multinational Russian Empire and the multinational Ch'ing Empire. This border rests on a solid foundation of legal treaties, and it cannot be shaken by any kind of excursions by Chinese historians into the past history of the Central Asian people.

Therefore, B. P. Gurevich's work, in which the first attempt is made to present a comprehensive discussion of international relations in Central Asia from the 17th century through the first half of the 19th, gives the reader a deeper understanding of the foreign policy of Russia and the Ch'ing Empire on their boundaries in Central Asia and of several

little-researched episodes in the history of the people of Kazakhstan, Central Asia and South Siberia. This will be of great value in exposing the unscientific and speculative theories of the Chinese historians who are trying to "reinforce" the great-power, hegemonic ambitions of the present PRC leadership in Central Asia with references to the past history of this region.

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CSO: 1805

## POLICY OF NATIONAL MILITARIZATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 194-195

[Review by G. A. Alekseyev of the book "Ekonomika KNR: transport, trgovlya, finansy" (The PRC Economy: Transportation, Trade, Finance), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 283 pages]

[Text] The fourth volume in a series of works on the PRC economy has now been published.<sup>\*</sup> The series was written by a group of authors from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy acting as editor-in-chief. The subject of this review contains an analysis of such important topics as transportation, water management, domestic and foreign trade, finance and the financial status of the Chinese workers.

A tremendous quantity of information has been collected and processed for this work, revealing the basic tendencies in the development of these spheres of the Chinese national economy between 1949 and 1975. The sections on the development of transportation, foreign economic contacts and the financial status of the workers deserve special mention. These sections, particularly the third, are noteworthy not only because the analyses they contain are thorough and comprehensive, but also because the methods of analysis are extremely precise. On the strength of this, the authors have been able to reveal the most significant features of the processes they describe.

The reader will find abundant information on these topics. We will only mention two salient features. In the first place, the authors of this work, just as, incidentally, of the entire series, describe the tremendous difficulties of socioeconomic construction in the first years of people's power, connected with the extreme underdevelopment of the national economy in prerevolutionary China, which was destroyed and disrupted in the years of civil war and struggle against Japanese aggression. For this reason, just

<sup>\*</sup> The earlier volumes in the series are: "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii stroy KNR (1949-1975)" [The PRC Socioeconomic Structure (1949-1975)], Moscow, 1978; "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo KNR" [PRC Agriculture], Moscow, 1978; "Promyshlennost' KNR" [PRC Industry], Moscow, 1979.

the very fact that the national economy was reconstructed and a national economic complex, consisting of all the branches important at that time, was established within the first decade after the people's revolution with the aid of the USSR and other socialist countries, and that the urban and rural masses, consisting of millions of people, were given an opportunity to perform useful work and gain a sense of security, provides irrefutable proof that China chose the correct path--the path toward socialism.

In the second place, the information presented in the work proves that the Maoist leadership's departure from the principles of scientific socialism and the experience of the socialist countries at the end of the 1950's took the form of great-power hegemonism and the related strategy of the all-round militarization of economic and social life. In the late 1950's and the early 1960's, when urban and rural areas were being "communized," the entire nation was essentially declared a military camp. Military spending began to grow rapidly in 1963-1965. It amounted to 14.3 billion yuan in 1965--that is, almost double the 1957 figure. There was also a sharp increase in so-called expenditures on science and culture (2 billion yuan), which were used primarily for the production of nuclear missiles. As a result, atomic and hydrogen bomb tests were conducted once in 1964, again in 1965, and three times in 1966 (pp 127-128).

The militaristic and expansionist ambitions of the Beijing leadership were vividly displayed in the development of transportation in the 1960's and 1970's. The military-strategic purpose of railroad construction was increasingly apparent. This construction took place mainly in northeast, southwest and central China. The Beijing press did not conceal the fact that railroad construction in central China was of great importance not only in connection with the economic development of this region, but also for "quicker preparations for war" (RENMIN RIBAO, 25 December 1978). As for the construction in the northeast, the author of this section correctly points out that "this considerable expansion of the railroad network in regions bordering on the USSR was indisputably motivated by military-tactical considerations and provided indirect proof of the aggressive nature of Beijing policy on the Soviet-Chinese border" (p 14).

The intensive preparations for increasing the through capacity of southwestern railroads in the 1960's could have been viewed as an attempt by the Beijing leadership to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American imperialists. In fact, however, this work was being performed for another strategic purpose--to establish prerequisites for future aggressive wars against the Southeast Asian countries. This was corroborated by China's war against the SRV in spring 1979.

The author of the section conclusively proves that the Beijing leadership was pursuing the same great-power expansionist goals in the intensive highway construction of the 1960's and 1970's. This work was also being performed in the same three strategic regions. In southwest China, for example, the new highways did not stop at the borders of neighboring

Southeast Asian countries, but often extended beyond China's borders, onto the territory of neighboring states. In Laos, for example, China built three highways in line with a 1962 treaty. In addition, China built another two highways without the consent of the Lao Government, one extending all the way to Dienbienphu in the SRV, and the other to Pangbeng on the Mekong River.

Considerable highway construction was also carried out in regions bordering on the SRV. The roads leading to the Vietnamese cities of Laokai, Langshon and Mongkai were repaired or rebuilt. As we know, it was these roads that served as the main channels for China's aggression against the SRV in 1979.

The Maoist leadership spent huge amounts on the construction of roads leading into Nepal, Tibet and Pakistan. According to Beijing's plans, this was supposed to guarantee China access through alpine regions to the closest approaches to India. The vigorous highway construction in the border regions of southwest China was also motivated by Beijing's desire to regularly assist separatists and pro-Chinese rebels in the South and Southeast Asian countries, and to prepare the groundwork for the "return" of supposedly lost territories from several other countries in this vast region (p 42).

Since the beginning of the 1960's, Beijing has been reorienting its foreign economic relations toward the capitalist countries. By the end of the 1960's the capitalist states already dominated Chinese foreign trade, both in terms of cost indicators and in terms of the importance of commodities to the Chinese economy (p 186). In the 1970's, China's economic cooperation with the capitalist countries took on unprecedented dimensions. Relying on the assistance of the capitalist countries, the Beijing leadership is trying to create strong military-economic potential. The payment for this assistance is Beijing's rabid anti-Sovietism and its pro-imperialist policy in the international arena with respect to questions of war and peace and the struggle of people for national and social liberation.

The Beijing leadership's foreign economic activity in the last 20 years has served militaristic goals: the emphasis in imports has been on purchases of military technology and equipment, as well as necessary food purchases, while the main purpose of exports is to pay for imports (pp 143-204). Moreover, the artificially created export structure has inflicted considerable harm on domestic consumption.

Chinese domestic trade during this period was calculated to satisfy the minimum living requirements of workers. The Beijing leadership restricted the growth of public purchasing power. It is therefore not surprising that the structure of retail commodity turnover has remained virtually unchanged for two decades: Foodstuffs account for almost half of all consumer goods, clothing and footwear account for around 20 percent, and goods of cultural or educational value account for 15 percent (p 110).



The author of the section on the financial status of the workers quite justifiably believes that the main reason for the difficult living conditions of the Chinese workers is that, ever since the end of the 1950's, the goal of national production has not been the satisfaction of the growing demands of the working masses, but the implementation of the Beijing leadership's great-power militaristic aims. Militarization is restricting the development of civilian industries and the renovation of the agricultural sector.

The work covers the period ending in 1975. In subsequent years, several steps were taken in China toward economic reconstruction and development. "However," as the concluding section of the book correctly points out, "this is not being done for the purpose of returning to socialist forms of control and restoring Leninist standards of economic management, but to escape economic recession at any cost and to escalate militarization for the attainment of great-power hegemonic objectives" (p 266). In its reassessment of methods of national economic control, the Beijing leadership has continued to cling to many Maoist postulates. Whereas the revision of Marxism-Leninism "from the left" was energetically conducted in Mao Zedong's lifetime, a large part of the Chinese leadership began to revise the economic theories of scientific communism from rightist-opportunist positions after Mao's death.

The facts indicate that the present Beijing leadership will not return to the practice of national economic development based on scientific communism and the experience of socialist construction in other countries. "A move to a truly socialist system of management and to democratic forms of planning in the PRC," the author of the concluding section remarks, "will only be possible if the existing regime is denounced and the course of total national militarization is rejected" (p 267). But this prospect obviously does not please the present Chinese leaders. They do not want to renounce great-power chauvinism or the militarization of economic and social life in the nation.

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CSO: 1805

EXPERIMENT IN NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 195-197

[Review by T. A. Yakimova, candidate of historical sciences, of the book "Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika: uverennaya postup'" (Mongolian People's Republic: Confident Progression) by Ye. P. Bavrín, Moscow, 1980, 64 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

## THE USSR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 197-200

[Review by S. K. Stasov of the book "SSSR, SShA i narodnaya revolyutsiya v Kitaye" by A. M. Ledovskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 215 pages]

[Text] The Chinese people had to overcome tremendous difficulties and make countless sacrifices on the way to liberation from foreign enslavement and the bourgeois-landowner dictatorship of the Kuomintang. A particularly difficult time was the period of Japanese invasion, which lasted almost 14 years. After the Japanese occupants were driven out of the country, a bloody civil war was started by Kuomintang reaction with the all-round support of the United States--this is how conditions in China just before the 1949 revolution are described in the recently published book "SSSR, SShA i narodnaya revolyutsiya v Kitaye" [The USSR, the United States and the People's Revolution in China].

The author, renowned Soviet diplomat A. M. Ledovskiy, spent 10 years (1942-1952) in China in the diplomatic service and then served as a consultant to the Soviet Embassy in the United States, and later as ambassador to Burma. He was an eye-witness of the events he describes in this book.

In his work, A. M. Ledovskiy presents a detailed discussion of the Crimean Conference of the Allied powers and their decisions on problems in the Far East, on Soviet, U.S. and Chinese diplomacy in the concluding stage of the war in the Far East, on the liberation of Manchuria by the Soviet Army in 1945, on the Soviet Union's struggle against the expansionist plans of the United States in Manchuria, on the Soviet insistence that American and Japanese troops be withdrawn from China, and on the founding of the PRC and the consolidation of the people's revolutionary victory.

In an extensive bibliography, the author has painstakingly collected much of what has been published on this subject, including works, little-known to us, by American, Chinese (particularly those working in the United States), English and Japanese authors.

It is noteworthy that the author has used important primary sources, both Soviet and foreign. Information conveyed to the U.S. Congress, which only began to be declassified in 1967, has been thoroughly analyzed and carefully selected.

On a solid historiographic basis, the author analyzes the topics in question and predicts future developments, boldly entering into arguments with American and Chinese authors. The polemical nature of the book is an extremely important feature of this work.

After defeating Hitler's Germany, the USSR entered the war in the Far East, defeated the Kuangtung Army of the Japanese militarists, liberated Manchuria and forced Japan to surrender. The Soviet Army's liberating mission in the Far East played a prominent role in the fate of the national liberation and democratic movements in the Asian countries, including China. The Soviet Union aided in the growth and reinforcement of Chinese revolutionary democratic forces and in the establishment of the Manchurian revolutionary base. Its consistent policy forced the Americans and Chiang Kai-shek's troops to disarm and expel the Japanese, hastened the withdrawal of American troops and wrecked the plans for direct U.S. military intervention in China.

All of the political fabrications spread by Western and Beijing propaganda in regard to Soviet-Chinese and American-Chinese relations at the end of the war in the Far East and in the first postwar years look particularly unattractive in comparison to the facts. The wave of fabrications rose quite noticeably in the late 1960's and early 1970's in connection with the "new policy" declared by the U.S. Government in relations with China. This policy was calculated primarily to strengthen the rift created by Mao Zedong and his supporters between the PRC and the USSR and other nations of the socialist community, and to use China's isolation for imperialist purposes. This is how the United States wants to take revenge for the failure of its expansionist policy in China in the second half of the 1940's.

In line with this "new policy," attempts are being made to revise the traditional view of American official circles and bourgeois historians in regard to the events in China, as well as American policy in this country, particularly during World War II and afterward.

In connection with this, people in the United States are taking another look at documents and materials, paying special attention to the letters, diaries, memoirs, dispatches and other papers of several American political and military figures, diplomats and journalists. The testimony of American diplomats, journalists and scholars who spoke before U.S. congressional committees during the McCarthy era to expose the flaws of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and express doubts about the irreproachability of the American line of unconditional support for this regime, is back in the public eye. Now the authors of many publications are regretting

Washington's failure to listen to the advice of these individuals and are harshly criticizing the Chiang Kai-shek regime after the fact. They are saying it is unfortunate that the United States did not break off relations with Chiang Kai-shek at that time and did not reach an understanding with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai when they were willing to cooperate with Washington.

By criticizing figures in the American Administration of the late 1940's, A. M. Ledovskiy writes, "the initiators and apologists of the 'new policy' are trying to reduce the matter to mere tactical errors on the part of American diplomacy and individual officials and to divert the attention of the American and world public away from the main fact, which is that U.S. policy toward China was imperialist (as it still is even today) and could not be otherwise due to the very nature of the American State; this policy was resolutely rejected by the Chinese people, who were able, with Soviet support, to wreck U.S. political maneuvers in China and prevent the United States from conspiring with Mao Zedong and his group" (pp 10-11).

The Soviet Union's policy toward China was the direct opposite of this. From the very first days of its existence, the USSR expressed feelings of friendship and warm sympathy for the Chinese people. The USSR was the first state to base its political and economic relations with China on the principles of complete equality and respect for sovereignty. After the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the birth of the Soviet State, the ideals of October and the very existence of the USSR had a tremendous effect on the development of the anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement in China. Soviet policy toward China was deservedly commended by the leader of the Chinese people, Sun Yat-sen, who was completely aware of the vital need for Soviet-Chinese friendship and always advised the Chinese people to strive for its comprehensive development and reinforcement. In a message sent to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR just before his death, Sun Yat-sen wrote: "I firmly believe in the immutability of the support you have always given my country."

The Soviet Union completely lived up to the Chinese people's expectations, as expressed in Sun Yat-sen's dying words. During the words of China's most difficult trials, when the Japanese militarists vented their aggression against China, the Soviet Union was the only power to stretch the hand of friendship out to the Chinese people. The USSR took a firm and resolute stand, calling upon all peace-loving people to join the struggle to restrain the Japanese aggressors. The Western powers, on the other hand, did everything within their power to prevent the acceptance and implementation of the Soviet Government's proposals.

Among the numerous issues analyzed in the book, the following are of particular interest.

Much has been written in the Soviet Union and abroad about the Crimean conference of the leaders of the three powers. In these publications,



however, the authors have concentrated on questions connected with the end of the war with Hitler's Germany and postwar regulation in Europe. The negotiations pertaining to the Far East have been discussed much less. Western bourgeois historians, particularly the Americans, have written much more about this, but their works are often tendentious in nature.

The author of "SSSR, SShA i narodnaya revolyutsiya v Kitaye" analyzes the diplomatic struggle over the decisions made regarding the Far East. American diplomacy made a massive effort to prevent the acceptance of the Soviet Union's stipulated terms for its entry into the war against Japan or to restrict them by means of various provisos. In addition, the United States, supposedly on the pretext of helping the Soviet Union to conduct military operations against Japan, insisted on its military presence in the Soviet Far East. All of this was done in pursuit of one of its main objectives--to keep the Soviet Union and its armed forces from carrying out their historic liberating mission with regard to the people of China, Korea and other Asian countries.

Soviet diplomacy shattered these plans at the Crimean conference and promoted the kind of Far East agreement that would be in the national interest of the USSR and would simultaneously fit in with its internationalist duties.

The Soviet-Chinese talks connected with the drafting and conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 14 August 1945 are described in detail in the work. Earlier Soviet publications did not analyze this matter in such great detail and only mentioned that the treaty was concluded. The author of this book describes the difficult struggle that Soviet diplomacy had to wage to disrupt the plans of the United States and Kuomintang China to revise the Yalta agreement on the Far East. The United States tried to revise the terms specified in the Yalta agreement for Soviet-Chinese accord in order to give American imperialism access to Manchuria and prevent its transformation into the main base of the Chinese revolution.

Soviet diplomacy defended the basic, fundamental provisions of the Yalta conference and recorded them in the Sino-Soviet treaty, including the stipulation regarding the complete sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic, to which the Chinese delegation, supported by Washington, voiced the loudest objections at the talks.

This was a fair treaty, guaranteeing China's liberation from Japanese aggression as quickly as possible and paving the way for all-round Soviet cooperation with China in the postwar period. The treaty specified that neither side could enter into negotiations with Japan or conclude a separate peace treaty, which was primarily in the interests of China, as the victim of Japanese aggression. The treaty also stipulated the joint adoption of measures to prevent new aggression and render mutual assistance in the event of an attack on either side.

The provisions of the treaty testify that the Soviet Union did not have the slightest intention of seeking any kind of advantageous bargains with the enemy against the interests of its partner, particularly such a weak partner as China was at that time.

The author presents new information, taken from recently declassified documents of the U.S. State Department and Congress, to expose the activities of American diplomacy and the American military establishment. These activities were essentially intended to launch a campaign of military intervention, set up a sea blockade, dismember China and accomplish other hostile objectives. This aggressive policy pursued the goal of preventing the development of the Chinese revolution from the very beginning.

After Japan's surrender, two diametrically opposed foreign policy lines clashed in China: the Soviet Union's line of supporting the Chinese people in their struggle for complete national independence, the prevention of civil war and the democratic development of China, and the imperialist U.S. line of subordinating China to the interests of American monopolies, suppressing democratic forces and strengthening the reactionary Kuomintang regime.

The author describes Soviet diplomacy's extensive, purposeful and vigorous activity in support of the Chinese revolution. Soviet diplomacy was able to subvert the imperialist plans of the United States--its plans for military interventions which were hostile and dangerous to the Chinese people.

After Japan's surrender, the United States hastened to send large contingents of armed forces to China. In all, around 113,000 troops were sent here. This was done on the pretext of helping the Chinese Government disarm the Japanese and expel them from the country. Later events showed, however, that the main purpose of this action was a show of U.S. military strength in Asia to influence the political situation in China and support the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

The Americans and the Kuomintang were not in any hurry to disarm and evacuate the Japanese. They were hoping to use the Japanese in the struggle against the CCP and democratic forces in China. The Japanese kept their weapons and continued to control the cities and regions they had occupied, blocking the way of CCP troops. Furthermore, in several cases, Chiang Kai-shek used the Japanese, with the knowledge and complete approval of the Americans, in combat operations against people's revolutionary forces.

The presence of American troops in China fit in with the plans of U.S. military-political strategists in the Far East. They were trying to gain control over all major ports and island support bases from Taiwan to Malaya in order to solidly establish themselves here for a long time. The situation was complicated by the fact that the American actions were

supported by the Chiang Kai-shek government, which did not want the American troops to leave.

The Soviet Government waged a resolute struggle for the withdrawal of American troops and the immediate disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese.

With the firm and active support of the USSR and Soviet diplomacy, the Chinese people were able to force the United States to evacuate all of its armed forces from China and expel all Japanese occupation troops.

The thoroughness with which the author analyzes the state of affairs in China in the second half of the 1940's and the early 1950's and the actions of Soviet diplomacy to guarantee the triumph of the Chinese revolution and to reinforce the international positions of the PRC is largely a result of the 10 years, from 1942 to 1952, the author spent in the diplomatic service, during which time he witnessed the events taking place in China and in the Far East as a whole. The author's personal observations and excerpts from his diary were useful to him as a supplement to the abovementioned Soviet and foreign sources and materials when he was writing this book.

There is no question that A. M. Ledovskiy's book will arouse the interest of the party aktiv, lecturers, propagandists and the general public and will give them a more precise and clear understanding of the history of the liberation movement in China in the difficult and crucial period of the late 1940's, of the period following the founding of the PRC, and of the role played by the USSR and the United States in these events.

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## CHINESE POLICY IN RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 201-203

[Report on science conference held 25-27 March 1980 in Moscow]

[Text] On 25-27 March an all-union science conference was held in Moscow to discuss "Chinese Policy in Relations with the Developing Countries." The conference was organized by the Institute of the Far East (IDV) of the USSR Academy of Sciences in conjunction with the Oriental Studies Institute, the Africa Institute, the Latin American Institute and other scientific establishments in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Vladivostok. Sinologists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the SRV, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland and the CSSR participated extensively and actively in the work of the conference along with Soviet scholars and expert sinologists. Conference participants were welcomed by Vice President P. N. Fedoseyev of the USSR Academy of Sciences and First Deputy Section Chief O. B. Rakhmanin of the CPSU Central Committee.

Director M. I. Sladkovskiy of the IDV, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, called the conference to order.

In his speech, Academician P. N. Fedoseyev stressed that the development and intensification of the world revolutionary process and one of its important facets--the national liberation movement--have been accompanied by the increasingly precise disclosure of the definite significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in this process. In these days of festivities commemorating the 110th of V. I. Lenin's birth, he said, we will redirect the attention of all thinking people to the theory propounded by Vladimir Il'ich in regard to the national and colonial question, to the significance he attached to the liberation, anti-imperialist struggle of the people in the colonial and dependent countries, and to the fact that it was precisely V. I. Lenin who defined the basic laws of this struggle and the laws of its interaction with world socialism. In these days, we will also direct the attention of all communists and democrats, all patriots and internationalists to the Beijing's leadership's betrayal of the great Lenin's instructions regarding the interaction and mutual dependence of components of the world revolutionary process. Maoist policy

toward the developing countries provides irrefutable proof that Beijing's actions in this sphere are not only inconsistent with the internationalist functions of the proletarian state and the alliance of these states, but is even becoming increasingly hostile to them. In this respect, PRC policy cannot be called an element or variation of international socialist policy, as it is diametrically opposed to the role the socialist alliance has been called upon by history to play in the world.

In his speech, First Deputy Section Chief O. B. Rakhmanin of the CPSU Central Committee stressed the great importance of scientific cooperation by Soviet sinologists with their colleagues from the socialist countries in the collective analysis of Chinese affairs under the conditions of the serious complication of the international situation brought about by China's rapprochement with imperialism. Beijing is no longer serving extreme imperialist reaction as just a yes-man. It is now taking on the functions of its military and political stooge. The Chinese leadership's policy is still provocative, chauvinistic and antisocialist. The tripod supporting Maoist ideology and policy still consists of hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and "Sinized Marxism." Moreover, Beijing, as the facts testify, is displaying a tendency to activate precisely these aspects of Maoism. This is why ideological irreconcilability to Maoism, the demonstration of the injuries inflicted by Maoist policy on China's development and the exposure of the Maoist "model of socialism" will be of great internationalist assistance to the cause of socialism in China and to Chinese communists. The line of China's Maoist leadership is becoming increasingly hostile to the Asian, African and Latin American people's cause of national liberation and social progress.

Professor V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences, reported on "The Antisocialist Foreign Policy Line of the PRC in Relations with the Developing Countries."\* Noting the increasingly important role of the developing countries in today's world, the speaker stressed that both imperialist forces and the Beijing leaders, conducting parallel and coinciding policy lines, tried to exploit the problems of these countries in their own geopolitical interests in the late 1970's and early 1980's. This kind of policy, aimed at curbing the growing independence and socioeconomic development of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, and at forcing them to serve the interests of imperialism and hegemonism, is fundamentally inconsistent with the objective needs of the developing countries and diametrically opposed, by its very essence, to the consistently friendly position of the socialist countries. Citing the data of a thorough analysis of the PRC leadership's policy toward the developing countries, the speaker pointed out the need to expose the increasingly active hegemonism of the Beijing rulers, which could pose a serious threat to the cause of national liberation and social progress in the

\* The report presented by Professor V. A. Krivtsov is printed in full in this issue of the magazine.



developing countries, and stressed the internal inconsistency and adventurism of Beijing's social-chauvinistic foreign policy line.

Conference participants listened with interest to a report by A. G. Yakovlev (IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences) on "The Pro-Imperialism of Maoist Foreign Policy Strategy During Different Stages of Its Evolution." Comparing the content and methods of Beijing's diplomatic activity in the late 1950's, the 1960's and the 1970's, the speaker revealed the internal "logic" of Maoist foreign policy's evolution from covert nationalism to anti-Sovietism and alliance with imperialism and world reaction. Yakovlev cogently revealed the actual purpose of the Maoists' frenzied "ultra-revolutionary" pretenses and the provocative role of their foreign policy line in the late 1950's, with which the Maoists essentially tried to conceal the aggressive nature of imperialism and its role as the real source of military danger by depicting it as a force which supposedly had a "vital interest in peace." At the same time, the Maoist tactics of those years revealed a desire to undermine the unity of world socialism and the revolutionary forces of the present era and, consequently, a willingness to "take on part of the most important permanent function of imperialism, which it had not always been able to perform effectively on its own." These moves by Beijing diplomacy, the speaker stressed, attest to "the Maoists' constant knowledge of the inevitability of a confrontation with the revolutionary forces of the present era and, consequently, the inevitability of interaction with imperialism." The indirect pro-imperialism of the late 1950's was replaced by increasingly overt pro-imperialist behavior in the 1960's and 1970's. As early as 1960, the Maoists had already opened their "second front" of struggle against socialism, revealing that the targets of the main thrust of Maoist and imperialist strategy were identical.

General matters pertaining to the theme of the conference were also analyzed in depth in the report of the GDR delegation, "On the Effect of the Present PRC Leadership's Cooperation with Imperialism on the Developing Countries," presented by Doctor B. Kaufman (Humboldt University). Pointing out the characteristic features of Beijing's foreign policy strategy, the speaker stressed that "the Chinese leaders hope to use the alliance with the United States and the assistance of imperialism to gain a new running start for the attainment of their hegemonic goals on the regional and global scales, goals which they, using various methods and changing partners, have futilely been pursuing since the end of the 1950's." The policy of the PRC toward the developing countries, which essentially consists in turning these countries into a reserve of world imperialist, antisocialist and anti-Soviet forces, should also be examined within the context of this strategy. Beijing propaganda has completely denied its widely publicized statements about the leading role of national liberation forces in the world revolutionary process. The volume of Chinese aid to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America has been radically reduced and the nature of this aid has changed. It has obviously become an instrument of hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and pro-imperialism and is now given primarily

to pro-Western reactionary regimes. The new tactic includes attempts to direct the movement for non-alignment into anti-Soviet channels, ASEAN into anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese channels, and so forth. The Chinese leaders are urging the developing countries to cooperate with imperialist blocs and centers of the capitalist economy and are simultaneously doing everything within their power to intensify the "export of counterrevolution" and subversive activity against countries with progressive regimes, coordinating this activity with imperialist strategy. This policy is diminishing the PRC's authority in anti-imperialist circles, but it is also dividing these forces, and it would therefore be a serious mistake to count on the automatic failure of Beijing policy.

Comrade Pham Duc Dhiong, head of the SRV delegation, noted in his speech that "the victory of the three Indochinese countries is a victory of the wisdom, faith and conscience of the present era and is also an example of the correct and creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the practices of Indochina and Asia as a whole." It is precisely this fact that is disturbing those who are trying to extend the "Chinese model" to Asia (and beyond). Under these conditions, the Maoists are serving as the assault force of counterrevolution and reaction. "The victory of the revolution in the three Indochinese countries," the speaker stressed, "is a mirror reflecting the reactionary essence of Maoism and Mao as a traitor and imperialism's accomplice." Beijing's policy toward the developing countries was quite clearly exposed by its actions in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

The report by Doctor of Historical Sciences Estrella Rey (Cuba) contained an analysis of Beijing's search for ways of allying itself with reactionary forces in Latin America. Rey stressed that the entire history of Maoist policy and Maoism's stooges in Latin America and the Caribbean testifies to a direct connection between Beijing policy and the actions and position of North American imperialism in this region. It was here that the Maoists began to form pro-Beijing schismatic groups in the 1960's to promote the policies of the Chinese leaders. After the failure of this tactic and the change of the general atmosphere in this region and the rest of the world, the PRC began to take actions aimed at the ultimate isolation of socialist Cuba and the alienation of the liberation movement in this region from world socialism, employing for this purpose primarily official diplomatic means, cooperation with ruling circles in certain countries and attempts to create a rift in the movement for non-alignment. This led to confusion in pro-Chinese and Maoist groups, but they nonetheless remain a political reality, and the resistance of them is an important factor contributing to the unity of revolutionary and progressive forces in Latin America and the Caribbean countries.

The results of studies of the general characteristics of Beijing policy toward the developing countries were discussed in reports on Beijing's maneuvers with regard to the movement for non-alignment, in connection with the struggle for the new international economic order and security

problems in Asia. The facts cited by speakers at the conference irrefutably attest to the Beijing leaders' intention to subordinate these movements and the decisions made on world problems to the selfish interests of Beijing and its political leaders, and indicate that PRC policy is essentially subversive in regard to all of these issues and has displayed the obvious desire to give them an anti-Soviet interpretation.

Speakers at the conference also analyzed specific trends and methods of PRC policy toward the developing countries in detail. In his speech, Ye. D. Stepanov (IDV) discussed the territorial border disputes between the PRC and developing countries, revealing Beijing's chief objective in Asia--the creation of its own sphere of political influence on this continent, for the attainment of which "cartographic aggression" has been assigned the role of the first step in the exertion of pressure on neighboring states, the continuation of expansion and the instigation of conflicts.

Another form of PRC expansion in Asia involves the use of subversive pro-Beijing organizations in China's neighboring countries. On the basis of abundant factual material, R. M. Aslanov (IDV) exposed the anti-people essence of these (often armed) organizations in India, Burma, the Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand and other Asian countries. He described Beijing's "pragmatic" policy toward these organizations as double-dealing, and spoke of the ability of Chinese "experts" in subversive activity to deny their agents and leave them to the mercy of fate.

The report presented by T. M. Kotova (IDV) analyzed the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie's cooperation with Beijing. She presented a thorough analysis of three tendencies in Beijing policy in regard to this matter: the involvement of this bourgeoisie in the process of "modernization," the activation of its influence in the politics of its host country, and the employment of this bourgeoisie as a channel for rapprochement with the developed capitalist countries and ruling circles in the developing countries. Kotova revealed the historic limitations of this policy--its political, economic and ideological limits.

Beijing's hostile actions against Afghanistan and the countries of Indochina and Southeast Asia and the maneuvers of Chinese diplomacy in relations with India and the countries of the Near and Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean were exposed in reports and speeches by Soviet and foreign speakers at the conference. Detailed reports on these matters were presented by representatives of the SRV, Poland, the CSSR and Mongolia.

These reports and speeches demonstrated that studies by scholars from the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries have exposed the PRC's expansionist policy in the developing countries and have cited specific examples to reveal the pro-imperialist essence of Beijing foreign policy as a whole.

In his concluding speech, Director M. I. Sladkovskiy of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences summed up the results of the discussion and drew the following conclusions:

The Beijing leadership is not only continuing to ally itself with imperialist and reactionary circles, conducting a line parallel to theirs, but is also assuming the obligations of imperialism's assault brigade;

Although the Beijing leaders do not have the necessary technical and economic potential to truly assist the developing countries, they are trying to prevent cooperation between the nations of the socialist community and the developing countries and are paving the way for the imperialist monopolies' penetration of the Third World;

Beijing's aggression against Vietnam and Kampuchea, its provocation of conflicts on the Indian and Burmese borders and its involvement in the imperialist aggression against the people's democracy of Afghanistan testify that the Beijing leadership is beginning to carry out specific expansionist plans for its neighboring countries in Asia.

Beijing's great-Han expansionist policy line poses a direct threat to the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the developing countries and is a serious obstacle to their social progress.

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SCIENTIFIC-THEORETICAL CONFERENCE ON 'THE NATURE AND PECULIARITIES OF THE  
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRC'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 204-205

[Report by I. N. Korkunov, candidate of economic sciences, on conference held 24-25 April 1980 in the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] On 24-25 April 1980, a scientific conference was held in the Institute of the Far East (IDV) of the USSR Academy of Sciences to discuss "The Nature and Peculiarities of the Current Economic and Social Development of the PRC." The conference was addressed by First Deputy Section Chief O. B. Rakhmanin of the CPSU Central Committee, Academician A. M. Rumyantsev, Corresponding Member M. I. Sladkovskiy of the USSR Academy of Sciences and representatives of Moscow city organizations.

At plenary sessions of the conference, reports were presented by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. I. Akimov on "Some Aspects of Current Economic Development in the PRC," Professor Ye. A. Konovalov, doctor of economic sciences, on "The Specific Workings of the Objective Laws of Socialism in the PRC," Candidate of Economic Sciences I. N. Naumov on "Aspects of the Methodology for Studying the Economic Basis in the PRC," Candidate of Economic Sciences I. N. Korkunov on "The Economic Role of the State and the Program of 'Four Modernizations' in the PRC," Candidate of Economic Sciences E. P. Pivovarova (IEMSS [Economics of the World Socialist System Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences) on "An Inquiry into the Social Orientation of the Program of 'Four Modernizations,'" Candidate of Economic Sciences A. P. Morozov on "Some Problems of Economic Construction in the PRC" and Candidate of Economic Sciences V. S. Milonov (INION [Scientific Information on Social Sciences Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences) on "The Discussion of Economic Problems in the PRC Press."

In addition to the plenary sessions, lively and productive discussions took place in two sections: 1) "The Nature of the Economic Basis, Social Class Structure and Economic Policy of the PRC"; 2) "The Basic Current Economic Problems of the PRC."



A broad variety of socioeconomic problems in today's China was examined at the conference, and the present economic policy of the Chinese leadership and possible variations in the nation's future development were analyzed from a Marxist-Leninist, scientific standpoint.

Speakers pointed out the fact that, when the PRC leadership set forth the program of "four modernizations," it was only planning to develop productive forces, ignoring the need to improve production relations and the societal superstructure which was devastated during the "Cultural Revolution."

The events of the last 2 years have proved that the planned rates and volumes of industrial development were unrealistic, resulting in the need to revise the program. Speakers noted that the PRC leadership has acknowledged the inefficiency of existing forms of national economic control and is trying to make more active use of economic leverage--specialization and cooperation, division of labor, the profit and financial incentive mechanism, and the training of scientific and technical personnel.

Although all of these innovations have some external similarity to previous forms of production management and organizations (dating back to the first decade of the PRC's existence), they are being implemented within the framework of the Maoist militaristic line of adapting the economy to the general great-Han strategy.

Speakers also discussed the recent appearance of several fundamentally new features of domestic economic policy, attesting to the increasing threat posed to socialist elements in the economic basis of the Chinese society and indicating the possibility of a new and dangerous stage of economic erosion. The line of national militarization and the use of collective means of production for antisocialist purposes have brought about a profound socioeconomic crisis in the nation. The growth rates of industrial branches unconnected with military production have constantly declined, agricultural production is incapable of satisfying the food requirements of the rapidly growing population, and industry cannot satisfy the nation's need for raw materials. The military bureaucratic regime has made radical changes in the nature and goals of production, as well as in exchange, distribution and consumption--the main components of the economic basis. Now that the Chinese leaders have ignored the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism, defining the goals of production, for so long, the working masses are virtually alienated from the results of their labor. The bases of socialist production relations, laid in the first decade of the PRC's existence, have been destroyed.

Conference participants also gave serious attention to the recent rebirth of the multistructural economy and the promotion of petty bourgeois practices and private ownership in China on the pretext of establishing a "economic system" which supposedly corresponds to the specific conditions of China, and of searching for new ways of "breathing new life" into the

economy. In view of the working class' isolation from authority, the brittle social structure, the PRC's break with the socialist community and its identification with the capitalist countries, the most important socio-economic gains of the Chinese workers are in danger. This tendency is attested to by the active promotion of various types of private enterprise, the establishment of "family" trade and industrial enterprises, and Beijing's demands for a "planned economy combined with a market economy" and a "green light" for independent craftsmen. It is also attested to by the fragmentation of cooperative ownership as a result of the assignment of labor and administrative functions to so-called "worker links" and even individual holdings. Members of the national bourgeoisie are being actively encouraged to engage in economic operations, and the bank deposits and property confiscated during the "Cultural Revolution" have been returned to them.

China's foreign economic ties, speakers stressed, are aimed at the intensive militarization of the country. It is obvious, however, that the attempted all-round modernization of the economy will be incompatible with the militarization of the country. The PRC leadership is mistakenly relying on the extensive use of foreign credit, technology and equipment for the completion of the program of "four modernizations." To guarantee the repayment of this credit, the Chinese leadership has agreed to the establishment of mixed enterprises, jointly owned by foreign and Chinese capital. So-called "free trade zones" are to be created in China's coastal provinces (Guangdong, Shandong and Fujian), where foreign businessmen will be allowed to conduct trade.

The attempts to use the financial and economic assistance of capitalist countries are creating the real danger that the Chinese economy could become seriously dependent on these countries and that China could be drawn into the sphere of imperialist economics and politics. This would mean that the Chinese workers would be doubly exploited--by their own military bureaucratic regime and by worldwide capitalism.

Speakers noted that the failure of the program of "four modernizations" and the planned line of "regulation" in the next 3 years are the result of a crisis in the economy, which is still lacking in the prerequisites for planned and proportional development. The actual renunciation of this program, however, did not have any real effect on the plans to augment military potential. Direct military expenditures were 3.5 billion yuan higher in 1979 than in 1978.

As a general conclusion, conference participants agreed that the present trends in the Chinese leadership's economic policy and its identification with the capitalist countries will not solve the chief problem in the Chinese economy--the need to raise the standard of living of Chinese workers through the development and reinforcement of the material and technical base and the development of agriculture and other branches of the economy.

The present policy is contrary to the vital interests of the entire Chinese population and serves the purposes of imperialist forces and the Chinese emigrant bourgeoisie. It is incapable of solving the urgent socioeconomic problems facing the nation. This is the reason for the indefinite and uncontrolled nature of all developmental processes in the Chinese society. There is no question that China's rapprochement with the capitalist world will eventually be opposed by the progressive public in this nation.

Conference participants stressed that only the substitution of scientific socialism for Maoism, cooperation with the socialist countries and the renunciation of the plans to militarize China can lead to the real modernization of the country and the creation of a new society.

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COMMEMORATING K. M. POPOV'S EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 p 206

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

COMMEMORATING A. P. ROGACHEV'S EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1980 p 207

[Not translated by JPRS]

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